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This research uses the emergence of the Chinese incineration industry as a case 
study to examine changes in environmental policies in China from 1989–2012. Three 
prevailing models have an unsolved question about which actors contribute to Chinese 
environmental policies. The citizenship awareness model suggests that environmental 
non-governmental organizations can promote environmental regulations. Environmental 
authoritarianism argues that the Chinese state maintains capacities to improve the 
environment. The industrial environmental management model points out that 
proliferation of private regulations can reduce pollution. However, the above models do 
not explain why these actors’ efforts of reducing pollution cannot prevent environmental 
deterioration produced by the rapid economic growth. 
Using the organizational-political economy perspective, this research argues that 
the ability of actors to influence policies are historical variations. I evaluate Chinese 
environmental policies in three periods. The first period from 1989–1997 passed the 
marketization reform of the environmental policy strategy. The second period 1997–2007 
passed BOT public utilities and the renewable energy law. The third period from 2008–
2012 passed incinerator increasing rates and feed-in tariffs. There are four findings: (1) 
changes in political and economic stability affects the state managers and social actors to 
support state general agendas in crises or pursue their interests in economic growth; (2) 
the ability to access the state structures provides channels social actors to influence 




conflicts and exercise power; and (4) social actors who are able to evaluate the historical 
variations in neo-liberalism can define policies that align with the neo-liberal or alternative 
agendas. This research demonstrates that the state and society are embedded and cannot 
separated from one another during decision-making processes. Furthermore, this research 
illuminates that the Chinese incineration market could not be created and operated without 
politics. Incineration corporations’ involvement into environmental policies focused on 








I wish to thank my committee chair, Dr. Harland Prechel, for his guidance and 
contributions throughout the dissertation processes. His valuable insight provided crucial 
theoretical suggestions for this dissertation. I would like to thank my committee members, 
Dr. Robert Mackin, Dr. Ren Mu, and Dr. Nancy Plankey Videla. Each provided 
constructive comments to help me to promote my dissertation. Special thanks to Dr. Lu 
Zheng for being generous with his assistance during my fieldwork in Beijing. 
I also owe appreciation to my parents that have encouraged me in the completion 
of this dissertation. My wife, Hui-min Chen, has been a constant source of love, 
encouragement, and support. Without her, I cannot overcame many difficulties throughout 
the research. 
Thanks also go to my friends and colleagues and the department faculty and staff 





CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES 
 
This work was supported by a dissertation committee consisting of Professor 
Harland Prechel, Robert Mackin, and Nancy Plankey Videla of the Department of 
Sociology and Professor Ren Mu of the Bush School of Government and Public Service. 
All work for the dissertation was completed independently by the student. 
The fieldwork was supported by a grant from Department of Sociology of Texas 
A&M University and a dissertation research fellowship from Chiang Ching-kuo 








ACCA Administrative Center for China’s Agenda 21 
BOT Build-Operate-Transfer 
BCSD Business Council for Sustainable Development 
CFBC Circulating Fluidized-Bed Combustion 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment 
ENGO Environmental Non-governmental Organization 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IPP Independent Power Plant 
LULU Locally Unwanted Land Use 
MAFMPU Measures for the Administration on the Franchise of Municipal Public 
Utilities 
 
MNC Multinational Corporation 
NIMBY Not In My Back Yard 
OIMP Opinion for Increase in Marketization processes of Municipal Public 
Utilities 
PPP Public-private Partnership 
SOE State-owned Enterprise 
TMMPAC Trial Measures for the Management of Prices and Allocation of Costs for 
Electricity Generated from Renewable Energy 
 
UN United Nations 




WTO World Trade Organization 
viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ABSTRACT .......................................................................................................................ii  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. iv 
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES .............................................................. v 
NOMENCLATURE .......................................................................................................... vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ x 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................ xi 
CHAPTER I  INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 1 
Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 
Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 12 
An Alternative Formula: Organizational-political Economy Perspective ................... 20 
Research Design ........................................................................................................... 29 
Data .............................................................................................................................. 34 
Chapter Design ............................................................................................................. 37 
CHAPTER II  POLICY PERIOD ONE: MARKETIZATION REFORM OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY STRATEGY, 1989–1997 .............................................. 40 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 40 
Historical Background, 1976–1988.............................................................................. 43 
Criticism of the UN and World Bank from 1970s–1980s, and the Rio UNCED of 
1992 .............................................................................................................................. 48 
Political and Economic Crisis: The Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 .................... 56 
Efforts towards the Marketization of the Environmental Policy Strategy during the 
Economic Growth Period, after 1992 ........................................................................... 62 
Conclusions .................................................................................................................. 79 
CHAPTER III POLICY PERIOD TWO: URBAN PUBLIC UTILITIES BUILD-
OPERATE-TRANSFER POLICY  AND RENEWABLE ENERGY LAW, 1997–




Introduction .................................................................................................................. 85 
The Asian Financial Crisis and the State-dominated Agenda ...................................... 86 
Efforts at BOT Promotion and the MAFMPU ............................................................. 90 
The Renewable Energy Law ...................................................................................... 109 
Conclusions ................................................................................................................ 117 
CHAPTER IV POLICY PERIOD THREE: 12TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND 
NATIONWIDE FEED-IN TARIFF, 2008–2012 ........................................................... 121 
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 121 
The Previous Policies’ Deficiencies ........................................................................... 124 
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Waning of Neo-liberalism................... 125 
The Incineration Development Agenda ..................................................................... 128 
Nationwide Feed-in Tariff .......................................................................................... 134 
Beijing Incineration Development ............................................................................. 143 
Anti-incinerator Protests in Beijing............................................................................ 154 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 162 
CHAPTER V CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 165 
Changes in Environmental Policies in China ............................................................. 165 
Theoretical Implications ............................................................................................. 174 
Limitations of the Study ............................................................................................. 179 
Directions for Future Research .................................................................................. 181 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 184 





LIST OF FIGURES 
 Page 
Figure 1.1: The Number of Incinerators in China .............................................................. 6 
Figure 1.2: The Volume of Incinerator Treated ................................................................. 7 
Figure 1.3: The Environmental Policies Regarding Incineration from 1989–2012 ......... 11 
Figure 2.1: Actors and Their Political Coalitions Related to the Development of the 
Chinese Incineration Industry, 1989–1997 ................................................... 42 
Figure 2.2: The Relationship between the World Bank’s Strategy and Incinerator 
Project ............................................................................................................ 80 
Figure 3.1: Actors and their Political Coalitions Related to 
the MAFMPU, 1997–2007 ............................................................................ 89 
Figure 3.2: Actors and their Political Coalitions Related to the Renewable Energy 
Law, 1997–2007 .......................................................................................... 110 
Figure 4.1: Actors and their Political Coalitions Related to the Development of the 
Chinese Incineration Industry, 2008–2012 ................................................. 123 
Figure 4.2: The Number of Incinerators in Four Types of Cities in China .................... 142 





LIST OF TABLES 
 Page 
 













Since the economic reform of 1979 in China, the replacement of the planned 
economy of the Mao era with the market economy, labelled market socialism has created 
economic growth (Guo 2013). In 2010, China became the world’s second largest economy, 
trailing only the United States. By 2012, China’s gross domestic product (GDP) was 146 
times larger than in 1979. The private sector became dominant economically (Lardy 2014), 
the relative economic contribution of agriculture decreased dramatically, and rapid 
industrialization and urbanization occurred. The government went through several waves 
of market-oriented reforms, resulting in privatizations and officials’ going into business 
for themselves (Guo 2013; Saich 2016). 
However, China’s economic success has also produced negative social side effects 
(Hsing and Lee 2010), for example, labor disruption, corruption, income inequality, and 
environmental pollution all increased (Economy 2004; O’Brien and Li 2006; Mertha 2008; 
Spires, Tao and Chan 2014). Recently, the Chinese environmental issues received 
significant attention. Numerous international and domestic environmental reports have 
focused on China’s severe problems of environmental contamination (World Bank 2007; 
Gallagher 2013; Asian Development Bank 2015; Albert and Xu 2016). Rohde and Muller 
estimate that air pollution contributes to 1.6 million deaths in China each year, roughly 




Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China posits that 42.7% of China’s 
water resources are severely polluted and over 75% of China’s lakes and reservoirs contain 
water unfit for human consumption (Ministry of Environmental Protection 2010). 
Moreover, serious pollution has caused widespread social discontent, which threatens 
government stability (Nankivell 2006; Mertha 2008). Thus, it has become important in 
recent years to identify the reasons for environmental degradation and offer viable 
solutions. 
Researchers have conducted several studies in response to the growing problem of 
environmental pollution in China. These studies have provided insights into how the 
market reforms contribute to the environmental degradation and have yielded valuable 
information by utilizing different models to analyze specific factors that may alleviate 
pollution in the Chinese social context. Researchers have concluded that recent efforts by 
international institutions 1 , the state, environmental non-governmental organizations 
(ENGOs), or corporations have contributed to the development of environmental 
regulations, mobilization of pollution monitoring, and prevailing private regulations 
(Christmann and Taylor 2001; Lee 2005; Shi and Zhang 2006; Zhu, Sarkis and Lai 2007; 
Ho and Edmonds 2008; Wu 2013). However, the extant literature does not explain why 
 
1 International institutions here mean international organizations that are made up primarily of sovereign 
states and set international agendas. They include the World Bank, the United Nations, the World Trade 




the above listed actors’ efforts of reducing pollution cannot prevent environmental 
deterioration produced by the rapid economic growth. 
The above question remains unsolved because current research does not 
adequately focus on the role of corporations as primary polluters or actors who define 
environmental policies. Rather, researchers assume that the state, ENGOs, and 
corporations are both willing to reduce pollution and able to identify means to do so. The 
extant research focuses on these actors’ efforts to promote environmental regulations, but 
does not sufficiently address whether these policies and advocacy significantly influence 
pollution rates. 
Therefore, this dissertation explores and evaluates the extent to which 
organizational and political arrangements affect environmental pollution. This line of 
research suggests that organizations play the primary role in environmental degradation 
and offers a different perspective on the relationship between the state agendas, structure, 
and environmental policies (Perrow 1997; Prechel and Touche 2014). Environmental 
pollution results from changes in policies defined by diverse groups, which include 
corporations. This line of research in the US shows that corporations exercise their power 
with self-interested, not only encouraging deregulation by environmental authorities, but 
also allying with other actors when their interest coincide. Research in this tradition 
centers on the unequal power possessed by polluters and their influence on decision-
making processes (Held et al. 1999; Prechel 2012; Scherer, Palazzo and Baumann 2015). 
Such research emphasizes how organizational and political-legal arrangements affect 




The Chinese Incineration Industry 
Building on this perspective, my study examines the policy formation process in 
the Chinese incineration industry. The Chinese incineration industry is a coalition 
comprising foreign and domestic private firms and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
engaged in the design, construction, and operation of solid waste incinerators. Industry 
associations represent common interests and operate to unify this coalition. After the 
country’s market reform in 1979, as economic growth and urbanization significantly 
increased the amount of urban solid waste, there was a demand for appropriate solid waste 
treatment in large populous areas. Incineration technology which disposes of urban solid 
waste by burning was a potential solution in China based on several advantages. 
Incineration has several positive characteristics including reducing garbage volume, 
generating electricity, and avoiding the problems of odor and groundwater contamination 
associated with landfills and composting. 
However, incineration also has negative characteristics. First, the burning of solid 
waste produces toxic pollution, specifically carcinogens such as heavy metals and dioxin. 
In the 1980s, environmental agencies and ENGOs in developed countries began to protest 
incinerator construction. Incineration thus was unpopular in developed countries (Pellow 
2007). Second, significant investment and technological requirements make incinerator 
construction unaffordable for many developing countries. 
When incineration markets shrank in developed countries after the 1980s, 
incineration multinational corporations (MNCs) sought new markets. Developing 




After the 1990s, international institutions and incineration MNCs covered up pollution 
associated with incineration and primarily used build-operate-transfer (BOT) 
arrangements to promote incinerator construction within developing countries. According 
to the World Bank, BOT arrangements include public sector franchises to a private 
corporation with the right to build a facility and operate it for a fixed period of time 
(usually 20–30 years) (World Bank n. d.). BOT policies were crucial for the emergence of 
the incineration industry because they allowed international and private funding to invest 
in incineration in developing countries 
With the help of incineration MNCs and international institutions, from 1989 to 
2015, the number of incinerators in Chinese cities increased from one to 220. The volume 
of waste treated by incineration increased to 61.8 million tons/year (See Figure 1.1 and 
1.2). Moreover, national proposals exist to build another 200 incinerators over the next 
decade. At the local level, anti-incinerator protests suspended two Beijing incineration 
projects in 2007 and 2009, respectively. However, the Beijing government has restarted 
these projects in 2012 and has plans for building an additional 10 incinerators in the city. 
China is now the largest incineration market in the world, but the rapid expansion of the 










2 The publication of China Urban Construction Statistical Yearbook was started in 2002. The figures 
cannot show the number of incinerators from 1989–2001. 
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Figure 1.2: The Volume of Incinerator Treated 
 
 
Actors Related to the Development of the Chinese Incineration Industry 
Apart from the increasing amount of solid waste, the development of the Chinese 
incineration industry was the result from diverse social actors’ efforts to change 
environmental policies. The policies included BOT of public utilities, renewable energy 














































feed-in tariff)3. The various affected parties organized political coalitions and allied with 
different state departments in support or opposition of incineration. Since the market 
reform was fundamental to all policies, the pro-reform group appeared in all relevant 
coalitions. The composition of the pro-reform group changed over time, but the core 
members remained fairly constant. The pro-reform group consisted primarily of reformist 
intellectuals and officials, as well as the international institutions that embraced the neo-
liberal agenda of promoting market reforms. When the market reforms focused on BOT 
policies for incineration construction from 1989–2007, the pro-reform group allied with 
private corporations to form the pro-BOT group. After 1997, the pro-reform group allied 
with a hydropower company, the Ertan Hydropower Station, to protest against the State 
Power Corporation’s monopoly on the electricity market. The success of the pro-reform 
group produced a consequence that the hydropower industry aligned with other renewable 
energy industries to promote the renewable energy law. 
In contrast, leftist officials, intellectuals, and socialists mobilized politically to 
form the anti-reform group. During 1989–2007, BOT policies became a core reform 
strategy to privatize public utilities. The anti-reform group aligned themselves with SOEs 
and administrative departments operating public utilities, which formed the anti-BOT 
 
3 Feed-in tariff policies guarantee incineration electricity a price that is above market value to encourage 
incineration investments (Hsu 2012a; Lo 2014). Because feed-in tariff price in China is paid by the 




group. Furthermore, to resist the electricity market reform, the State Power Corporation 
allied with the anti-reform group after 1997. 
After 2007, after the BOT policies and the renewable energy law were ensured, 
actors focused on specific policies of promoting incineration: increasing numbers of 
incinerators and incinerator subsidies. When the influence of the neo-liberal agenda 
declined, local government leaders (especially in cities with serious garbage problems) 
and private incineration corporations ceased promoting the marketization strategy and 
allied with SOEs to form the pro-incineration group. Meanwhile, academics concerned 
with environmental issues, ENGOs and residents concerned by incinerator pollution 
formed anti-incineration groups. In the following chapters, I represent the relationships 
among the actors and political coalitions. 
Research Objectives 
This study conducts empirical analysis in two interrelated parts. First, it explores 
changes in the environmental policy of China’s central government. Second, it examines 
policy changes and practices implemented by the city of Beijing. This research focuses on 
Beijing because: (1) it is China’s capital; (2) it is China’s political center, home to the core 
operations of central and local government; and (3) it has China’s highest concentrations 
of foreign investors, incineration corporations, and environmental groups. By analyzing 
Beijing at a local level, this study will examine the comprehensive interactions among the 
diverse actors involved in policy formation processes. The objectives of this study are to 




environmental policy changes at the central and local administrative levels, (2) restrict 
influences of anti-incinerator groups, and (3) affect the increase of pollution in Beijing. 
I examined the environmental policies regarding incineration from 1989–2012. 
During this period, the Chinese society experienced a dramatic change driven by market 
reforms. The environmental policies related to the Chinese incineration development 
aligned with the market reform practices: From broader strategies to more specific policies. 
After 1989, the marketization reform of the environmental policy strategy established a 
legal framework for the incineration development. This broad and general environmental 
strategy created a new market for the incineration by privatizing urban utilities and 
attracting foreign investments. By 1997, since the broad strategy was ensured, pro-
incineration policies that focused on specific industries were promoted. After 1997, BOT 
public utilities and the renewable energy law were two specific policies for the 
incineration development. Since 2008, identifying incinerator increasing rates and 
subsidies (feed-in tariffs) were two specific policies to determine the rapid growth. 
Therefore, to evaluate key factors to promote these policies, I divided this research into 
three periods:  (1) after the Tiananmen Square protests (1989–1997), (2) after the Asian 















The Marketization Reform 
of the Environmental Policy 
Strategy
•A broad and general legal 
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To understand the policy formation process, I examine the environmental laws, 
administrative rules, and five-year economic plans. All environmental laws in China are 
passed by the National People’s Congress, which comprises representatives of the people 
and superficially resembles the parliament of a democratic country. However, the National 
People’s Congress continues to be controlled by government departments and the Chinese 
Communist Party. Administrative rules include measures, opinions, and notices issued by 
administrative authorities. In China, the chief administrative authority is the State Council, 
which manages departments at the cabinet-level as well as provincial governments. 
Because China remains an authoritarian state, the administration has discretionary power 
to issue rules that transcend existing laws. As administrative rules have significant power, 
the formation processes of these rules become contested terrains among diverse 
departments and social actors (Ran 2015). The origins of the five-year plans lie in a 
planned economy, but they remain the primary national and social development strategy 
after the market reform. The plans are reviewed by the State Council and approved by the 
Chinese Communist Party. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Three major models help explain the development of environmental policies in 
China, namely the citizenship awareness model, environmental authoritarianism, and the 
industrial environmental management model. These models make different assumptions 
about state-society relationships, social actors’ roles in decision-making processes, and 




Citizenship Awareness Model 
The decline in the control of the Chinese authoritarian regime after the market 
reform has encouraged political sociologists to develop a new paradigm to explain policy-
making processes within China (Yang 2004; Ho and Edmonds 2008; Salmenkari 2008; 
Xie 2009; Spires 2011). Drawing on the pluralism and democratization theories, the 
citizenship awareness model describes how weak authoritarian governance allows diverse 
social actors to influence policy (White 1996; Yang 2004; Tang and Zhan 2008). 
The model assumes that: (1) as an authoritarian regime weakens, the state becomes 
increasingly vulnerable as an instrument of interest groups within democratization; and (2) 
social actors have opportunities to pursue their interests (Kennedy 2005; Tang and Zhan 
2008; Liu and Zhang 2010). While some actors are more likely to determine specific 
policies, other actors are able to utilize opportunities and structures for their own interests 
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Ho and Edmonds 2008). 
Using China as an example, the citizenship awareness model demonstrates that 
changes in the Chinese political and economic system allowed ENGOs to affect 
environmental policies. Scholars suggest that ENGOs, seen as relatively weak in terms of 
resources and power, can affect environmental policies (Ho and Edmonds 2008; Hsu 
2012b). Drawing on social movement theories, the citizenship awareness model also 
posits that Chinese ENGOs pursue their goals by using various political opportunities 
(O’Brien and Li 2006), exploiting resources (Becker 2012; Hildebrandt 2012), and/or 




In response to the long term criticism that ignores power actors, one important 
evolution of the citizenship awareness model is to inject the state and power groups into 
the model. Even with this modification, the citizenship awareness model remains unable 
to transcend the pluralist weakness to provide a distinct account of the operations of state 
and different power groups. Hence, several criticisms exist of the citizenship awareness 
model. 
First, the citizenship awareness model described the state as having different roles, 
in authoritarian or democratic countries whereas the state remains an instrument of diverse 
social actors. In recent years, state-centered theories have developed complex and 
comprehensive explanations for the state roles in decision-making processes. State-
centered theorists have argued that the state can overcome conflicts among social actors 
to offer a general agenda (Block 1977b; Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Block 2007). Without 
taking the state seriously, the citizenship awareness model cannot answer many questions, 
such as why state managers can offer a general agenda, especially when social actors have 
intense conflicts of interest, which prevent their provision of common suggestions. 
Second, the citizenship awareness model overlooks differences among social 
actors in access to power and resources. ENGOs’ activities are not in a vacuum. Other 
power groups may compete against ENGOs’ influences. The power elite theory has 
demonstrated that power groups which occupy top positions in the hierarchies of 
organizations, institutions, and inside the government (Useem 1982; Domhoff 1990) can 




compare different power of social groups, the citizenship awareness model tends to make 
an easy conclusion that ENGOs have great influences on policies. 
In short, the citizenship awareness model acknowledges that ENGOs can influence 
environmental policies, especially when the control of authoritarian regimes fades. 
However, the citizenship awareness model tends to overemphasize the political influence 
of ENGOs. The model remains unable to transcend the pluralist weakness to provide a 
distinct account of the operations of the state and different power groups. 
Environmental Authoritarianism 
In contrast to the instrumentalism of the citizenship awareness model, 
environmental authoritarianism (Shearman and Smith 2007; Beeson 2010; Cao and Ward 
2011; Gilley 2012; Eaton and Kostka 2014; Moore 2014) draws on state-centered theories 
to suggest that scholars should “bring the state back in” to better comprehend decision-
making processes (Orloff and Skocpol 1984; Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985). 
State-centered theories suggests that social actors possess conflicting interests and so 
cannot generate common agendas. The state is a crucial mediator of social actors conflicts 
and promotes a general agenda of increasing economic growth (Block 1977b; Block 2007). 
Environmental authoritarians argue that the state determines the transformation of 
environmental policies, especially in countries that have experienced long-term 
authoritarian rules and have solid established bureaucratic systems (Shearman and Smith 





Several studies have used environmental authoritarianism to examine 
environmental policy formation processes in China. For example, Shearman and Smith 
point out that compared with corporations and ENGOs, the bureaucratic system in China 
is relatively efficient and effective. Consequently, the Chinese government enjoys relative 
omnipotence in gathering and weighing information on international pressures, the 
demands of social actors, and challenges faced in national development (Shearman and 
Smith 2007). Scholars offer empirical evidence that the Chinese government has 
dominated environmental policies in response to the significant environmental risks 
(Eaton and Kostka 2014; Moore 2014). Cao and Ward show that the Chinese government 
has responded to efforts to strengthen citizen participation in environmental decision-
making processes by establishing new environmental committees and authorities (Cao and 
Ward 2011). Rather than making policy process more democratic, such expansion of the 
bureaucracy offers more channels for the government to gather information and de-
escalate social discontent (Cao and Ward 2011). 
The power elite theory criticizes that the state-centered theories overemphasize the 
state power and argues that power groups can directly influence the policy-making process. 
For example, MNCs and international institutions possess resources to establish ties with 
state departments and domestic elites to promote policies (Babb 2001; Robinson 2005). 
In brief, the environmental authoritarianism model provides a theoretical 
framework to analyze the state’s crucial role in decision-making processes. This model 
suggests that conflict among social actors negatively impacts their capacity to make 




among social actors. Therefore, rather than being an instrument of social actors, the state 
can unilaterally dominate political and economic agendas. Studies on environmental 
authoritarianism then demonstrate that, after China’s market reforms, the capabilities of 
the Chinese government increased rather than decreased. With sufficient government 
resolve, appropriate environmental enhancements became realizable, benefiting the public. 
However, this model overlooks the fact that power groups possess resources that they can 
use to resist state policies. Moreover, to garner information and seek support, the state 
must establish diverse ties with society. These ties offer platforms for social actors, 
especially resource-rich corporations, to affect environmental policy. 
Industrial Environmental Management Model 
More recently, by incorporating the neo-liberalist claim that self-regulating 
markets create incentives for corporations to distribute common goods efficiently, many 
business leaders, scholars, and politicians have maintained that private regulations and 
voluntary environmental controls offer the best form of environmental protection. The 
argument is that such an approach is effective, easily applied, and can simultaneously 
realize both economic growth and rational ecological protection (Tietenberg 1998; 
Khanna 2002; Lyon and Maxwell 2004; Jordan, Wurzel and Zito 2005; Jermier et al. 2006). 
Advocacy for this approach, called industrial environmental management4, stresses that 
 
4 Scholars use different terms to describe this advocacy, such as industrial environmental management 
(Zhu, Sarkis and Geng 2005), new corporate environmentalism (Jermier et al. 2006), and non-mandatory 




public regulations are not an effective instrument to prevent pollution, but rather harm 
business initiatives and damage long-term economic development and environmental 
protection (Jermier et al. 2006). 
The industrial environmental management model emphasizes that neo-liberal 
reforms are necessary to resolve environmental degradation in developing countries. 
Scholars employing this model track the evolution of private regulations in China. They 
suggest that because China’s neo-liberal market reform helped eliminate government 
regulations and encourage foreign investment. The reform benefited the environment by 
importing advanced-technologically efficient equipment as well as international 
environmental private standards. For example, the country’s environmental performance 
has improved as foreign corporations have introduced international environmental 
standards (Child, Lu and Tsai 2007; Lan, Kakinaka and Huang 2011). Given widespread 
acceptance of ISO 140015 and green supply chain management (GSCM) from developed 
countries, these private regulations have become a mechanism that pressures suppliers in 
China to improve their environmental performance (Fryxell and Lo 2002; Zhu, Sarkis and 
Lai 2007; Zhu et al. 2008). 
Therefore, the industrial environmental management model makes different 
assumptions to the citizenship awareness model and environmental authoritarianism. First, 
the former model suggests a different state-society relationship, which advocates the 
 





elimination of state intervention in the market. Market self-regulation can stimulate 
efficient exploitation of societal resources, technological innovation, economic growth, 
and thus achieve ecological sustainability (Jermier et al. 2006). Similarly, several scholars 
conceptualize the “environmental state,” which suggests that the role of the state with 
regard to environment issues should realize a partnership with the private sector to 
encourage enterprises to innovate pollution prevention (Mol and Spaargaren 2002; Mol 
2007). Second, this model implies that corporations are not strongly motivated to influence 
decision-making processes, except in relation to policies that eliminate regulations and 
directly enhance the market economy. When corporations can realize their desires to 
protect the environment in self-regulating markets, they are unwilling to expend resources 
in pursuit of policy changes. 
The industrial environmental management model’s endorsement of the self-
regulating market has attracted criticism. First, this model ignores how corporations 
pursue changes in political-legal arrangements; moreover, as Polanyi demonstrates, a self-
regulating market cannot exist without the support of political systems. The emergence, 
maintenance, and sustainability of markets involve diverse policies and political 
institutions in the state. Hence, attempts to substitute market rules for public policies, and 
to separate markets from society have had devastating social effects (Polanyi 2001[1944]). 
Finally, policies and political institutions offer social actors unequal access to resources 
and the political system. This encourages corporations to pursue or maintain control over 




In summary, the industrial environmental management model explains how 
corporations will be motivated to protect the environment when market reforms eliminate 
public regulations. However, this model ignores the fact that a self-regulating market 
manifests private corporations to pursue self-interest. The industrial environmental 
management model cannot explain how to identify whether corporations’ efforts to 
deregulate environmental policies are driven by self-interest or a desire to reduce pollution 
(Prechel 2012). 
AN ALTERNATIVE FORMULA: 
ORGANIZATIONAL-POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE 
Organizational-political economy perspective maintains that the prevailing 
literature does give adequate attention to the exercise of organization power in the policy 
formation processes. My research draws on three dimensions of organizational political 
economy. First, society-state relationships do not remain constant and cannot be separated 
from one another (Prechel 2000; Prechel and Morris 2010; Prechel 2012). Second, 
organizational structures inside the state affect the policy formation process. Third, 
historical conditions affect the policy formation process, which become of focus of 
political coalitions. 
The organizational-political economy perspective draws on central themes within 
the modern political economy, including Polanyi’s view that markets are embedded in 
politically, socially, and culturally arrangements (Polanyi 2001[1944]). Markets are not 




affected by organizations outside the state. These arrangements are the outcome of 
compromises among political elites and capitalists. 
In short, there are four interrelated dimensions of social structures relevant to my 
analysis: historical conditions, state structures, political coalitions, and neo-liberal 
ideology. In the following sections, I will elaborate on these dimensions and develop 
propositions from them. 
Historical Conditions 
The organizational-political economy perspective incorporates historical 
contingency theory, which shows that state autonomy and social actors unity change over 
time and this change depends upon historical conditions (Prechel 1990). During crises that 
impact all sectors, almost all social actors are damaged. To find a new state general agenda 
to stabilize the economy, either social actors unite or state managers successfully mediate 
conflicts among these factions. 
However, neither the state nor social actors can guarantee the persistent 
implementation of the new state agenda. Conflicts emerge when (1) the state agenda 
cannot resolve or produces general economic problems, and (2) the state agenda restores 
economic stability. In the former scenario, diverse social actors ally with state managers 
to seek an alternative general agenda. In the latter scenario, several social actors identify 
that the state agenda cannot benefit all economic sectors equally. Because of the 
restoration of economic stability, these actors no longer face a general threat and they will 




This research proposes that in response to changes in economic performance in 
China, (1) the state provided new developmental agendas, (2) foreign and domestic 
corporations mobilized politically and aligned with these state agendas, and (3) during 
periods of political and economic stability, several social actors worked to redefine these 
state agendas. Accordingly, Chinese environmental policies were fashioned by the state, 
as well as foreign and domestic incineration corporations. 
Proposition 1: Changes in political and economic stability are historical 
conditions that the state managers and social actors support state general 
agendas in crises or pursue their interests in economic growth. 
State Structures 
The organizational-political economy perspective perceives the state as an 
organization with broad and diverse authorities. The structure of this complex organization 
is not isolated from society; and its agendas are not only determined by state managers, 
but also by the actions of corporations, civil organizations, and political elites (Prechel 
2000; Woods and Morris 2006; Prechel 2012). Moreover, the state organizational 
structures are not static, and actors attempt to reform state structures to access decision-
making processes. 
To facilitate market-based economic growth, China represents a unique set of 
historical contingencies. This study suggests that the reform of the Chinese state creates 
significant opportunities for political coalitions to dominate policy formation processes. 
This argument is consistent with research by political sociologists that suggests a high 




function of markets creates demands for a rational and efficient bureaucratic state (Weber 
1968). The Chinese government employed numerous waves of administrative reforms to 
promote the market economy. The core of these reforms was to withdraw government 
intervention from economic issues and shift the responsibility of administration from 
intervention to macro control. Hence, the reforms attempt to decrease the number of state 
officials and make macro control more efficient and rational. However, as administrative 
organizations shrink, the administration become less able to collect information and make 
rational decisions in the ever-expanding market economy. To promote rational policies 
and maintain value neutrality in decision-making processes, the authorities change their 
structures to better access market information. This is accomplished by involving experts 
in decision-making processes and outsourcing to policy research institutions the task of 
administering various surveys (Zou 2004; Guo 2007; He 2008). 
However, Weber argues that bureaucratic structures do not exclude policy 
influence by special interest groups, despite increasing the access of power groups to 
policy-making channels. Weber also argues that establishing consulting teams is a type of 
collegiality (Weber 1968). The consulting teams in bureaucratic structures cannot 
completely mitigate the influences of social groups as well as promote democracy. As 
Weber explains: “Collegiality is in no sense specifically ‘democratic.’ Where privileged 
groups have had to protect their privileges against those who were excluded from them 
they have always attempted to prevent the rise of monocratic power” (Weber 1968). In 




the outsourcing of surveys to policy research institutions do not result in professional and 
neutral advices, but merely allow powerful outsiders to influence decision-making. 
Hence, I posit that the ability to access the state organizational structures 
determines the influences of social actors on policy formation processes. When the 
Chinese government demands investment, technology, and market resources from 
international institutions and corporations, these actors became able to utilize the state 
structures to promote pro-incineration environmental policies. To protest incinerator 
projects, ENGOs also pursue close connections with the state structures. Given its 
enormous resources, I suggest that the Chinese incineration industry can easily utilize the 
state structures to pursue its interests. 
Proposition 2: Social actors with substantial resources are able to utilize the state 
structure as channels to assess decision-making processes and promote 
pro-incineration environmental policies. 
Political Coalitions 
According to the organizational-political economy perspective, political coalitions 
are a key consideration in evaluating the policy influence of social actors. This issue is 
important because it relates to how political coalitions transcend internal conflicts to 
engage in common actions with other social actors (Prechel 1990; Akard 1992). The 
organizational-political economy perspective suggests that organizations represent 





There are three general types of organizational mechanisms that mitigate the 
conflicts to influence policies. First, organizations with large resources represent a 
significant ability to collaborate with social actors both inside and outside the state 
(Therborn 1978; Offe and Wiesenthal 1980). MNCs and international institutions 
generally have significant resources to ally with domestic elites via investments, funding, 
financial compensation, and positions in exchange for those elites applying their influence 
to local policies (Babb 2001; Robinson 2005; Ranganathan and Prechel 2007). Second, 
organizations with diverse ties with other actors are more likely to share information and 
conduct negotiations that is relatively free from conflicts to establish a political coalition 
to promote policies. The ties include (1) individual levels that organizations’ leaders share 
similar backgrounds and experiences with other social actors, and (2) organizational levels 
that organizational have interlocking corporate directorates, common shareholders, and 
financial ties (Useem 1982; Useem 1984; Mizruchi 1987). Third, cross-firm organizations, 
such as policy-planning organizations or industry associations, are responsible for 
pursuing general opinions. They collaborate with other actors to establish several 
mechanisms, such as conferences and forums, to produce common policy suggestions 
(Dreiling 2000). The political influences of these three types of organizations vary across 
different historical conditions. 
Based on the above arguments, I propose that the ability to establish an integrated 
and broad political coalition affects the capacity of social actors to influence incineration 
policies. The Chinese incineration industry established a coalition with foreign firms, 




by a profound social transformation that has allowed corporations and industry 
associations to build ties with other actors. This social transformation has involved 
changes in state structures and educational reforms, as well as privatization, and the 
opening of markets to foreign investors (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Huang 2002; 
Walder 2003; Lieberthal 2004; Li 2006; Fayong 2008; Jing 2008; Li 2008).  I suggest that 
incineration corporations have established industry associations that could ally with other 
social actors to influence policy. 
Simultaneously, ENGOs in China formed a coalition with similar groups overseas, 
grassroots activists, professors, urban residents, journalists, and state officials as the anti-
incinerator group. This group had potential to engineer policy changes, such as by 
allowing public participation in project planning and suspending incinerator projects. 
However, because the Chinese government treated such environmental coalitions as a 
potential threat to authoritarian control, they are forced to remain informal coalitions, 
which tend to enjoy limited success against strong industrial-state coalitions. 
Proposition 3: Pro-business political coalitions, which are able to mitigate inter 
or intra conflicts and have close ties with state officials, can exercise far 
more influence on pro-incineration environmental policy. 
Neo-liberal Ideology 
As a political-economic ideology, neo-liberalism is a set of ideas to establish 
guidelines for political systems and economic behavior. When neo-liberalism superseded 
Keynesianism as a political-economic ideology in the 1970s, it did so as an alternative 




aligned (Prechel 2000; Prechel and Morris 2010; Prechel 2012). Neo-liberalism is critical 
of Keynesianism, which prescribes that the state plays a crucial economic role.6 To foster 
individual freedoms and private property rights, advocates of neo-liberalism prescribe 
deregulation, privatization, and the abolition of social welfare. Since the 1970s, from the 
organizational-political economy perspective, neo-liberalism has served to legitimize the 
behaviors of the state and social actors, which follows the principles of neo-liberal 
ideologies (Prechel 2000; Prechel and Morris 2010; Prechel 2012). Therefore, the 
organizational-political economy perspective argues that neo-liberalism offers an 
incentive and legitimacy for corporations and their allies to redefine the political-legal 
arrangements in which they are embedded. Moreover, after the financial crisis of 2008, 
neo-liberal ideology attracted heavy criticism. The organizational-political economy 
perspective suggests that when neo-liberal ideology can no longer offer an agenda for 
promoting economic growth, the state, corporations, and other actors mobilize politically 
to define new political-legal arrangements. 
After the market reform, neo-liberalism has influenced all sectors in China, 
including social movements (Cox 1983; Fisher 1997; Frank, Hironaka and Schofer 2000). 
 
6 In the period of Keynesianism, there was similar influences of the political-economic ideology on the 
policy formation processes. Bunker’s study shows that the modernization strategy, as an important 
ideology after the 1950s, encouraged the Brazilian government to accept economic agendas pursued by 
international institutions and foreign and domestic capitalists. These agendas resulted in heavy debts 
borrowing from international institutions and produced outcomes that exploited natural resources and 




Research has demonstrated that neo-liberalism shapes the strategies of social movement 
groups. However, different national contexts affect the strategies adopted by social 
movement groups and the outcomes achieved (Liu 2006; Hadler and Haller 2011). In 
democratic countries such groups face challenges from the state, corporations, and pro-
neo-liberal social groups funded by corporations and other elites (Ford 2003; Wallance 
2004; Alvarez 2009; Wright 2012; Carroll 2014). In contrast, in authoritarian countries, 
such as China, the neo-liberal market reform reduces state controls, supports private sector, 
and introduces foreign aid. This opening of political space allows social movement groups 
to gain resources and employ collective actions to pursue their interests (O’Brien and Li 
2006; Zhao 2010; Matsuzawa 2011). 
Consequently, this research suggests that historical variations of prevailing 
political-economic ideologies affect the behavior of social actors. I posit that the 
prevalence of the neo-liberal ideology legitimized the political mobilization of the pro-
reform and pro-incineration groups. They could change the central and local government 
policies, including the privatization of public utilities and subsidies for incineration 
facilities. Neo-liberalism also contributed political space to anti-incineration groups. I also 
posit that the global financial crisis of 2008 caused Chinese political elites and 
corporations to doubt the neo-liberal ideology. These doubts created divisions and led to 
the emergence of several factions, each promoting a different new political and economic 
agenda. With the anti-incinerator group lacking a single coherent agenda, it found it 




Thus, I propose the following arguments. First, alignment with the neo-liberal 
agenda legitimatizes reformists, incineration corporations, and other pro-incineration 
actors to define pro-incineration environmental policies. Second, the anti-incinerator 
group in China use political spaces created by neo-liberalism to enforce environmental 
regulations. Third, when the economic recession of 2008 made neo-liberalism vulnerable 
to challenge, the adoption of a pro-SOE strategy by political elites and SOEs increased in 
legitimacy. Fourth, the diminished legitimacy of neo-liberalism made it difficult for 
private corporations to oppose the pro-SOE strategy, and encouraged them to align their 
interests with those of SOEs in defining a new developmental agenda. Finally, the anti-
incinerator group which could not align with the new agenda that emerged after 2008 or 
offer an alternative were unable to change environmental policies. 
Proposition 4: The pro-business groups are able to evaluate the historical 
variations in neo-liberalism to define pro-incineration policies that align 
with the neo-liberal or alternative agendas. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This study uses a historical case study method to analyze the relationships between 
social actors’ actions and social structures during historical transitions. Weber’s multi-
causality methodology argues that social changes not only result from economic factors, 
but also include political, organizational, ideological, legal, and cultural forces (Kalberg 
1994; Kalberg 2012). Weber further argues that causal forces that influence social actions 




change, researchers should examine multiple causal forces and historical conditions that 
affect the associated degree of causality (Kalberg 2012). 
The above four theoretical-driven propositions will guide the examination of three 
distinct policy periods: (1) after the Tiananmen Square protests (1989–1997), (2) after the 
Asian financial crisis (1997–2007), and (3) after the global financial crisis (2008–2012). 
This study identifies specific patterns that characterize the actions of the state, 
corporations and other social actors. 
The Case Study 
Historical case study methods contribute to sociological studies by facilitating the 
examination of contextual effects within complex social processes (Ragin and Zaret 1983; 
Yin 2017). However, case study research, especially involving only single case studies, 
naturally raises questions about generalizability. Although such questions are important, 
the contribution of case study research rest on whether a case is typical or atypical, as well 
as why case’s similarities and differences with other research’s samples are theoretically 
important (Prechel 1994; Yin 2017). The Chinese incineration industry is unique with two 
crucial characteristics. First, the Chinese incineration industry simultaneously belongs to 
both the public utilities sector and the environmental protection industry. The state 
maintained controls over the public utilities even while allowing privatization because of 
its importance to the citizen lives. There are SOEs and private corporations in this sector. 
As a component of the broader environmental protection industry, the incineration 




environmental norms, and provided an example for other sectors. In addition, incinerators 
in China have confronted anti-incinerator groups’ resistance. 
Second, the Chinese incineration market has grown faster than any other such 
market in the world. A thorough examination of the Chinese incineration industry can 
provide insights in how the competing goals of corporate profits, solid waste problem 
resolution, and increased pollution have been solved via competing groups’ policies. 
This historical case study is valuable because it provide insights into the policy 
formation process. This study employs both the historical document analysis and interview 
methods. 
Historical Document Analysis Methods 
The historical document analysis method fits with the setting in China. First, it is 
difficult to locate accurate and consistent quantitative data while most Chinese 
incineration corporations are unlisted. Second, this research attempts to reflect the 
methods through which the state and social actors reach policy decisions during three 
study periods of time. Because no available survey covers every period, it is difficult to 
conduct survey research to identify the previous attitudes, motivations, and beliefs of 
interviewees (Klandermans and Smith 2002). Third, this study attempts to examine how 
social structures offer opportunities and incentives for the state and social actors to 
influence policies, yet numerous mechanisms link outcomes with the behavior of social 
actors. Therefore, document analysis is well suited to the historical case study method for 
exploring insights relating to the causal processes and mechanisms that link factors and 





To facilitate the data reliability, the historical document analysis method is 
supplemented with interviews. First, the analysis of documents provides data on the 
broader historical context, changes in environmental policies during specific periods, and 
the relationships between social actors and the state. Interviews provide information on 
interviewees’ experiences and interpretations of policy formation processes to verify 
document analysis. 
Second, interviews verify the contexts of available documents and expand the body 
of reliable documents. Moreover, some documents, such as formal statements produced 
by the state or social actors, may contain constructed narratives that do not represent the 
genuine behavior of organizations and ignore how other members interpret historical 
events (Blee and Taylor 2002). Comparison of documents to the narratives of interviewees 
can also provide more reliable data by filtering some of the constructed narratives used to 
influence the public and state actors. In addition, reliable information is offered by formal 
records, including –– but not limited to –– meeting minutes, official documents, and 
annual reports of listed corporations, public notices, and historical reports. In China, some 
of these documents are inaccessible or only rarely accessed by the government. The 
interview process offers access to formal records collected by interviewees directly 
engaged in decision-making processes (Weimer and Vining 2011). 
Third, interview methods allow the use of snowball sampling to access more 
potential interviewees. Snowball sampling contributes abundant information from a pool 




linkages because interviewees are encouraged to provide contacts until no additional 
interviewees are mentioned (Diani 2002). Snowball sampling offers a means to reach key 
persons responsible for environmental policy (Ostrander 1995; Farquharson 2005). 
However, interviews possess few disadvantages that may produce serious bias. 
This study addresses the weaknesses of interviews by the following ways. First, interviews 
may include inaccurate information, for example when interviewees deliberately give 
misleading answers or suffer memory lapses (Mikecz 2012). A well-prepared document 
analysis can help in correcting the responses of interviewees during both the interview and 
the coding processes (Patton 1999; Mikecz 2012). For example, key policymakers’ media 
interviews and their biographies represent important materials in identifying interviewee 
responses. 
Second, gathering documents from interviewees may receive selective or 
inappropriate data (Merry et al. 2010). Researchers can check obtained data through 
comparison with other documents and interviews. If the researchers evaluate that the 
interviewees should have other documents, they can arrange follow-up interviews. Next, 
if this fails to obtain further records, the study should report this situation and acknowledge 
the limitations of the records. 
Third, the snowball technique tends to produce sampling errors. Interviewees may 
offer contacts from their own networks, who in turn offer similar interpretations of events, 
resulting in research with one-dimensional interpretation. Thus, a researcher must 
establish a strategy of maximum variation sampling, which includes a set of criteria 




2006). Driven by theoretical perspectives and research objectives, document analysis can 
identify potential interviewee groups. By using snowball sampling with interviewees from 
diverse groups, researchers can access multi-dimensional kinds of information. 
In brief, the historical document analysis method presents a causal narrative of a 
case by gathering data, assessing their reliability, and extracting findings (Lange 2013). 
This method can also identify the validity of the mechanisms of diverse theories and 
examine their hypotheses, thus making it a better solution to deficiencies in other methods 
and a means of detailing the historical transitions (Ragin 1987; Lange 2013). This study 
employs document analysis and interviews as two complementary methods that together 
can garner reliable data. 
DATA 
The empirical data for this study are obtained from an analysis of document and 
interviews. In the document analysis, this study focused on policies, public statements and 
formal records. Policies and public statements were collected from webpages, libraries, 
and databases. They were created by central and local governments, social organizations, 
and crucial actors. These statements from crucial actors, especially department leaders, 
were of enormous importance for this study because articles by departmental leaders 
influenced public opinion, legitimatized self-interest, and refuted oppositions. They 
provided more detail on policy formation processes than other public sources (Stockmann 
2010). Articles of departmental leaders were also important sources for many China policy 
studies. However, while articles by departmental leaders may produce bias, this study 




Formal records include, but are not limited to, meeting minutes, official documents, 
and listed corporations’ annual reports and public notices. Some records are retrieved 
through webpages and archival databases, such as planning permits related to construction 
engineering, the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank’s online archives, and 
corporations’ annual reports and public notices. In the Chinese setting, certain seldom 
accessed documents, such as meeting minutes and official documents, may be more 
reliable than articles by department leaders and public notices (Diamant 2010). I obtained 
this data from two sources. First, I collected them from interviewees during the interview 
processes. Since the collection of documents from interviewees may produce bias, I 
performed document analysis and conducted further interviews to examine the integrity 
and reliability of the data. Second, I collected this data from Shenzhen Database Net and 
Chaoxing Net. In recent years, these two database services have scanned books and 
documents from libraries throughout China, including libraries of government 
departments. Relatively unknown, these two useful sources allowed me to collect several 
important documents that were unique and reliable. In addition, I collected media reports 
and biographies of key persons, which offered a broader picture of historical contexts and 
allowed me to verify the interviewees’ responses. 
The interviews primarily included officials, CEOs and managers of incineration 
firms, professors, and leaders of ENGOs (see Appendix A: Interview List in detail). The 
interviews were conducted in Beijing from May to July 2016, and involved 27 
interviewees. I used two strategies to ensure a diverse and representative sample of 




actors in every sector related to my research (Ostrander 1995; Farquharson 2005; Goldman 
and Swayze 2012). Because of the difficulty in accessing key policymakers in China, I 
interviewed journalists in China whose networks encompassed enterprises and 
government officials. These journalists not only had knowledge of the incineration 
industry, but also could identify figures from my lists who might be easily contactable. 
Then I successfully recruited a few officials and incineration industry leaders. Second, I 
asked the above contactable interviewees for referrals to other actors, including both those 
I had listed and others not listed. In this way, I not only recruited almost all the potential 
interviewees from my lists, but also overcame the limitation of the recruitment identified 
from the document analysis. Using these two strategies, I successfully interviewed 
relevant figures in every sector. 
More importantly, in developing the interview list, I considered the past work 
experiences of interviewees, and during each interview would ask further questions about 
this. This step is important because China policy scholars suggest that retired officials or 
those who have taken up new positions are often more willing to share details of their 
previous work history (O’Brien and Li 2006; Ran 2015). Therefore, my interviews 
included the experiences of interviewees at both their current and previous positions. 
Naturally, this approach is limited by interviewees having incomplete memories of 
previous work experiences. To collect reliable interview materials, I conducted document 
analysis to correct interviewee responses during both the interview and coding processes 




Prior to the interview, I provided an information sheet or consent form in English 
and Chinese for the interviewees. The interviewees were also informed that they could 
withdraw from the study at any point. All the interviews lasted one to two hours and were 
audio-recorded. All the interviewees in this dissertation are pseudonyms to provide greater 
anonymity and human subject protection. Each interview was reviewed for data related to 
these areas to verify the content of the interviews and for the purpose of arranging follow-
up interviews. The quoted interviewees in this research were translated from Chinese into 
English by the researcher. 
CHAPTER DESIGN 
As stated above, this research elaborates on the three distinct periods of time during 
the policy formation processes in the Chinese incineration industry from 1989 to 2012. In 
Chapter II, I provide the domestic and international historical context before 1989. Then I 
examine how China transformed its environmental strategy from command-and-control 
socialist regulation to a market strategy during 1989–1997, so providing the fundamental 
legal foundation for the emergence of the Chinese incineration industry. I demonstrate that 
the Tiananmen Square democracy protests of 1989 contributed to a political and economic 
crisis that the Chinese Communist Party decided to repress the protests. After the elites 
decided to employ the repression to resolve the political chaos, they found that the 
repression created other economic problems and became split over an appropriate agenda 
for further reform. Reformists allied with MNCs and international institutions to promote 




especially regarding parts of the privatization of urban infrastructure to invest in 
incineration. 
Chapter III presents the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and its impact on the 
behaviors of the state and social actors. The state’s bailout policies won support from 
social actors and saved China’s economy from disaster. However, the bailout also 
decreased private investment and production, created in a power surplus and caused 
conflict between the state-owned electric power corporation and independent power plants 
(IPPs), including incinerators. Two new energy agendas were created by an alliance 
between IPPs and reformist officials: the separation of the state-owned electric power 
corporation in 2002 and the renewable energy law in 2005, which offered subsidies to 
incinerators. During the same period, the experiences of practices regarding the 
privatization of the Beijing urban utilities established a political coalition between Beijing 
officials and the private sectors. After some officials were promoted into the central 
government, the coalition played an important role in passing a nationwide legal 
framework related to urban utilities privatization. This legal framework was crucial for 
the development of the Chinese incineration industry. 
Chapter IV elaborates on the impact of the global financial crisis of 2008. This 
crisis forced the state to provide an economic bailout policy supported by corporations, 
including the incineration industry. Although the bailout policy decreased the number of 
BOT projects, private incineration corporations did not promote privatization policies. 
Because the crisis created doubts regarding the neo-liberal ideology, it benefited SOEs, 




aligned with SOEs to influence incineration policies. Finally, in the same period, the 
consequences of booming incinerators produced pollution and spurred anti-incinerator 
protests. 
In the concluding chapter (Chapter V), I present the theoretical findings and the 





POLICY PERIOD ONE: 




This chapter analyzes the policy formation process how the Chinese government 
decided to substitute the marketization of environmental policy strategy for command-
and-control socialist regulations from 1989–1997. This strategy was a broad and general 
agenda that was promoted by MNCs and international institutions at the United Nations 
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro (1992). The 
strategy was important because it established the Chinese incineration industry from 
scratch. It effectively promoted a set of policies to privatize urban utilities, attract foreign 
investment and create new markets Specifically, three important policies were passed 
during this period: (1) the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) legal framework, (2) private 
environmental pilot projects, and (3) import of environmental technology, including 
incineration, from MNCs (Figure 2.1 shows social actors and political coalitions related 
to the strategy). 
Using the organizational-political economy perspective, this chapter explores how 
the Chinese pro-reform officials, MNCs, and international institutions established a 
political coalition of the pro-reform group, utilized the state structures, and aligned with 




strategy. The sections of this chapter are designed as following. First, I will introduce the 
domestic historical background and the characteristics of environmental and solid waste 
policies before 1989. Second, I will explain how MNCs aligned with pro-business UN 
officials to define a pro-marketization of global environmental policies, namely, Agenda 
21, at the UNCED in 1992. Third, this chapter will explore why the Tiananmen Square 
Protest in 1989 led the Chinese government to accept Agenda 21. Fourth, this chapter will 
illustrate how the pro-reform group succeeded in promoting a BOT legal framework. Fifth, 
I will demonstrate how the pro-reform group affected solid waste policies in Beijing and 





Figure 2.1: Actors and Their Political Coalitions Related to the Development of the 
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, 1976–1988 
After Mao Zedong’s death in September 1976, Chinese political elites sought to 
end the chaos of the Cultural Revolution. Hua Guo-feng, Mao’s designated successor, 
allied with several senior leaders and the military to define a new state agenda. First, in 
October 1976, this alliance arrested the “Gang of Four,” who were treated as the instigators 
of the Cultural Revolution, with the subsequent trail bringing the Cultural Revolution to a 
symbolic end (Lieberthal 2004; Vogel 2011; Saich 2016). Second, to maintain his position, 
Hua Guo-feng aligned with pro-Mao socialists in support of continued pursuit of Mao 
Zedong’s “class struggle” socialist agenda. Consequently, in 1977, Hua Guo-feng became 
the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (Vogel 2011). 
After Hua Guo-feng’s alliance successfully stabilized China’s political and 
economic situation, its socialist agenda was challenged by the pro-reform group. Led by 
Deng Xiao-ping, the pro-reform group argued that market-oriented reforms were a only 
way for China to develop economically and escape its status as one of the world’s poorest 
nations (Vogel 2011). Conflicts between Deng and Hua factions peaked at the annual 
central committee meeting of the Communist Party in 1978, namely the 3rd Plenary 
Session, and eventually, Deng Xiao-ping’s faction emerged victorious. Hua Guo-feng 
resigned as the party leader, and the market reform and opening-up of agenda was adopted 




ping became the paramount leader of China in 1979 and continued to implement the 
market reforms announced the 3rd Plenary Session (Pantsov and Levine 2015).1 
After the market reform agenda became official policy in 1979, the pro-reform 
group employed a moderate strategy and avoided radical market reforms to privatize SOEs 
that may damage economic stability. Before 1989, the reform had a greater effect in rural 
agriculture than in urban industrial areas to protest the interests of SOEs (Saich 2016). 
Under this moderate strategy, the pro-reform group established several important political-
legal arrangements that established the market economy from scratch and were relevant 
to the future development of the incineration industry. First, China permitted individual 
traders to operate, allowing urban and rural residents to run businesses. Second, the 
Chinese government employed the first step in the reform of SOEs, namely transferring 
SOEs into independent entities and expanding autonomy. By using the neo-liberal claim 
that administrative management was inefficient, China started to separate administrative 
controls from enterprise management (Zheng Qi Fen Kai) (Qian 1996). In this way, some 
SOEs ceased to rely on governmental funding and became responsible for their profits and 
losses. Third, the opening up market reform policies reversed China’s international 
isolation and encouraged China to attract foreign investment and technology. In 1980, 
China became a member of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
1 Although Deng Xiao-ping never formally served as the head of the state, the government, or the Chinese 
Communist Party, he remained China’s de facto leader of China from the 3rd Plenary Session until his death 




During this period, China realized that it lacked the power to influence international 
policies. Therefore, China participated in international conferences with the aim of 
learning international political-economic operations (Kent 2002; Johnston 2014). The pro-
reform group aligned with this learning approach in the field of national industrialization 
pursued loans for pilot projects to upgrade the efficiency of SOEs. As a result, experts 
from international institutions became advisors who offered suggestions on general 
economic reform policies (World Bank 2005a). 
These political-legal arrangements were important because they changed the state 
structures and created new social actors (i.e., individual sellers, private and state-owned 
corporations, and international institution advisors). Although the ability of these new 
actors to influence policies remained weak in this period, their importance would 
gradually increase (I will elaborate their roles in the following parts of my dissertation). 
Environmental and Solid Waste Policies from 1979–1989 
From 1979–1989, the Chinese government prioritized economic growth and did 
not offer a comprehensive environmental strategy. During this period, the Chinese 
environmental policies had two interrelated characteristics. First, environmental policies 
followed the concept of “grow first, clean up later.” The restatement of this, the Chinese 
government focused on the economic development to solve basic problems of food and 
clothing (Ran 2015). Several environmental regulations passed in this period were not 
enforced and presume that they would be implemented after the economic growth (World 




Second, environmental policies were influenced by the socialist legacy. 
Environmental policies fulfilled symbolic functions (Xu 2016), serving as political 
propaganda through leaders that demonstrated their concern for the environment (Ran 
2015). Additionally, environmental policies continued to involve command-and-control 
regulations. For example, SOEs were required to upgrade low polluting technologies. 
However, SOEs controlled by central and local governments were unwilling to follow 
environmental policies. Therefore, the governments acted as both polluter and regulator. 
The environmental command-and-control policies were inefficient and difficult to 
implement (World Bank 1992). 
Solid waste policies in this period were also influenced by the prioritization of the 
economic growth and the socialist legacy. First, China maintained a socialist solid waste 
strategy that treated garbage as a viable resource. In the Mao era, the Chinese government 
promoted a re-use approach to reduce waste (Feng 2007). The government established a 
used-goods reclamation system that allowed poor families to earn extra income by selling 
used bottles, paper, metal and so on (Cen, Li and Randles 2006). After the reform, the 
composition and volume of solid waste underwent a significant change (Wang and Nie 
2011). The previous waste management system proved inadequate to deal with solid waste 
that included increasing volumes of plastics and textiles. However, the Chinese 
government continued to emphasize the re-use approach throughout the 1980s in this 
slogan: “Comprehensive utilization of resources, transfer waste into resources” (Cen, Li 




Second, when the re-use approach failed to reduce the increase in solid waste, 
which grew from 31.3 million tons annually in 1980 to 63.9 million tons in 1989 (Wang 
and Nie 2011), the Chinese government employed socialist command-and-control waste 
policies For example, the government established waste allocation guidelines and 
suggested centralized treatment. However, local governments prioritized economic 
development and did not allocate funds for solid waste treatment. Given that land use 
remained relatively non-intensive throughout the 1980s, open dumping of solid waste in 
urban fringe areas became a primary solution and local governments were unable provide 
systemic solid waste treatment strategies (World Bank 1992). 
Third, the implementation of the re-use approach, waste allocation guidelines, and 
centralized treatment was responsibilities of different local administrative departments. 
These departments were responsible for the ultimate fulfilment of solid waste policies, but 
were not authorized to investigate the factors behind the increase in solid waste or offer a 
comprehensive solid waste strategy. Toward the end of this period, in 1988, the Ministry 
of Construction was established and tasked with management of solid waste problems in 
urban and rural areas. The establishment of this Ministry showed that the Chinese 
government first identified the relationship between the market reform and increasing 
solid waste and then appointed a department at the central administrative level to solve the 
solid waste issue (Chen, Geng and Fujita 2010). 
In short, during this period, the Chinese government recognized the conflict 
between economic development and environmental protection. Specially, in the solid 




jeopardizing economic development. Therefore, no systemic solid waste treatment 
strategy existed and solid waste authorities merely attempted to clean up the mess 
associated with economic growth. Solid waste treatment strategy became an issue at the 
end of this period after the Ministry of Construction was established. China planned its 
environmental and solid waste treatment strategies after the Tiananmen Square 
Democracy protests of 1989. 
In the next section, I will elaborate how the UN and the World Bank affirmed their 
neo-liberal environmental strategy. 
CRITICISM OF THE UN AND WORLD BANK FROM 1970S–1980S, AND THE 
RIO UNCED OF 1992 
The repeated economic crises in the 1970s and 1980s significantly affected 
international institutions and MNCs. In response to the stagflation and the large surplus of 
petrodollars brought by the economic crisis in the 1970s (Block 1977a; Helleiner 1994), 
the World Bank employed a new developmental strategy that offered developing countries 
generous loans for infrastructure projects focused on the export of raw materials and 
provision of utility services. The World Bank expected this strategy to combat poverty 
and propel economic growth in developing countries (Goldman 2007). However, it created 
a new crisis. In the 1980s, many developing countries that borrowed substantial amount 
of money from the World Bank could not repay the loans after the prices of raw materials 
dropped (Goldman 2007; Schaeffer 2009). The debt crisis resulted in developing countries’ 




trap (Weaver 2008). By the 1980s, the recurrent economic crises threatened international 
institutions’ developmental agendas and MNCs’ survival. 
In a separate political arena, MNCs and international institutions were blamed for 
global environmental degradation. Western countries began to experience severe pollution 
after the two decades of rapid economic growth that followed World War II. This led to 
the emergence of domestic ENGOs, which mobilized to pressure governments and 
polluting corporations. According to Longhofer and Schofer, more than 1100 domestic 
ENGOs were established in industrialized countries during 1965–1975, almost equaling 
the number established during 1950–1964. Furthermore, ENGOs pressured 
administrations in Western countries to pass environmental regulations (Longhofer et al. 
2016). 
As environmental problems became globally significant, domestic ENGOs in 
different countries formed alliances, leading to the emergence of transnational ENGOs 
that aimed to proactively deal with global environmental issues (Inglehart 1977; Bernstein 
2001; Clapp and Dauvergne 2011). The 1970s witnessed the establishment of a significant 
number of transnational ENGOs, such as Greenpeace, the Natural Resources Defense 
Council, and Friends of the Earth. While established originally as US and Canadian 
organizations, these groups developed international reach during the 1970s. The 
developmental strategies of MNCs and international institutions with their prioritization 
of economic growth over all else were criticized for causing environmental degradation. 
For example, environmental groups complained that the World Bank’s projects ignored 




and Tierney 2003). Transnational ENGOs urged international institutions to develop 
environmentally friendly development agendas (Princen and Finger 1994). 
In response to numerous political challenges from environmental groups, the UN 
and the World Bank employed several reforms to demonstrate their concern for the 
environment. For example, in 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment (Stockholm Conference) established the United Nations Environment 
Programme to prevent ecological degradation. In 1983, in response to continuous pressure 
from environmental groups, the UN held an important international conference, the World 
Commission on Environment and Development. In 1987, this conference released the 
“Brundtland Report”, formally titled Our Common Future. This report concluded that the 
weak bargaining power of developing countries led to MNCs posing a threat to the global 
environment and to interlocking crises involving the environment and economy (World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987; Hecht 1999). After the Brundtland 
report, environmental groups focused their efforts on another crucial international 
environmental conference, the Rio UNCED. 
A Contested Terrain: The Rio UNCED 
In response to strengthened environmental regulations and the upcoming Rio 
UNCED, 48 world business leaders (including leaders of incineration companies) created 
the Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD) in 1990 (Welford and 
Casagrande 1997). Organized by Dr. Stephan Schmidheiny, a Swiss industrialist, the 
BCSD stated its aim as being to “provide advice and guidance to the UNCED secretariat 




Future 1990). As Schmidheiny expressed, the primary objective of the BCSD was to 
promote the neo-liberal claim that markets created incentives to address economic and 
environmental problems simultaneously. The BCSD announced its agenda as being “to 
recognize that market-based instruments belong in our portfolio of environmental and 
natural resource policies” (Schmidheiny 1992). 
The influence of BCSD on the UNCED was associated with its ability to organize 
a political coalition within the UN body. During the preparation ahead of UNCED, the 
BCSD utilized the UNCED policy-making structures and its resources to establish 
coalitions with pro-business UN officials. First, the BCSD changed the UNCED’s policy-
making structures. For example, Maurice Strong, the UNCED Secretary-General, was also 
a leader in the Canadian oil and mineral industry (Bruno 1992a; Masood 2015).2 Strong 
used his relationships with MNCs, to have BCSD chairman, Dr. Schmidheiny appointed 
as the principal adviser for the UNCED (Welford and Casagrande 1997). The BCSD’s 
public relations consultant, Burson-Marstellar, was also appointed to assist the UNCED’s 
public relations. Second, the BCSD succeeded in persuading the UNCED secretariat to 
allow MNCs to donate funds to support UNCED operations (Wurst 1992; Chatterjee and 
Finger 1994). According to Wurst’s estimation, approximately one  fifth of the UNCED’s 
expenditure, or US$16.9 million, was funded by corporations, including numerous heavily 
 
2 When Strong served in the UN, he also acted as a leader of Canadian oil and mineral companies (Bruno 
1992a; Masood 2015). This background allowed him to establish close business ties with MNCs (Chatterjee 




polluting MNCs (Wurst 1992). The Earth Summit Times reported the observation of a UN 
Staff member that although corporations had donated to UN events before, the scale of the 
assistance given to the UNCED was unprecedented (Fraser 1992a; Gould 1992). 
The political coalition of the BCSD and UN pro-business officials transformed the 
decision-making processes of the UNCED. That is, the BCSD was permitted to participate 
in the consultative process of the UNCED, which represented the early stages of 
preparatory meetings (Ekins 1993; Chatterjee and Finger 1994). Through this 
transformation in MNC-UNCED relations and the UNCED’s policy-making structures, 
the BCSD could now impose a neo-liberal agenda during the UNCED’s preparatory 
process and utilize their substantial resources to offer suggestions to the UNCED 
secretariat (Chatterjee and Finger 1994; Doyle 2010). 
In contrast, although more than 700 ENGOs from 164 countries created the Global 
Forum as an alliance to monitor and participate in the UNCED, they could not match the 
influence of the BCSD (Fraser 1992b). The Global Forum could not establish a political 
coalition with the UNCED officials and utilize the UNCED policy-making structures as 
the BCSD did. During the UNCED, members of the Global Forum were aware of the 
BCSD’s increasing influence on the UNCED (Greenpeace International 1992; Adams 
2001). In response, the Global Forum proposed increasing regulations on MNCs and also 
criticized the close relationship of the UNCED secretariat with MNCs (Fraser 1992d; 
Greenpeace International 1992). However, because the Global Forum had limited 




Committees (Bruno 1992b), its efforts at augmenting the UNCED agreement were weak 
and ineffective (Fraser 1992e). 
To summarize, utilizing the political coalition with the UNCED’s pro-business 
officials and diverse channels to access the decision-making processes, the BCSD 
successfully inserted its neo-liberal agenda into Agenda 21 passed by the UNCED in 1992. 
With this move, the BCSD successfully reversed a political tendency of blaming MNCs 
and international institutions for global degradation and economic problems. Consistent 
with neo-liberalism, Agenda 21 concluded that sustainable development can only be 
achieved through free trade, privatization, and investment by MNC, and public-private 
partnerships (United Nations 1993; Chatterjee and Finger 1994; Doyle 2010). 
The World Bank’s Reform and the Rio UNCED 
By the 1980s, the World Bank’s projects had been heavily criticized by 
environmental groups for damaging the ecological systems and economies of developing 
countries (Chatterjee and Finger 1994; Goldman 2007). In response to such criticisms, the 
World Bank announced a lending policy reform that made the World Bank Environment 
Department responsible for enhancing project environmental standards. 
However, at this historical juncture where neo-liberalism was the dominant 
economic ideology, the World Bank’s proposed reforms were challenged. This occurred 
in several ways. First, even after the debt crises involving developing countries in the 
1980s, the IMF continued to use its Structural Adjustment Programs as viable solutions. 
Drawing upon neo-liberalism, the Structural Adjustment Programs made lending 




Bank’s economic and financial departments also aligned with these policies. Furthermore, 
because the World Bank Environment Department was small and had limited resources, it 
was forced to follow the guidelines of other departments, especially the Economic and 
Financial Departments (Nielson and Tierney 2003). 
Second, during the UNCED’s preparatory process, the BCSD also influenced the 
World Bank. Being affiliated with the UN, the World Bank was involved in the UNCED’s 
decision-making processes. Therefore, the BCSD’s efforts to alter the UNCED’s policy-
making structures also influenced the World Bank. Expecting that the BCSD’s neo-liberal 
agenda could facilitate the funding of a substantial number of environmental projects, the 
World Bank aligned with the BCSD and pro-business officials at the UNCED, and also 
became a joint partner of the UNCED’s new funding institution, the Global Environment 
Facility (Freestone 2013). The Global Forum criticized the World Bank for fully accepting 
the BCSD’s agenda and merely seeking to maintain its dominance over loan distribution 
(Fraser 1992c). 
As a result, neo-liberalism and the transformation of the UNCED’s policy 
structures affected the World Bank’s reforms, with the result that the World Bank 
Environment Department maintained its previous lending policies, despite those policies 
being heavily criticized. During the UNCED preparatory process, the World Bank 
Environment Department devised environmental strategy papers for developing countries, 
the content of which client countries were required to follow to secure loans. This strategy 
forced client countries to employ neo-liberal reforms, such as market incentive 




The signing of Agenda 21 at the Rio UNCED in 1992 saw MNCs and international 
institutions impose their version of sustainable development on developing countries. As 
a new lending institution, the Global Environment Facility became an essential instrument 
for utilizing loans as leverage to pressure developing countries. Collaborating with MNCs, 
the Global Environment Facility established a performance based resource allocation 
framework to evaluate various environmental projects. The framework incorporated the 
“free-market” into measures where a government “adopted neo-liberal economic policies 
(i.e., liberalization and privatization in the context of strict budgetary discipline)” (Ervine 
2007). 
In summary, although campaigns by environmental groups after the 1970s spurred 
environmental awareness in the world and resulted in the Rio UNCED of 1992, MNCs 
and UN agencies successfully redefined the agenda of sustainable development. This 
section denotes that MNCs mobilized politically to form a political coalition with the 
UNCED secretariat. By utilizing this political coalition, MNCs were able to access 
UNCED’s decision-making processes. As a result, MNCs achieved the aim of sustainable 
development with a neo-liberal agenda, which included privatizing inefficient public 
utilities, importing foreign investment and technology, increasing the loans from 
international institutions, and establishing public-private partnerships. After all the 
countries signed Agenda 21 at the UNCED, the next step for the MNCs and international 
institutions was to impose this version of sustainable development on developing countries. 
In the following sections, I will explore why China agreed with the global environmental 




POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: 
THE TIANANMEN SQUARE PROTESTS OF 1989 
The Tiananmen Square democracy protests was a historical condition that a 
political crisis prompted political elites to seek solutions. Led by Deng Xiao-ping, most 
Chinese Communist Party leaders (including top reformist officials, the anti-reform group, 
and the military) decided to repress the protests on June 4th, 1989. The repression 
identified a state agenda that China’s development must be led by the Chinese Communist 
Party. As a result, discontented social actors were forced to support the regime and few 
reformist officials who supported the protests, including the chairman of the Chinese 
Communist Party Zhao Zi-yan, were arrested. 
Although the event provided political stability, it also produced other political and 
economic shocks. First, Western countries imposed sanctions that halted most of 
international collaborations with China. The sanctions heavily impacted the Chinese 
economy.3 Second, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe worsened China’s international isolation (Robinson 1994; Deng 2005). 
Third, because the repression caused political uncertainty, new foreign and domestic 
 
3 The European Economic Community, the predecessor of the European Union, for instance, declared a set 
of sanctions, including cancelling all high level contact, economic co-operation, and loans (Youngs 2002; 
Giumelli 2013). The United States suspended military sales and commercial exports to China (Freidman 
1989; McFadden 1989; Skidmore and Gates 1997). The World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
determined that they would delay discussions regarding two loans for China and several loans that were 




investment from private sectors declined and the energy of Chinese economic 
development deteriorated (Seo 1993; Chen 2008). 
In response to the shocks, political elites allying with other social actors divided 
into two groups. (1) The pro-reform group consisted of the remaining reformist 
intellectuals and officials expressed their disagreement with political reforms. This group 
insisted that the economic disorder resulted from unfinished market reforms. This offered 
opportunities for corrupt officials and the wealthy to engage in rent-seeking behavior 
(Zhang 2010a). The group allied with international financial institutions to embrace the 
neo-liberal economic agenda and promote further market reforms. (2) An anti-reform 
group consisted of anti-market-reform officials and intellectuals who were leftist and pro-
Mao socialists. The anti-reform group argued that the protests occurred because the market 
reform had produced economic disorder and emerging capitalists had supported the radical 
students. Both groups offered different state developmental agendas. Therefore, the anti-
reform group argued that China should follow Mao’s socialist road map, whereas the pro-
reform group emphasized the deepening of the market reform (Han 1993; Ma 2012). After 
the protest, the influence of the pro-reform group was weakened because few important 
pro-reform leaders were arrested and Deng Xiao-ping maintained his neutrality. As a 
result, the anti-reform was strengthened and sought Deng Xiao-ping’s support in the state 
development agendas. Among the agendas, the environmental diplomacy strategy was 






A Potential Starting Point: The Environmental Diplomacy Strategy 
As described in the previous section, before 1989, China did not promote a specific 
agenda at international conferences and simply participated without leveraging 
environmental diplomacy.4 The initiative for China to employ environmental diplomacy 
was an outcome of the Tiananmen Square event. The repression of the protest in 1989 
maintained the Chinese regime’s stability. However it also produced a new political and 
economic impact, including the international sanctions and the declines in private 
investments. The impact was a historical condition that the pro- and anti-reform groups 
mobilized politically to define new agendas as well as to restore the international 
collaborations. 
By the early 1990s, unlike other international economic and military collaborations, 
the environmental issues (1) did not require political sensitive conditions (i.e., human 
rights and democracy) and (2) was an agenda where international institutions had looked 
to developing countries for participation, especially the upcoming UNCED. Therefore, 
after 1990, the Chinese government decided to employ an environmental diplomacy 
strategy in order to break the international isolations. In short, Chinese elites pursued 
 
4 Based on the documents I collected, environmental diplomacy was not an important environmental policy 
for the Chinese government before the Tiananmen Protest. For example, before 1989, environmental 
diplomacy did not appear on the Environmental Protection Committee’s annual Work Key Points. 




environmental policy as a means to resolve the conflicts with Western countries and 
international institutions. 
The 1990 Work Key Points of the Environmental Protection Committee5 indicated 
the importance of participating in the UNCED and applying for environmental projects 
with the World Bank, UN Development Programme, and the UN Environment 
Programme (Environmental Protection Committee 1990). The Chinese government 
negotiated with the World Bank to loosen the environmental loan limitations in 1990. The 
World Bank issued the first step, “strategy development assessment”, in their 
environmental lending process in 1990. Later, the World Bank employed the Beijing 
Environmental Project in 1990, and published the China Environmental Strategy Paper in 
1992 (World Bank 1992). In an internal document, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued 
that by participating in the UNCED, it would help “repair relationships with the Western 
countries by breaking up the sanctions that were in place” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
1992).6 
The pro-reform group and the anti-reform group put their own agendas on the 
environmental diplomacy strategy’s implementation. The pro-reform group attempted to 
utilize the international environmental participation as a window of opportunity to expand 
 
5 The Work Key Points of the Environmental Protection Committee was an annual guideline for Chinese 
environmental administrative practices for internal reference. The Work Key Points represented last years’ 
environmental practices’ summary and the next year’s plans. 




international collaborations, and to reimport foreign investment and technology. This 
would deepen open-door and reform policies (Qu 1992).7 In contrast, the anti-reform 
group agreed to participate in environmental conferences to break the international 
isolations. The anti-reform group expressed a viewpoint that international institutions in 
developed countries should not pass policies to damage China’s interests and sovereignty 
(Song 1989).8 
Deng Xiao-ping’s Southern Tour and Deepening of the Market Reform 
The conflicts between the pro- and anti-reform groups continued in the debate over 
the state developmental agenda. First, they utilized state-owned media to influence public 
opinion. Second, they utilized formal and informal relationships to influence Deng Xiao-
ping.  (Han 1993; Yeh 1994; Zhao 1998; Ma 2012). After evaluation of the competing 
reform arguments and China’s developmental demands, Deng Xiao-ping made a decision 
 
7 For example, Qu Ge-ping, the director of the State Environmental Protection Administration, posited that 
Chinese environmental problems could only be resolved by Western countries’ advanced management and 
technology. On the condition that developed countries did not threaten the Chinese Communist Party regime, 
China had to withdraw the alert that international institutions and developed countries helped China to 
reform its environmental policies (Qu 1992). 
8 For example, the Environmental Protection Committee’s chairman, Song Jian, made a statement in the first 
conference after the Tiananmen Protest. He emphasized: “This conference is postponed because of the 
counterrevolutionary riot … We have to pay close attention to tendencies of international environmental 
protection and actively participate in them … Developed countries and capitalist countries have their 





through a political action. Between January 18th and February 21st 1992, Deng Xiao-ping 
embarked on his southern tour9, during which he displayed his support for the pro-reform 
group by giving several pro-reform speeches (Goodman 1994; Saich 2016). Deng’s 
actions restricted the agenda of the anti-reform group and ensured that China would 
continue to pursue market and economic reforms (Goodman 1994; Zhao 1998). 
After the reform was assured, the Chinese government appointed Premier Li Peng 
to represent China, at the Rio UNCED in June 1992 and sign Agenda 21 (Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 1992). In July 1992, the Chinese government started the preparatory 
process regarding China’s Agenda 21 to reach the commitment to the UNCED. 
To summarize, this section demonstrates that the Tiananmen Square democracy 
protests was a historical condition that political and economic crises required the state 
leaders and social actors to define the state agendas. Although the repression identified an 
agenda that China’s development must be led by the Chinese Communist Party, it resulted 
in the international isolation and declines in private investments. As a result, the pro- and 
anti-reform groups mobilized politically to define their own state agendas. The pro-reform 
group’s success in ensuring the market reform by aligning with the environmental 
diplomacy strategy and utilizing the state structures to influence Deng Xiao-ping. The 
reaffirmation of the reform in February 1992 also resulted in China’s participation into the 
Rio UNCED in June 1992 and the agreement of pro-neo-liberal Agenda 21. 
 




EFFORTS TOWARDS THE MARKETIZATION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY STRATEGY DURING THE ECONOMIC GROWTH PERIOD, AFTER 
1992 
During 1992 and 1993, conflict arose in a historical condition in which China’s 
annual GDP growth rate reached 14.1% and 13.9%, respectively. By 1993, as the 
significant economic boom cause inflation, the anti-reform group attacked the pro-reform 
group for causing the country’s economy to overheat through its pursuit of market reforms. 
Pro-reformist officials allying with the international institutions argued that inflation 
occurred because the reforms were incomplete (Dong 2007; Ma 2012). The capacity of 
this political coalition to promote further market reforms involved use of the state 
structures. First, when reformist officials gained control over the state-owned newspaper, 
the pro-reform group used this state structure to influence public opinion. 10  Second, 
reformist officials created a decision-making process open only to the members of the pro-
reform group to solve the inflation issue. In June 1993, China’s State Economic System 
Reform Committee collaborated with the World Bank to hold the international workshop 
on “China’s Macro-economic Reform” in Dalian. The workshop was attended by 14 
foreign scholars and World Bank officials as well as 24 Chinese government officials. 
 
10 For example, in November 1993, Mr. E. C. Hwa, Senior Economist with the World Bank Office in Beijing, 
offered an internal report to the Chinese government. After reading the report, Vice Premier Zhu Rong-ji 
instructed the People's Daily newspaper to publish the full report. This action reflected the World Bank 




Reformist officials directed the pro-reform conclusion of the workshop, which became the 
basis for the State Council’s solution to the inflation issue (Lu 2005). On June 24, 1993, 
11 days after the end of the workshop, the State Council announced “The Opinion about 
the Current Economic Situation and Macro-economic Management,” in the Article 
Sixteen (Hu, Huo and Yang 2012). The announcement ensured pro-market macro 
managerial systems in the fiscal, taxation, foreign exchange and pricing fields (Lu 2005; 
World Bank 2005a). 
In a separate political arena, the historical condition of economic growth also 
affected the marketization of environmental policy strategies. At the Rio UNCED in 1992, 
China’s increasing international integration validated the environmental diplomacy 
strategy. The reformists and international institutions were optimistic that the World Bank 
and Agenda 21’s marketization of environmental policy strategies could swiftly be 
established in China. For example, the Chinese delegation of the UNCED submitted an 
internal report to the Chinese Communist Party and the State Council after the UNCED. 
The delegation argued that “The UNCED was an important step for human development. 
The documents and treaties signed in the UNCED will enforce all countries in the world. 
It is an opportunity as well as a challenge for all countries. We should grasp this 
opportunity to promote the sustainable development” (Chinese Delegation of the UNCED 
1992). 
However, when inflation emerged, foreign investments, including the UN and 
World Banks’s projects, were blamed for overheating the economy. In response, the anti-




successfully blocked the restriction of foreign investment, the marketization of 
environmental policy strategies provoked other conflicts. During the drafting of China’s 
Agenda 21 and the implementation of the China Environmental Strategy Paper, the UN 
and World Bank demanded comprehensive reforms to privatize public utilities by 
establishing a fee-collecting system, new financing rules, and the private environmental 
industry. (World Bank 1992:4, 57-60). However, conflicts between supporters and 
opponents of the marketization of the environmental policy strategy emerged from two 
pro-reform suggestions. First, the UN asked China to meet high standards in terms of 
reductions in carbon emissions and the high ratio of coal-fired power energy generation. 
Second, the UN and the World Bank suggested a comprehensive reform plan for private 
sector participation in public utility construction markets to promote public-private 
partnerships (PPP)11 policies. Thus both supporters and opponents of the marketization of 
the environmental policy strategy utilized the changes in the state structures, political 
coalitions, and neo-liberalism to influence policies. 
Actors of Response to the UN Demands 
Opposition to the demands for reductions in carbon emission emerged from the 
State Planning Commission and the Ministry of Coal Industry. The State Planning 
Commission was the most important economic department in the State Council, and 
 
11 Based on the World Bank’s definition, PPP is “a long-term contract between a private party and a 
government entity, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party bears significant risk 




integrated the options of other departments before offering a macro control economic 
strategy. From the perspective of the State Planning Commission, the UN’s demand 
violated the current economic strategy which prioritized economic development. 
According to this strategy, replacing coal-fired power generation with other clean energy 
was unrealistic in the short term (Rong 1995). As the ministry responsible for coal 
exploitation, distribution, and consumption, the interests of the Ministry of Coal Industry 
were naturally damaged by the reduction of coal-fired power generation. 
During the debate, pro-reformists allied with state departments that had competing 
interests in coal-fired power plants for example, the Ministry of Water Resources 
(responsible for hydroelectric generation) and other energy producing bureaus within the 
Ministry of Power Industry (especially the bureau responsible for nuclear power 
generation). The reformists and allied state departments formed a political coalition with 
the UN and the World Bank to support the UN demands (State Science and Technology 
Commission and State Planning Commission 1992; Niu 1994). 
As the conflict intensified, the capacity of this political coalition to influence 
policy became associated with the use of new state structures created by the UN and the 
World Bank. First, to meet the requirements of the UN, the Chinese government appointed 
the State Planning Commission and the State Scientific and Technological Commission 
to take the lead in forming China’s Agenda 21 leading group in 1992 and in 1993 
established the Administrative Center for China’s Agenda 21 (ACCA). The task of the 
leading group and the ACCA was to fulfill China’s Agenda 21 by coordinating with 




World Bank’s lending requirements, the Ministry of Finance established the Project 
Management Office at the central (National Project Management office) and local (Local 
Project Management offices) administrative levels to review and manage all World Bank 
projects (Ceng 2004; World Bank 2005b; Tan 2013).12 
These new state structures were important because they demonstrated that the 
World Bank and the UN established branches in the Chinese government. World Bank 
and UN staffs not only served as external advisors, but were authorized to instruct 
departments and influence policies. These political-legal arrangements allowed the pro-
reform group to expand their influence on more departments and form a broader political 
coalition. For example, the Project Management Office in the Ministry of Finance could 
pressure the Ministry of Finance to support the marketization of environmental policy 
strategies (World Bank Department of Ministry of Finance 1996; Ceng 2004; World Bank 
2005b; Tan 2013). 
Consequently, despite a few compromises, the final version of China’s Agenda 21 
included the following two crucial rules that promoting the market-oriented reform and 
incineration: (1) The UN and the World Bank encouraged the State Council, the Ministry 
of Water Resources, and the Ministry of Power Industry to apply for construction loans to 
fund clean energy projects with aid funds for sustainable development, especially 
 
12 The Local Project Management Offices were established by bureaus of finance at the provincial level and 





hydroelectricity (Niu 1994).13 China’s Agenda 21 listed clean energy facilities, including 
incinerators, and argued that in the long term such facilities would substitute for coal-fired 
power generation. This marked the first time that Chinese official documents treated 
incineration technology as clean energy. (2) The Ministry of Coal Industry agreed to 
upgrade the efficiency of coal-fired power plants 
These two rules supporting the introduction of clean energy and the upgrading of 
coal-fired power plants created new political-legal arrangements that transformed the state 
structures. MNCs, the UN, and the World Bank then leveraged their capital and 
technological advantages to force the Chinese government to promote further reforms. 
Three practices in the implementation of these rules significantly influenced the promotion 
of the marketization of the environmental policy strategy and incineration. First, MNCs, 
the World Bank, and UN utilized the rules to justify BOT reform to draw foreign 
investment (The BOT reform will be discussed in the next session). 
Second, the Chinese government applied to the Ertan Hydropower Station with the 
World Bank. The conditions included establishing a new company instead of a bureau in 
the Ministry of Water Resources to operate Ertan. This new company became an 
independent power producer (IPP), which had a self-interest and profit orientation. As a 
result, this change in the state structure provided a transformation of political-legal 
 
13 Niu Mao-sheng, the minister of the Ministry of Water Resources, posited that China’s Agenda 21 was a 
good opportunity for the Ministry of Water Resources to address problems pertaining to the shortage of 




arrangements that the state and social actors could exercise power to influence policies in 
the future (I will describe this case in Chapter III). 
Third, these political-legal arrangements significantly affected the promotion of 
incineration technology because they changed the state structures for MNCs to access the 
state departments responsible for solid waste policy. For example, China’s Agenda 21 
enabled formal collaboration between MNCs and the Ministry of Construction. As 
described above, the Ministry of Construction was established in 1988, with one of this 
functions being to address the growth of urban solid waste. When China’s Agenda 21 
called for proposals in 1993, the Ministry of Construction submitted a proposal entitled 
“Municipal Solid Waste Management Systems, Technical Standards and Capacity 
Building in China”. The purpose of the project was to “strengthen the capability of the 
municipalities with China to better manage municipal solid waste, through both direct 
support to selected demonstration cities as well as through strengthening of the Ministry 
of Construction at the central level. This will increase its capability to develop appropriate 
strategies and provide advice to the municipalities in planning municipal solid waste 
management and operations on an on-going basis” (United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization 1998). 
One important activity of the project was to train officials in the Ministry of 
Construction and local governments. Shi Zhi-hong, who is an important urban solid waste 
policy maker and was a member of the internal working group of the project, recalled that 
“participating in this project was very important to my career. The training taught me a 




municipal governance and the relationships between urban development phases and 
appropriate solid waste treatment” (Interview Shi Zhi-hong, June 17, 2016). According to 
the UN project document, this project received donations from the Swiss government and 
the foreign advice team of the project was managed by the Swiss government. To promote 
incineration technology, the Swiss government appointed Kurt Wiesegart, who was an ex-
staff member of the AAB Group (one of biggest companies in Switzerland. Incineration 
was its most important component), as an advice team leader. Shi admitted that “Mr. 
Wiesegart’s professional advice convinced the Ministry of Construction to put 
incineration into a more important role in solid waste management” (Interview Shi Zhi-
hong, June 17, 2016). In short, the project of China’s Agenda 21 allowed the MNC to 
influence the Chinese government to take incineration into consideration. 
BOT Reform at Central Administrative Level 
After the Rio UNCED in 1992, the BCSD continued to use the political coalition 
with the UNCED officials and the UNCED pro-business structures to influence the 
practice of Agenda 21. After several discussions about eliminating “institutional barriers” 
between the BCSD and the UN, the UN agreed to change its organizational structure to 
set up a new program with the BCSD. In 1994, the BCSD established the Sustainable 
Project Management program in partnership with the United Nations Development 
Programme. This change in the political-legal arrangement was important because MNCs 
not only had a lobbying relationship with the UN, but they also became deeply involved 




The primary objective of Sustainable Project Management was to promote PPP. 
Hugh Faulkner, the BCSD’s president, claimed that Sustainable Project Management’s 
aim was to create pilot water, waste, and energy infrastructure projects in developing 
countries’ Agenda 21 in order to (1) demonstrate that the PPP practices were able to bring 
efficiency and green technology and (2) encourage developing countries’ “political will” 
to reform institutional arrangements to benefit the PPP (Faulkner 1997b; Faulkner 1997a). 
The establishment of the Sustainable Project Management program showed that 
promoting PPP in developing countries had become the policy of MNCs, the UN, and 
World Bank in support of sustainable development after the Rio UNCED in 1992. 
As described in the above section, the UN and the World Bank attempted to impose 
PPP on China during the drafting of China’s Agenda 21 and the implementation of the 
China Environmental Strategy Paper. Their efforts strengthened after China’s Agenda 21 
identified as core goals to promote clean energy and upgrade coal-fired power plants. 
There are many forms of PPP. 14  In the 1990s, the UN and the World Bank 
primarily promoted BOT in China in which the private sector builds an infrastructure 
project, operates it and eventually transfers ownership of the project to the government. 
The UN and the World Bank’s promotion of BOT divided the Chinese state departments 
 
14 According to the World Bank, PPP includes SC (Service Contract), MC (Management Contract), LBO 
(Lease-Build-Operate), DBT (Design-Build-Transfer), BT (Build-Transfer), BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-
Transfer), BTO (Build-Transfer-Operate), TOT (Transfer-Operate-Transfer), BOT (Build-Operate-




into two groups. The anti-BOT group was primarily comprised of anti-reformists and 
departments which were still responsible for constructions of public utilities. The pro-
BOT group primarily consisted of reformists and departments which were responsible for 
economic development and finance. The UN and the World Bank aligned with the pro-
BOT group to resist the anti-BOT group’s opposition. 
Similar to the scenario with the UN’s demand for carbon emission reductions, the 
policy influence of the two competing groups depended on their ability to use and redefine 
the state structures. The changes in the state structures provided opportunities for the pro-
BOT group to pressure crucial departments and expand its alliance with those departments. 
The first such department was the Ministry of Finance, which was responsible for 
financing and budgeting. Due to the World Bank’s requirements, the Ministry of Finance 
established the National Project Management Office to monitor projects related to the 
World Bank. This arrangement gave the World Bank a state structure and associated 
funding channel that could be used as leverage to influence the Ministry of Finance. 
Making the neo-liberal argument that public utilities were inefficient, the pro-BOT group 
and the World Bank convinced the Ministry of Finance that promotion of BOT projects 
could avoid the heavy debt associated with inefficient public utilities (World Bank 
Department of Ministry of Finance 1996; Ceng 2004; World Bank 2005b; Tan 2013). 
The second department was the ACCA. After the creation of the ACCA, the UN 
continued to exert its power to initiate preparations for the implementation of China’s 
Agenda 21. The UN used funds and technological knowledge as leverage to pressure the 




submitted them to the UN for examination. In this way, the UN could reject and amend 
departmental projects relevant to the China’s Agenda 21. János Pásztor, UN Development 
Programme’s chief of the consultant group, admitted: “[The] UN Development 
Programme’s role has been crucial in many ways – not least of all due to the fact that it is 
through a UN Development Programme project that activities of this project have been 
developed, supported and implemented” (Pásztor 1993). ACCA director Gan Shi-jun 
revealed that “the UN Development Programme corrected the draft proposals chapter by 
chapter” (Gan 1993). 
Additionally, in the preparatory process, the UN also created a mechanism that 
allowed MNCs to influence the Chinese government. This process stipulated that the 
ACCA held a roundtable conference to affirm that the projects adequately met the criteria 
of all those donating funds (i.e., MNCs, the World Bank, and the UN). 
These changes in the state structures permitted MNCs and the international 
institutions to fulfill their agenda by influencing the Chinese government. The UN and 
MNCs raised doubts about the financing of project proposals without considering BOT 
during the preparatory process. For example, at the roundtable conference in 1994, Edwin 
Falkman, the executive chairman of Waste Management International (one of the biggest 
incineration companies globally) suggested that the Chinese government had to 
demonstrate a deep commitment to BOT and the privatization of public utilities (Falkman 
1994). Hugh Faulkner, president of the BCSD, reiterated that the BCSD’s only objective 
in China was the establishment of PPPs (Faulkner 1994). As a result, in 1994, the State 




forms to support projects, including aids, loans, sole proprietorship, joint capital, and BOT 
(State Planning Commission and State Science and Technology Commission 1994). 
Later, expecting that China’s Agenda 21 would create a number of BOT projects, 
the pro-BOT group mobilized politically to change the state structures. First, the State 
Planning Commission invested in two BOT consulting companies: Beijing BOT Ltd. and 
Trust of Bridge Basic Installation Investment Consulting Ltd. The leaders of these two 
companies were the State Planning Commission officials going into business (Mao and 
Chen 1997; Jin 2014). These corporations dealt in project consulting, project feasible 
reports’ writing, project supervision, assets evaluation, etc. (Beijing Engineering 
Consulting Corporation 1995). 
Second, supported by the UN and the World Bank, the Chinese central government 
held two important international conferences. In 1994, the same year when China’s 
Agenda 21 was approved by the State Council and sponsored by the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank, the State Planning Commission held an international 
conference related to BOT investment in May 1994. Half a year later, in November 1994, 
the State Planning Commission and the World Bank held another international conference 
regarding the policies of foreign direct investment in public utility infrastructure (Liu 1995; 
Mao and Chen 1997). An official of the Ministry of Water Resources who was responsible 
for foreign investment management said that “the main purposes of the conferences was 
to refer to foreign experiences in order to attract foreign investment and develop 




As a result, despite resistance from the anti-BOT group, in the second half of 1994, 
the State Planning Commission and the UN Development Programme collaborated to 
establish a BOT legal framework. In January 1995, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation announced “The Notice of Concerning Issues of Using BOT to 
Attract Foreign Investment.” The State Planning Commission, the Ministry of Electric 
Power, the Ministry of Communications announced “The Notice of Concerning Issues of 
the Examination and Approval Administration of Foreign Investment in BOT” in August 
1995 (Zhai 2003). 
These two BOT notices were important because they provided political-legal 
arrangements to enforce BOT projects. First, they provided legal protection for BOT 
projects. The two notices reduced investment risks faced by MNCs in relation to BOT 
projects, such as political and default risks.15 Second, pro-BOT officials could refer to the 
two notices to overcome resistance. Third, the two notices provided a route for foreign 
investment to enter local markets. When China faced budget restrictions and 
dissatisfaction with the inefficiency of public utilities, BOT notices became an important 
means for local officials to introduce foreign investment to grow local economies, 
including in Beijing. 
 
 
15 In the 1980s, although China operated a few pilot projects for BOT (most of them were electrical power 
and transportation constructions) at a local level, the Chinese government did not pass any law or orders 
pertaining to BOT (Zhai 2003; Jin 2014). 
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The Establishment and Practices of the Beijing Waste Management Strategy 
In Beijing, the promotion of the marketization of the environmental policy strategy 
represented another contested terrain. In 1990, after launching its environmental 
diplomacy strategy, the Chinese government immediately encouraged the World Bank to 
implement the China Environmental Strategy Paper. Making Beijing a focus in promoting 
the marketization of the environmental policy strategy, the World Bank submitted the 
Beijing Environmental Project in 1990 as a sub-program of the China Environmental 
Strategy Paper. 
Similar to China’s Agenda 21 and the China Environmental Strategy Paper at the 
central level, the enforcement of the Beijing Environmental Project confronted local 
resistance. In response, pro-reform officials and the World Bank mobilized politically to 
use changes in the state structure to fulfill their agenda. First, the World Bank demanded 
that the Beijing’s financial authority, the Beijing Finance Bureau, established the Local 
Project Management Office. This new state structure provided the World Bank a lever 
with which to influence the Beijing Finance Bureau. Using the neo-liberal claim that 
public utilities were inefficient, the pro-BOT group and the World Bank convinced the 
Beijing Finance Bureau that BOT projects offered a means to avoid debt (Ceng 2004; 
World Bank 2005b; Tan 2013). 
The second change in the state structure occurred in the Beijing Planning 
Commission. Similar to the State Planning Commission at the central government level, 
the Beijing Planning Commission was the most important economic department in the 
Beijing government responsible for offering macro control over the economic strategy of 
76 
Beijing. In 1989, the Beijing Planning Commission established the Beijing Engineering 
Consulting Corporation as a corporatized pilot project. Expecting that the UN and the 
World Bank’s BOT proposals would create business opportunities, the Beijing 
Engineering Consulting Corporation created a BOT analysis team in 1992. This change of 
the state structure was important because the profits of the Beijing Engineering Consulting 
Corporation were associated with income of the Beijing Planning Commission, giving the 
latter an incentive to promote BOT  (Zhu, Ji and Zhang 1992; Beijing Engineering 
Consulting Corporation 1995). 
With the support of the Beijing Finance Bureau and the Beijing Planning 
Commission, the pro-reform group utilized these state structures to broaden its political 
coalition with officials in these two departments. The political coalition of the pro-reform 
group continued to exert its power, and did so in the following ways. 
First, the UN and the World Bank’s sustainable development agenda significantly 
influenced on Beijing’s solid waste management strategy. Using their advantages in terms 
of funds and technology, the UN and the World Bank influenced the Chinese 
government’s solid waste management. In fact, given that China did not have a 
comprehensive strategy before 1989, the UN and the World Bank helped create China’s 
first solid waste management strategy. To define China’s solid waste management strategy, 
China’s Agenda 21 and the China Environmental Strategy Paper prioritized the solid waste 
issues. For example, urban solid waste management was an independent project among 
China’s Agenda 21 priority projects in 1994. In the Beijing Environmental Project, the 
World Bank funded the Beijing government to build a landfill facility. Through funding 
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these projects, the UN and the World Bank promoted a new strategy whereby solid waste 
treatment became part of the broader process of reforming China’s economy. Using the 
claim of sustainable development, the UN and the World Bank emphasized that market 
reform only negatively impacted solid waste in the short term. When the market reform 
created a fee system for waste disposal, private corporations, and credit markets, private 
corporations seeking profit were encouraged to invest in solid waste treatment and provide 
efficient services. The market economy and solid waste management thus offered mutual 
support in the long term (World Bank 1991; World Bank 1992). Shi Zhi-hong, who is an 
important urban solid waste policy maker I mentioned in the previous section, recalled 
that in the 1990s, the UN and the World Bank primarily used the marketization strategy 
to promote solid waste management. He said: “They [the UN and the World Bank] 
attempted to promote industrialization and private enterprises to increase efficiency. 
Therefore, they suggested to use PPP and privatization to establish the incineration 
industry” (Interview Shi Zhi-hong, June 17, 2016). 
Specifically, in 1996, the World Bank created a new state structure to promote 
incineration. The World Bank funded and advised the Beijing Environmental Sanitation 
Administration (Beijing’s environmental authority in the 1990s) to study solid waste 
treatment for Beijing. In the study report, Options for Domestic Solid Waste Treatment in 
Beijing, the Beijing Environmental Sanitation Administration outlined future projections 
for the growth rate of Beijing’s garbage, as well as construction plans for five incinerators 
(Beijing Environmental Sanitation Administration 1996). This report became an important 
road map guiding Beijing’s waste disposal plan for the next 20 years. 
78 
Second, the UN and the World Bank’s sustainable development agenda affirmed 
that marketization of public utilities was an inevitable solution for Beijing’s environmental 
degradation. Utilizing the neo-liberal claim that marketization of public utilities (i.e., 
corporatized SOEs and BOT) could improve efficiency, the World Bank requested the 
corporatization of certain public utilities of the Beijing Municipal Construction Bureau as 
a project conditionality (Yue 2000). 
These political-legal arrangements of the Beijing waste management and 
marketization strategy, in conjunction with the two BOT notices passed by the central 
government, strongly affected the emergence of Beijing’s incineration industry. Using the 
BOT legal framework, the Beijing government sought investors for environmental 
projects, including incineration, and thus imported foreign and private investment without 
World Bank project loans. In 1997, the mayor of Beijing, Jia Qing-lin, decided to build 
the Gaoantun incinerator. The Bureau of Environmental Health of Beijing’s Chaoyang 
District and Hua Lian Da Clean Energy Technology Ltd. accepted loans from the Spanish 
government to support their joint investment in the Gaoantun incinerator project (Jia 2005; 
Xu 2007). The Golden State Environment Group Corporation (Golden State), founded by 
returning overseas scholar Peter C. Jiang, imported the equipment required for the project 
in 1997 (Zhang 2010b). Golden State was important because in 2002, it became the largest 
investor in the Gaoantun incinerator project and was also an important founder of 
environmental associations in China. Subsequent chapters will further detail the influence 
of Golden State. 
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To summarize, this section shows that during the period of the economic growth 
after 1992, the pro- and anti-reform groups mobilized politically to define their agendas. 
The pro-reform group succeeded in utilizing the state structures, allied with the MNCs and 
international institutions, and incorporated with the neo-liberal agenda. As a result, the 
pro-reform group established a BOT legal framework in the central government and 
promoted a BOT incinerator in Beijing. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The analysis here demonstrates that the policy formation process in relation to 
sustainable development in China supports the organization-political economy 
perspective. First, the historical variation in the political and economic stability affected 
the actions of the state and social actors. The Tiananmen Square protests caused a political 
and economic crisis that most leaders of the Chinese Communist Party decided to repress. 
While this decision eliminated social discontent and recused the regime, it produced the 
international isolation and the economic stagnation. There was a debate whether China 
should continue further the market reforms. Deng Xiao-ping sought to mitigate the conflict 
between the pro-reform and anti-reform groups by offering a general developmental 
agenda to ensure the market reform. After China’s international isolation faded and 
economic growth returned in 1993, the anti-reform groups mobilized politically to resist 
the pro-marketization reform of environmental policy strategy. In contrast, the pro-reform 
group attempted to deepen the market reform to incorporate environmental policies. 
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Figure 2.2: The Relationship between the World Bank’s Strategy and Incinerator 
Project 
The relationships among the World Bank’s national environmental strategy, proposed work programs, 
and subprojects, which are related to waste treatment in China and Beijing. The shapes in Figure 2.2 
with grey background represent the World Bank’s projects. The bottom part of the figure is actors 
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Second, changes in the state structures provided opportunities and channels for 
social actors to affect policies. To meet the demands of the UN and the World Bank, the 
Chinese government established new organizations within the state structures that allowed 
the UN and the World Bank to access decision-making processes, monitor project 
practices, and offer policy suggestions. Although the UN and the World Bank assigned 
experts to advise China, those experts were not neutral, but rather utilized the enormous 
aid resources of the UN and the World Bank to promote a comprehensive marketization 
reform of environmental policy strategy. 
 Third, corporations could establish organizations to pursue their interests and 
create political coalitions with other actors to overcome obstacles to their agendas. In the 
early 1990s, the BCSD composed of MNCs with diverse interests successfully produced 
a common agenda aligned with the pro-neo-liberal sustainable development of the UN and 
the World Bank. Moreover, the BCSD attempted to impose this agenda on China to 
promote marketization reform of the country’s environmental policy strategy. Although 
several state departments in China opposed the reforms, MNCs, the UN, and the World 
Bank took advantage of their own resources and allied with the pro-reform officials and 
state departments to provide new agendas. The new agendas generated three sets of 
policies: (1) clean energy and the upgrading of coal-fired power plants, (2) BOT for 
foreign investment, and (3) BOT pilot projects. Although the policies did not involve 
comprehensive reform, they offered political-legal arrangements for the pro-BOT group 
to promote the following round marketization of public utilities. 
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Fourth, this chapter depicts the creation of a new market to promote the 
development of a public utility infrastructure. Inconsistent with neo-liberal claim that 
marketization was intended to eliminate the government and political intervention in the 
economy, the creation of this market for a public utility infrastructure resulted from 
collaboration of international institutions and MNCs with state officials. International 
institutions, MNCs, and reformist officials did not separate government intervention from 
the economy, but rather utilized political and economic power to form political-legal 
arrangements to foster marketization. Moreover, through the BOT legal framework, they 
attempted to privatize public utilities, establish fee-collecting systems, reform financing 
rules, and foster a private environmental industry. Because the establishment of these 
political-legal arrangements required reforms in numerous state departments and naturally 
attracted resistance from significant beneficiaries of the previous planning economy, the 
pro-reform group required collaboration between both state and non-state actors. Hence, 
the pro-reform group sought to embed the marketization of public utility infrastructure 
within the state, mobilize political factions, and introduce political-legal arrangements. 
This chapter also illustrated that the marketization reform of environmental policy 
strategy between 1989 and 1997 was crucial for the development of the Chinese 
incineration industry. First, the BOT legal framework created a new market focused on 
public utility infrastructure. Although the two notices dealt with foreign investment, their 
implementation legitimized the mobilization of the pro-BOT group to promote further 
BOT projects, including incinerators. 
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Second, both the UN’s China Agenda 21 and the World Bank’s China’s 
Environmental Strategy Paper identified incineration technology as a solution to China’s 
waste and environmental problems. When departments within the Chinese government 
sought support for waste management projects from the UN and the World Bank, the latter 
made approval conditional on the introduction of incineration technology. More 
importantly, because the UN and the World Bank could monitor the projects and train 
project participants, their perspectives on waste management substantially influenced 
Chinese officials. Some of these officials would later play important roles in implementing 
pro-incineration environmental and waste policies. 
Third, the BOT projects and diverse associated actors created by the marketization 
reform led to the rapid development of surrounding industries. After corporations in these 
industries accumulated resources and experience from project implementation, they 
attempted to employ these new political-legal arrangements to pursue more BOT projects. 
Incinerators were important targets. Additionally, many leaders of these corporations had 
government ties that allowed them to lobby for BOT incinerators. 
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In brief, the practice of sustainable development in China favored the agenda of 
international institutions and MNCs while reformists exploited sustainable development 
to legitimate the marketization reform of environmental policy strategy. Although the 
World Bank advocated that new projects should incorporate both democratic and 
environmental standards, including accountability, transparency, and citizen participation, 
these were overlooked in real project processes in China. The expansion of foreign and 
private investment in environmental sectors, support for the environmental industry, and 
importation of new technology became the primary way that the Chinese government, 
international institutions, and MNCs practiced sustainable development. The practice of 
sustainable development changed the state structure and produced new actors. The BOT 
legal framework and BOT pilot projects thus established political-legal arrangements that 
allowed the private sector to participate in environmental protection and to exercise its 
power to influence policies. The remaining chapters focus on how new environmental 




POLICY PERIOD TWO: 
URBAN PUBLIC UTILITIES BUILD-OPERATE-TRANSFER POLICY 
 AND RENEWABLE ENERGY LAW, 1997–2007 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I utilize the organizational-political economy perspective to 
analyze the policy formation processes of two pro-incineration policies from 1997–2007: 
(1) the “Measures for the Administration on the Franchise of Municipal Public Utilities” 
(MAFMPU), and (2) the renewable energy law. These two policies extended the 
marketization of the environmental policy strategy on two specific industries: public 
utilities and renewable energy. 
By 1997, the marketization of the environmental policy strategy provided the 
political-legal arrangements through which MNCs submitted BOT incinerator projects. 
However, the Asian financial crisis impacted China’s economic growth1, leading to the 
government-driven bailout policies that reinforced the state power and threatened the 
market reforms. 
1 China nevertheless experienced an economic downturn. Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, 
which held at 9.9% in 1996, fell to 9.2%, 7.8%, and 7.6% in 1997, 1998, and 1999, respectively. The GDP 




In response to the threat of the market reform, the pro-reform group mobilized 
politically to promote the MAFMPU and the renewable energy law. The MFMPU was a 
nationwide build-operate-transfer (BOT) rule to allow foreign and domestic private 
investments in urban infrastructure, including the building of incinerators. The renewable 
energy law stipulated that incinerators could enjoy the state feed-in tariffs. The feed-in 
tariffs included (1) guaranteed access to the grid; (2) the provision of stable, long-term 
purchase agreements by grid firms; and (3) payment levels that encouraged the 
development and utilization of renewable energy. 
Using the organizational-political economy perspective, this chapter explores how 
the threat posed by the Asian economic crisis to economic growth, the changes in the state 
structures, the political coalition of the Chinese incineration industry, and the neo-liberal 
agenda contributed to the MAFMPU and the renewable energy law. 
THE ASIAN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE STATE-DOMINATED AGENDA 
To alleviate the impact of the Asian financial crisis, the Chinese government 
employed an economic stimulus plan to expand domestic demand. From 1998 to 2000, 
the government issued 360 billion yuan of long-term treasury bonds to fund construction. 
Ceng Pei-yan, the director of the State Development Planning Commission2, announced 
that the central government would allocate these bonds to support construction projects in 
2 The State Development Planning Commission’s preceding agency was the State Planning Commission. 





several areas, including agriculture, water conservancy, communication, urban utilities, 
environment, power grids, grain depots, and economic housing (Ceng 2001). 
Under the historical condition that the crisis impacted all economic fields, bailout 
policies gained support from corporations and local governments. Through construction 
bonds, the central government provided local governments with significant funds to build 
urban utilities and environmental facilities, while eliminating the need for BOT to attract 
private investment (Department of Economic Construction of Ministry of Finance 2006; 
Zhuang 2011). Thus, the construction bonds reduced the number of BOT projects, 
including BOT incinerators (Zhou 2001; Zhuang 2011). Rather than being disappointed 
by the decreased number of BOT projects, private corporations supported the construction 
bonds because local governments awarded urban utility construction contracts to private 
corporations. The construction bonds thus helped private corporations resolve the profit 
crises they faced owing to the economic downturn. For example, in the incineration field, 
Zhejiang province used construction bonds to offer concessional loans to support specific 
projects. Weiming Environment Protection Co., Ltd. and Hangzhou Jinjing Environment 
Corporation seized this opportunity to obtain incineration projects (Chen 2003). Mao Dan, 
a leader of Jinjing, admitted that this allowed Jinjing to transform from a textile and coal-
fired energy enterprise with outdated facilities to an incineration company (Interview Mao 
Dan, June 26, 2016). 
In a separated political area, the Asian financial crisis caused a decline in energy 
consumption that impacted the revenue of all power plants. Simultaneously, the renewable 




corporations, the Chinese government reversed restrictions on electricity use that had been 
in place for almost 20 years. In 1998, the State Development Planning Commission 
announced a new strategy of encouraging electricity use (State Planning Commission 
1998). All power corporations then aligned with this new strategy, which eased the 
problems they faced in terms of declining revenue and excessive market competition. 
By 1999, the bailout policies simultaneously averted economic disaster and 
demonstrated the competence of the Chinese government, leading the anti-reform group 
to advocate that China extend these policies into a state-dominated developmental agenda 
(Wang 2004a). Several corporations that benefited from the bailout policies supported this 
agenda. In response to this proposal, the pro-reform group mobilized politically to reaffirm 
the market-oriented reform. Conflicts associated with the development of the Chinese 
incineration industry focused on two crucial policies relevant to BOT policies and the 
renewable energy industries. These policies were MAFMPU (Figure 3.1 shows social 
actors and political coalitions related to the MAFMPU) and the renewable energy law 
(Figure 3.2 shows social actors and political coalitions related to the renewable energy 






Figure 3.1: Actors and their Political Coalitions Related to the MAFMPU, 1997–
2007 
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EFFORTS AT BOT PROMOTION AND THE MAFMPU 
In late 1999, the Chinese economy began to display positive signals. Under this 
historical condition, the pro-BOT group mobilized politically to resist the attempts of the 
anti-reform group to enlarge the economic stimulus plan. Although the stimulus plan 
successfully rescued the economy, the pro-BOT group treated bond projects as non-
institutional and temporary solutions. The group mobilized politically to promote further 
market-oriented reform to maintain or expand BOT policies. 
Reaffirmation of BOT Policy in Beijing 
The pro-BOT group concentrated their political actions in Beijing, where during 
the implementation of the economic stimulus plan, the anti-BOT group had successfully 
opposed many BOT projects. Several BOT projects in Beijing met suspension or failure 
as a result of anti-BOT activism after 1997, with examples including the Gaoantun 
incinerator (I mentioned this project in Chapter 1), and the Jingtong Expressway (Jin 2003; 
Xu 2007). In addition, in 1998, because of the economic stimulus plan, the anti-BOT group 
in Beijing allied with Beijing Waterworks Co. and the Beijing Municipal Construction 
Bureau to convince the Beijing government to support the Beijing Tenth Waterworks 
project with state funds. 
Conflicts between the pro-BOT and anti-BOT groups emerged from the attempt to 
transform the Beijing Tenth Waterworks from state-control to a BOT project. At the end 
of 1999, two historical variations provided opportunities for the pro-BOT group to 
promote BOT projects. First, the stabilization of economic growth provided a historical 




utilities field, private environmental corporations involved in sewage treatment, 
incineration, and other environmental business mobilized politically to oppose the bond 
projects. They promoted sewage facility BOT schemes to justify various other local BOT 
pilot projects, including those involving incineration projects. For example, Sound 
Environmental Resources Co. Ltd. (Sound Co.) was a private environmental corporation 
diversified into various industries, including sewage treatment, incineration, and other 
environmental business. The chairman of Sound Co., Wen Yi-bo, believed that 
construction bonds were a temporary policy and inadequate to meet the demand for new 
infrastructure generated by continued economic growth. In an ambitious gesture, late in 
1999, Wen Yi-bo took out a full-page ad in a major Beijing newspaper to advocate the 
China Blue Water Plan, which posited private sector participation in sewage treatment as 
the only solution to river pollution (Zhang 2009b). Wen Yi-bo explained that sewage 
treatment and incineration had a complementary relationship from the perspective of 
environmental corporations. That is, when environmental corporations successfully 
promoted BOT policies involving sewage treatment and established political relationships 
with government leaders, it became easier to promote incineration projects (Yan 2016). 
Second, the pro-BOT group aligned itself with China’s national agenda of seeking 
World Trade Organization (WTO) membership in the late 1990s. The WTO’s neo-liberal 
requirements of open markets and privatization legitimized the further reform. As a result, 
the pro-BOT group advocated for promoting BOT to meet the WTO requirements (Wu 




Moreover, changes in the state structures provided several channels for private 
environmental corporations to exercise power. First, some authorities, such as the Beijing 
Planning Commission and the Beijing Finance Bureau, preferred the marketization 
environmental strategy because they collaborated with the UN and the World Bank’s 
sustainable development projects in the previous period. Second, leaders of state-owned 
BOT consulting companies left to launch independent careers in the environmental 
business. The above state structures were important channels for private environmental 
corporations to establish political coalitions with officials to access decision-marking 
processes. For example, Jin Yong-xiang was an employee of the BOT analysis team of the 
Beijing Engineering Consulting Corporation (see Chapter II). He went into business and 
established the Dayue Consulting Corporation (Dayue) in 1996. Because of Jin Yong-
xiang’s ties with the Beijing government, in the late 1990s, Dayue became the first 
external expert advisor in the Beijing public utility projects. Jin Yong-xiang recalls: 
To promote BOT projects, Wang Guang-dao convinced the Beijing government 
to establish the project financing committee and to appoint him as the director of 
the committee. Then the committee established the bidding office and hired 
Dayue as a financing and tender advisor to design BOT projects. It was the first 
time that Beijing government hired an external expert advisor in public utility 
projects. The Beijing government placed great hopes on “external brain” of us 
(Jin 2003). 
As a result, in 2000, private environmental corporations, including Sound Co. and 




inefficiency (Jin 2015b). Although the anti-BOT group fought back (Interview Mai 
Cheng-feng, July 12, 2016), the pro-BOT group successfully reopened the tender process 
for the Beijing Tenth Waterworks project in 2000, despite the Beijing Municipal 
Construction Bureau having won the project with an offer price of 6.9 yuan per ton of 
water in 1998. When two foreign private water supply corporations offered 1.15 and 1.39 
yuan per ton, Wang Guang-dao used these offers as leverage to blame the Beijing 
Municipal Construction Bureau for excessively high water prices and transformed the 
Beijing Tenth Waterworks to a BOT model (Jin 2015b). 
In other successes for the pro-BOT group, Sound Co. was awarded the Xiaoguhe 
sewage treatment BOT project in 2001 (Jin 2003), Golden State took over the suspended 
Gaoantun incineration BOT project in 2002 (Xu 2007; Du, Zhao and Li 2014). 
Eventually, the successful reaffirmation of BOT projects in Beijing became a 
political-legal arrangement by which reformists and private incineration corporations 
could promote further BOT policies. This became especially prevalent after Wang Guang-
dao became the minister of the Ministry of Construction in 2001. 
The Policy Formation Process of the MAFMPU in the Central Government 
After 2001, there were three important developments that encouraged the pro-BOT 
group to promote a nationwide BOT law. First, the historical condition of economic 
growth after 2001 urged the pro-BOT group to pursue their interests. The group expected 
that China’s population growth and urbanization would significantly increase the demand 
for solid waste treatment facilities (Gu 2001). Second, the pro-BOT group were not 




and private environmental corporations argued that support for the continuation of BOT 
projects remained tentative (Jin 2003). Third, the promotion of Wang Guang-dao to the 
minister of the Ministry of Construction in 2001 became a historical variation in the state 
structure that allowed the pro-BOT group to access the decision-making processes. In 
addition, the political coalition established during Wang’s Beijing tenure played an 
important role. Utilizing the above state structure and political coalition, Wang Guang-
dao announced  a proposal of urban utilities BOT legal framework (Jin 2014). In August 
2002, Wang Guang-dao declared that “operations of municipal sewage and waste 
treatment projects have to follow corporatization and marketization models in order to 
push industrialization (Wang 2002).” This declaration demonstrated that Wang Guang-
dao’s policy direction was to utilize the marketization reform (BOT was a primary reform) 
to promote environmental industries, including the incineration industry, and to deal with 
urban sewage and waste problems. 
However, Wang Guang-dao’s efforts were met with opposition, which debated 
whether BOT can solve the environmental problems. The opposition was derived from 
two sources: anti-BOT officials in the Chinese government and public opinion. 
The Challenge from Anti-BOT Officials and the Changes in the State Structure 
Although the minister of the Ministry of Construction, Wang Guang-dao, 
promoted the BOT legal framework, anti-BOT departments mobilized politically to resist 
the marketization of the urban utilities. For example, Li Dong-xu, the director of the 
Ministry of Construction’s Urban Construction Department, wrote an article in the 
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People’s Daily. He criticized some conservative departments’ resistance on the 
marketization of the urban utilities.  Li Dong-xu argued: 
Some departments neglect nation’s whole interests... The urban public utility 
industry doesn’t get rid of the planned economy influence. The governmental 
departments’ managerial system does not fit with the requirements of market 
socialist development, and the administrative controls on enterprise management 
still exists (Li 2003). 
His action revealed that the anti-BOT group’s obstacle had an effect and reformists 
had to disclose the conflict between them in order to put pressure on the anti-BOT group. 
Besides arguing for the importance of maintaining public departments, anti-BOT groups 
complained that pro-BOT officials did not have the capacity to draft a working law. 
From the perspective of the pro-BOT group, these criticism were partly valid 
because there was a significant historical variation of the state structures that the 
administrative reform of 1998 weakened many state departments’ capacity. Following the 
neo-liberal advice from the World Bank that the government should be downsized to limit 
its intervention in the economy, in 1998, the State Council disbanded 15 departments and 
dismissed thousands of officials (Luo 1998). The Ministry of Construction, which was 
responsible for urban planning and solid waste management, employed two administrative 
reform policies. First, numerous subunits of the Ministry of Construction were merged 
and corporatized. Second, the Ministry of Construction altered the function of intervention 
into macro control, and did not focus on policy details (Ye 2000). As a result, when Wang 




and altered structure of the Ministry of Construction did not have sufficient workforce to 
adequately investigate the market operation and the capacity to establish an appropriate 
law for a market economy (Jin and Chang 2004). 
In response to the anti-BOT groups’ challenge and the weakened capacity of the 
Ministry of Construction, Wang Guang-dao altered the state structure to establish a 
channel in the Ministry of Construction for external support. Because of close 
relationships established during the promotion of BOT projects in Beijing, Wang Guang-
dao introduced Dayue to the decision-making processes. Jin Yong-xiang, the general 
manager of Dayue, recalled why Wang Guang-dao had to find external support: 
In the traditional socialist system, the government controlled everything, 
including industry and projects’ planning, design, building, and operations, and 
supervision of corporations. This system must led to low efficiency of investment 
and operation. ……Government agencies also have a limited number of staffs. 
Moreover, since administrative works are heavy, the utilizing of professional 
consulting institutions’ participation within decision-making and industry-
managing processes is capable of enhancing the government’s efficiency (Jin, 
Wu and Ma 2003). 
As a result, Wang Guang-dao outsourced the BOT draft to Dayue. This shift in the 
state structure was crucial because it enabled Dayue to participate in internal decision-
making processes of the Ministry of Construction, such as employing BOT survey, 




Public Opinions’ Debate on the Marketization and the Emergence of Industry 
Associations 
In a separate political arena, public opinions that were concerned about further 
market reforms emerged. After 1997, new leftists became an important member of the 
anti-reform group. Unlike the anti-reform group in the previous period advocating the Mao 
era political and economic doctrines, the new leftists used the Western anti-globalization 
movements’ arguments3 to oppose the market reform. The core members of the new 
leftists were primarily young intellectuals who were familiar with the power of the Internet 
and media to influence public opinion. As a result, the anti-reform group catalyzed public 
opinion against the market reform. This was accomplished by utilizing the widespread 
social discontent of the large scale privatization in the late 1990s. The Ministry of 
Construction’s BOT promotion process caused another wave of outcry from the anti-
reform group (Shan 2002). 
In response to negative public opinions, the Ministry of Construction aligned with 
private environmental corporations to produce a counterargument. At the administrative 
level, private environmental corporations also focused on a sewage treatment’ BOT to 
justify a nationwide BOT legal framework, which would be able to support incineration. 
For example, Wen Yi-bo placed several related advertisements and contributed several 
 
3  The anti-globalization movements refer to social movements against economic globalization which 




articles to newspapers between 2001 and 2002 to support the Ministry of Construction’s 
BOT proposals (Lu 2009). 
In the early 2000s, the political influences of the private environmental 
corporations began to change as an industry group and take a step toward economic 
organization. This step became crucial factors advancing policies. The “h2o-china” 
website was as an informal environmental industry association and was funded by Golden 
State. H2o-china was intended as a collective platform for options via which 
environmental corporations could counter the threat to BOT policy from the construction 
bonds issued after the Asian financial crisis. Superficially, h2o-china was registered as an 
industrial news website, but in fact, it performed many functions of an industrial 
association, such as recruiting members, collecting membership fees, holding conferences, 
publishing annual industrial reports, and announcing collective statements (H2o-china 
2004b; H2o-china n. d.). 4 
 
4 Golden State decided to establish a website instead of a formal industrial association for the following two 
reasons. First, in the beginning 2000s, the size of urban utilities corporations was too small and inadequate 
to call on them to organize a formal group and make collective decisions. Second, there were two 
government-organized environmental industrial associations in the early 2000s: the China Association of 
Circular Economy and the China Association of Environmental Protection Industry. However, the 
establishing of an independent industrial association involved political risks for private corporations. As a 
result, Golden State decided to establish and promote a website to report industrial news and generate more 




After h2o.china was established, to reinforce the dramatic influence, h2o-china 
established a political coalition with the Ministry of Construction by following actions. 
First, h2o-china established a formal “strategic partnership” with the Ministry of 
Construction and an academic institution, the Department of Environmental Science and 
Engineering, Tsinghua University (H2o-china 2004c; H2o-china 2004a). 
Second, h2o-china hired a Ministry of Construction a retired official, Wang An-
pei, as an advisor. H2o-china took advantage of Wang An-pei’s close ties with the 
Ministry of Construction to gain resources and influence BOT policies (Interview Zhuang 
Ying-mei, June 21, 2016). A private industrial association5 evaluated Wang An-pei’s role 
in h20-china: “Due to Wang An-pei's help, h2o-china participated in the policy reforms 
regarding urban public utilities and water environment governance. The policies included 
water price adjustment, investment system, the development of the environmental service 
industry, and the PPP” (Wang and Feng 2016). 
Third, the Ministry of Construction outsourced conferences and specific events’ 
websites to h2o-china in order to allow the latter to receive more revenue (H2o-china 2002; 
H2o-china 2004c). For example, the Ministry of Construction supported h2o-china to 
sponsor the “Technical Seminar of National Treatment of Municipal Sewage” in Beijing 
in 2002 (H2o-china 2002). 
 
5 Z-Park Non-governmental Science technology Entrepreneurs Association. This association was the high-




Fourth, h2o-china generated public opinions which garnered support for the 
Ministry of Construction leaders’ marketization policies of urban utilities. Wang An-pei 
suggested that after h2o-china.com was established, it played a major role in its impact on 
public opinion and the theoretical support for the reformists among the state managers 
(Interview Wang An-pei, June 29, 2016). Zhu Guo-an, who was a leader of h2o-china, 
said that, “the reformists we wanted to support were Wang Guang-dao and his colleagues 
in the Ministry of Construction” (Interview Zhu Guo-an, June 30, 2016). Since its 
establishment in 2000, h2o-china has published several convincing articles supporting the 
marketization of sewage treatment and urban utilities, as well as hosting academic 
conferences and industrial forums where professors, officials, and industrial leaders could 
voice similar support (H2o-china 2002; H2o-china 2004c). 
In sum, as an informal industry association, h2o-china fulfilled the importance of 
an economic organization. First, h2o-china provided a vehicle for the industry to voice 
common opinions, helping to mitigate internal conflicts and providing a general industrial 
agenda. For example, h2o-china held an industrial forum once or twice each year to 
discuss policies, with the conclusions of these forums being published as an industry 
consensus and potential reference for policy makers. Second, h2o-china facilitated the 
establishment of a political coalitions with crucial actors outside the industry, including 
professors and officials. Such political coalition was important because it utilized the state 
structures to obtain resources for industry associations and provided support for pro-BOT 





The MAFMPU and the Beijing BOT Legal Framework 
According to the analysis in the previous section, altered state structures and 
political coalitions allowed private corporations to access the decision-making processes, 
and to establish collaboration between private corporations and leaders in the Ministry of 
Construction. This resulted in the December 2002, the Ministry of Construction “Opinion 
for Increase in Marketization Processes of Municipal Public Utilities (OIMP).” In order 
to accelerate the legislation, the Ministry of Construction utilized the same state structure 
to authorize Dayue to employ BOT project investigation research, and allowed Dayue to 
participate in the MAFMPU’s drafting process (Jin and Chang 2004). With the help from 
Dayue, in March 2004, the MAFMPU was announced. 
Beijing BOT Legal Framework and BOT Practices of Incinerators 
The passing of the OIMP was a historical variation that provided a political-legal 
arrangement for the pro-BOT group at local levels to promote local BOT rules and a 
variety of BOT facility projects, which included incinerators. In Beijing, there were two 
other catalysts for the city of Beijing to construct more BOT projects. First, after Wang 
Guang-dao, the primary BOT advocacy leader in Beijing, was promoted to the Ministry 
of Construction in 2001, the Sound Co.’s Xiaoguhe sewage treatment facility became a 
catalyst for the city of Beijing to construct more BOT projects.6 Second, because the city 
 
6 Since the Xiaoguhe project, the Beijing government created another eight sewage treatment BOT projects 




of Beijing won its bid for hosting the 2008 Olympic Games in 2001, the demand for a 
large amount of Olympic venues prompted the Beijing government to create additional 
BOT projects. As a result, the large demands of new BOT projects created the necessity 
for BOT laws, policies, and rules to attract more private investment targeting various BOT 
projects (Zhou 2010). 
After the Ministry of Construction passed the OIMP in 2002, the pro-BOT group 
requested that the Beijing government followed the central government’s opinion and 
fulfilled local BOT laws. In 2003, the Beijing government announced two crucial BOT 
rules. The first was “The Opinion for Deepening Municipal Infrastructure Facility’s 
Investment and Financing System Reform.” This opinion explicitly stipulated that the city 
of Beijing would use PPP and BOT to attract private investment to urban infrastructures. 
The second was “The Measures for the Franchising Operation of Urban Infrastructures of 
Beijing Municipality.” These measures offered explicit steps for authorities to implement 
BOT projects and stipulated the scope of various urban infrastructures authorized to use 
BOT, including that of solid waste facilities (Zhou and Xu 2008; Zhou 2010; Yang 2012). 
The new rules provided an incentive for the Beijing government to utilize BOT to build 
infrastructures. 
As a result, the effort to promote BOT urban utilities altered the Beijing municipal 
solid waste treatment policy, which created even more incineration facilities. In the same 
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year of passing these two BOT rules, the Beijing government announced an urban solid 
waste treatment document: the “White Paper of Beijing Household Waste Governance” 
in 2003. To meet the requirements of a green Olympics, the white paper claimed to 
complete fifteen new urban solid waste facilities, along with three new incinerators. 
Because the BOT rules inspired the Beijing government’s confidence in building more 
urban utilities, the white paper emphasized that building solid waste facilities would utilize 
BOT to meet the construction requirements. 
Sound Co. reaped substantial benefits due to their active mobilization in the 
Beijing BOT and waste policies. The Beijing government announced the construction of 
two new incineration projects with BOT in Asuwei and Liulitun in 2005. Sound Co. 
collaborated with a local Beijing SOE, Beijing Fourth Environment Sanitation Group Co. 
Ltd., which won the bid for the Asuwei incinerator (Zhou and Xu 2008). The Beijing 
Green Energy Environment Co., another local SOE of Beijing city, received approval for 
the project of the Liulitun incinerator.7 
In 2007, the Beijing government announced another important urban solid waste 
treatment document: “Beijing Municipal Solid Waste Treatment Facility Construction 
Implementation Plan in the 11th Five-Year Plan (Beijing Municipal Solid Waste Treatment 
in the 11th Five-Year Plan).” The efforts of the pro-BOT group finally expanded the 
 
7 I will describe the reason why the Asuwei and Liulitun incineration projects’ investors were not all private 
incineration corporations, but rather included two local Beijing SOEs (Beijing Fourth Environment 




Beijing incineration market. The plan extended the white paper and specified, in 2010, an 
increase in the rate of incineration to treat solid waste from less than 10% to 40%, as well 
as the completion of four scheduled incinerators. Besides Liulitun, Gaoantun, and Asuwei, 
the Beijing government decided to construct the Nangong incinerator (Beijing Municipal 
Committee of the City 2007). 
Further Developments 
The success of the MAFMPU encouraged Wang Guan-dao and the private 
environmental corporations to use existing policies to further legitimize other policies, 
which further allowed for diverse actors to influence solid waste policies and expand the 
incineration industry within the next period. This occurred in several ways. 
First, the Ministry of Construction established formal committees of experts, 
which then recruited external experts’ participation in the decision-making processes. This 
change in the state structure allowed more social actors to influence incineration policies. 
After the market reform of 1979, the Chinese government established expert committees 
and research institutions in several departments to recruit external scholars and specialists 
who had been persecuted during the Great Cultural Revolution (Cheng and White 1990; 
Zang 1999; Zou 2004). These recruits formed committees of experts and research 
institutions8 that superficially could access decision-making processes. However, unlike 
 
8 Committees of experts recruited external academic scholars and specialists to consult and garner their 
opinions. Research institutions were internal units within departments and they recruited highly-educated 




experts from international institutions who possessed significant resources and technology, 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s these domestic experts remained subordinate to 
departments and reliant on departmental resources. Therefore, these experts merely acted 
as consultants who provided a rubber stamp (He 2008; Cao 2013). 
As previously described, the expansion of the administrative reforms in 1998 was 
crucial changes in the state structures that coincided with the administrative experiencing 
shrinkage and capacity decline. As a result, it was difficult for the state agencies to keep 
up with the rapidly changing market. Some departments, such as the Ministry of 
Construction, had to recruit external specialists to conduct market surveys and draft 
pragmatic and appropriate policies. 
Although Dayue’s help allowed the Ministry of Construction to fulfill the 
MAFMPU, the help was only temporary because it relied on the political coalition of 
Dayue and Wang Guang-dao. To establish a political-legal arrangement to allow external 
specialists to access decision-making processes, the Ministry of Construction declared in 
January 2003, “the Key Points for the Work of Science and Technology of Department of 
the Ministry of Construction in 2003” (Ministry of Construction 2003b). The Ministry of 
Construction decided: 
In order to offer decision-consulting service for industrial development, the 
Ministry of Construction will give full play to experts’ effects, raise the 
scientification of decision-making and the competence of administration by law, 




Construction’s committees of experts according to the key industries, specific 
works, and demands (Ministry of Construction 2003b). 
This general declaration offered a legal basis for stipulating various experts’ role 
in the decision-making processes within specific administrative fields, which also 
included incineration. In March 2003, the Ministry of Construction announced the 
“Administrative Rule of Committees of Experts of Ministry of Construction,” which 
formally introduced experts into the realm of decision-making processes (Ministry of 
Construction 2003a). The rule stipulated that experts were able to participate in policy-
making processes, draft general strategic plans, investigate projects, and undertake 
projects related to the Ministry of Construction commission (Ministry of Construction 
2003a). In other words, experts were responsible for diverse policies; those which were 
relevant to the development of the incineration industry such as urban utilities politics’ 
demonstration, solid waste management strategy plans, and research surveys. 
Two committees of experts in the Ministry of Construction were relevant to the 
incineration development: The Committee of Experts of Urban Public Utilities Sector and 
the Committee of Experts of Sustainable Development and Resource Environment. Many 
pro-incineration scholars and incineration corporation leaders were recruited as experts of 
the two committees by the Ministry of Construction. 
Second, the success of h2o-china in guiding generate public opinion and 
establishing a political coalition to promote the MAFMPU inspired private environmental 
corporations to advance their organizational capacity to build strong political coalitions. 




The first organization was soildwaste-china website9, which was established by 
Golden State in 2005. Besides the website operation and recruitment of members, 
solidwaste-china held the “Solid Waste Advanced Salons”, which invited officials, 
incineration corporation leaders, international institution staffs, and academic professors 
to provide policy suggestions (Li 2005). The Solid Waste Advanced Salons were held 
once or even several times per year, and developed into an important platform or forum 
for corporations, professors, and officials to discuss current problems and general issues. 
Moreover, the change in the state structure provided a channel for solidwaste-china 
to access decision-making processes. The two new committees of experts in the Ministry 
of Construction recruited participants of the Solid Waste Advanced Salons.10 In this way, 
the Ministry of Construction and solidwaste-china were mutual beneficial. The Ministry 
of Construction recruited the experts who had close association with the industry and were 
able to formulate appropriate policies. Solidwaste-china was able to learn policy 
tendencies and provide significant influence on policies through these experts (Interview 
Qin Ya-ling, June 17, 2016). In addition, the change in the state structures that allowed 
solidwaste-china to access decision-making processes also occurred at the local level. The 
 
9 Solidwaste-china’s domain name is http://solidwaste.com.cn/. 
10 Nie Yong-feng, Xu Sen-long, and Xu Hai-yun were famous pro-incineration experts on the committees. 
Nie Yong-feng was a professor of the Department of Environmental Science and Engineering, Tsinghua 
University. Xu Sen-long and Xu Hai-yun were staff members of the China Urban Construction Design & 
Research Institute Co. Ltd., which was corporatized from the Ministry of Construction’s departments. They 




members of the urban sanitation committee of the Beijing Municipal Committee and the 
Solid Waste Advanced Salons were also overlapped. Thus, one-half of the experts had 
close relationships with solidwaste-china. The urban sanitation committee had eight 
members. Four members, Wang Qi, Li Guo-xue, Xu Wen-long, and Fang Jian-hua, were 
pro-incineration experts who had a close relationship with solidwaste-china. 
The second organization was a formal industrial association: the China 
Environment Chamber of Commerce (China Environment Chamber). Based on the 
experience of h2o-china and solidwaste-china, active participants in these two 
organizations concluded to create the China Environment Chamber. Zhuang Ying-mei, a 
leader of the China Environment Chamber, observed that, “Wen Yi-bo realized that even 
though the using of personal relationships and informal ties to influence policies could 
benefit Sound Co.’s interests, there was a limitation. In contrast, a formal institution of an 
industry can pursue industrial interests and expanding the market to benefit Sound Co.’s 
interests” (Interview Zhuang Ying-mei, June 21, 2016). As a result, Golden State, Sound 
Co., and Wang An-pei established the China Environment Chamber in 2007. The China 
Environment Chamber was a formal industry association, which was registered with the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs. The members of the association generally consisted of 
corporations involved with sewage treatment, solid waste, and air pollution protection 
(China Environment Chamber of Commerce n. d.), and Wen Yi-bo was elected as the first 
president of the China Environment Chamber. 
Because the formal committees of experts and the China Environment Chamber 




development and expansion of the Chinese incineration industry after 2007. Therefore, I 
will elaborate on their roles in the next chapter. 
THE RENEWABLE ENERGY LAW 
In a separate political arena, during the Asian financial crisis, the state’s new 
energy agenda (i.e., the strategy to encourage electricity use) alleviated internal conflicts 
among power plants. The Chinese government announced a set of policies to reduce 
electricity prices and stimulate power consumption (State Planning Commission 1998), 
and the implementation of this agenda rescued power corporations from disaster. However, 
the new energy agenda did not change the state structure by which the State Power 
Corporation monopolized this market. The State Power Corporation continued to 
prioritize the purchase of electricity from its own plants (Wang 2007; Sang and Zhang 
2011). 
By early 1999, the strategy to encourage electricity use had been implemented for 
months. Under historical condition that the new strategy rescued the power market, IPPs, 
mainly represented by the renewable energy industry, realized that their revenue had 
remained static. Consequently, these IPPs mobilized politically to redefine a new energy 
agenda, and these mobilization efforts intensified after the economy recovered in 2000. 
The subsequent section will describe how this conflict encouraged both the renewable 
energy industry and reformists to change the state structures and how the alliance towards 
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The Ertan Event 
Conflict between the State Power Corporation and the renewable energy industry 
emerged from the Ertan Event in 1999: the Ertan Hydropower Station was notable for 
having experienced a continuous financial deficit since the Asian financial crisis. 
Construction of the Ertan Hydropower Station had commenced in 1991 and reached 
completion in 1998, being supported by US$930 million loan from the World Bank. 
During the construction of the Ertan Hydropower Station project, the Chinese government 
was confident that the plant would solve the problem of electricity shortages by providing 
cheap, abundant, and clean power (Wen 2012). However, just as the plant reached 
completion in 1998, the Asian financial crisis produced an economic downturn and 
associated decline in power consumption. In response, Ertan Hydropower Station 
mobilized politically and aligned with the strategy of encouraging electricity use. 
Consequently, in 1998, Sichuan Provincial Government followed the new energy strategy 
to pass a new power price reduction rule to mitigate the financial deficit of the Ertan 
Hydropower Station (Wang 2013). 
However, the State Power Corporation limited its electricity purchases to 
generation from its own power plants’ electricity, leaving 40% of the capacity of the Ertan 
Hydropower Station idle. As a result, from the perspective of the leaders of the Ertan 
Hydropower Station, although the power industry generally stabilized after the 
implementation of the strategy of encouraging electricity use in early 1999, the station still 




a significant deficit and was under pressure to repay loans from the World Bank (Hu 2000; 
Wen 2012; Liu 2015). 
In response to the deficit, the Ertan Hydropower Development Corporation 
mobilized politically to redefine a new energy agenda. The Ertan Hydropower 
Development Corporation utilized the state structures to influence the state-controlling 
media and top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (Wang 2004b; Liu 2015). In 
response to this mobilization, Chinese president Jiang Ze-min inspected the Ertan 
Hydropower Station in April 1999. Jiang Ze-min strongly criticized the State Power 
Corporation and asked the State Development Planning Commission to solve the feed-in 
problem surrounding Ertan’s power generation and immediately reform the electric power 
system. Reformist officials immediately acted to take advantaging of Jiang Ze-min’s order, 
and in June 1999, Zhu Rong-ji presented a proposal on the electric power system reform. 
Using the neo-liberal claim that state monopolization of the power market produced 
inefficiency, the proposal promoted a pro-marketization energy agenda to split the State 
Power Corporation into separate companies responsible for power generation and power 
distribution (Hu 2000; Wen 2012; Liu 2015). In this way, the Ertan Hydropower 
Development Corporation established a political coalition involving senior leaders and 
reformist groups dissatisfied with the monopoly of the State Power Corporation. 
The State Power Corporation also used its alliance with the top leaders to oppose 
the reform. In the historical condition that the political coalition of the Ertan Hydropower 
Development Corporation and reformist officials benefitted from both state structures and 




Power Corporation president Gao Yan, who adamantly opposed the reform, was named 
as a suspect in a corruption case and impeached under the “double designation (shuanggui)” 
procedure.11Later, in 2001, he would abscond abroad (Wang 2004b; Liu 2015). Gao Yan’s 
“double designation” represented the top leaders of the Chinese Communist Party to 
punish anti-reform members, while his flight shocked other opponents of the reform. In 
February 2002, the State Council published “The No. 5 Document on Electric Power 
System Reform,” which formally implemented the State Power Corporation’s restructure 
dividing into five power energy companies and one power grid company (Liu 2015). 
Changes in the State Structure and the Promotion of the Renewable Energy Law 
The dismantlement of the State Power Corporation created a new state structure. 
This new state structure represented a crucial historical variation that broke the long-term 
state monopoly over the energy market and eliminated the political power of state-owned 
power corporations derived from their dominance of the energy supply. Under this 
historical condition, reformists and renewable energy corporations (including incineration 
corporations) approached the following issues within the context of the new state 
structures to define a new energy agenda: the renewable energy law. 
 
11 Double designation means that a member of the Chinese Communist Party is held in detention at a 
designated time and designated location because of corruption and other violations of discipline. When a 
member of the Chinese Communist Party is double designation, it shows that his or her political life almost 
ends (Sapio 2008). 
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First, after the separation of the State Power Corporation in 2012 which was the 
major obstacle to promote renewable energy, the renewable energy industries were able 
to align with the state agenda that promoted renewable energy to reduce China’s 
dependence on foreign sources of energy. For reformist state managers, for example, 
Wang Guang-hui, an official of the Electric power department of the State Economic and 
Trade Commission, argued that dismantling the monopoly of the State Power Corporation 
was a necessary step toward the development of renewable energy (Wang 2000). 
Second, China’s economy managed to recover from the Asian financial crisis 
which caused another wave of power shortages in 2012 (He, Zhang and Xiao 2004; Ma 
2004b; Wang 2005). The State Power Corporation’s inefficiency and monopoly was to 
blame for restrictions on energy innovation as well as the IPPs’ efficient power to feed in 
(Wang 2005). After the separation of the State Power Corporation, renewable energy was 
treated as an important option, which was necessary to solve power shortages (He, Zhang 
and Xiao 2004). 
Third, because renewable energy generation was a new technology, its costs were 
higher than traditional energy methods. One of the most significant support policies for 
the renewable energy industries was the feed-in tariff, which guaranteed access to the grid 
and purchased power at inflated prices. However, the previous policies did not stipulate 
specific purchasing prices nor identified who would be responsible for payment (Wang 
2007). A renewable energy facility had to negotiate a contract with the State Power 
Corporation on a case by case basis (Ma 2004a). However, the State Power Corporation 




tariffs. After the State Power Corporation was divided, renewable energy corporations 
were well aware that it was time to have a renewed and higher support rule within the legal 
hierarchy (Chen 2005). As a result, they treated the renewable energy law as a tremendous 
opportunity to benefit their interests. 
In the law-making process, due to the differences in political channels and 
resources, different renewable energy industries used a wide diversity of strategies to 
influence the law. When the hydropower industry and the solar industry had stronger 
collective political actions, the incineration industry association as mentioned previously, 
was burgeoning; therefore, individual corporations used their personal relationships to 
influence the law. Because the hydropower industry had a long history and a dedicated 
department in administration (i.e., the Ministry of Water Resources), it possessed 
numerous channels to mobilize pro-hydropower officials to change the draft. For example, 
large-scale hydropower was not be listed in the initial draft of the renewable energy law. 
The hydropower industry allied with Chen Wang-xiang, a veteran of the Ministry of Water 
Resources and an important planner of the electric power system reform, to change the 
policy. As a result, the newly passed renewable energy law stipulated that large-scale 
hydropower was renewable energy and enjoyed subsidies. 
The solar industry utilized the position of Himin Solar Group’s chairman Huang 
Ming, a National People’s Congress’s delegate, to advance its interests. Huang Ming 
united other delegates to issue another version of the draft of the renewable energy law in 




incentive in the law being passed for the renewable energy industries (Zhao and Zhang 
2005; Fu 2006). 
In the incineration field, according to the National People’s Congress’s records, 
incineration was not involved in renewable energy, at least in the draft. Ye Ru-tang, the 
deputy director of the National People’s Congress Environmental and Resources 
Committee, suggested that incineration should be treated as renewable energy in a 
subgroup meeting (National People’s Congress 2005). Zhuang Ying-mei, who was a 
leader of the China Environment Chamber and was the general secretary of the National 
People’s Congress’s Environmental and Resources Committee in 2005, admitted that an 
incineration corporation lobbied Ye Ru-tang. Zhuang Ying-me recalled that “Ye Ru-tang 
was familiar with some incineration corporations. I assure that incineration corporations 
influenced him, but I don’t know the exactly corporations.” (Interview Zhuang Ying-mei, 
June 21, 2016). In the end, the renewable energy law stipulated that incineration was 
renewable energy and thus able to take advantage of subsidies. Zhuang Ying-me said that 
Ye Ru-tang’s support to the incineration industry is a likely reason Ye Ru-tang was hired 
as an independent director of an incineration corporation after his retirement (Dongjiang 
Environmental Company 2009). 
As a result, the renewable energy law was one of the acts that was passed with 
lightning speed, the fastest since the PRC was founded in 1949 (Zhao and Zhang 2005). 
The National People’s Congress announced the draft of the renewable energy law in 2003, 
and the law was passed in 2005. In 2006, another important measure relating to the subsidy 




Allocation of Costs for Electricity Generated from Renewable Energy (TMMPAC)” 
stipulated that feed-in tariffs for incineration plants were comprised of a “benchmark feed-
in tariff for conventional coal-fired plants in the same province”, as determined by the 
government authorities from time to time plus a fixed “subsidy premium” of RMB 0.25 
per kWh (National Development and Reform Commission 2006). After the TMMPAC 
was passed, the investment of incinerators began to boom because the feed-in tariff was 
able to increase the income of incinerators. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter demonstrates that the organizational-political economy perspective 
explains the decision-making processes of the MAFMPU and the renewable energy law. 
Several dimensions of the policy formation processes are explained by the organizational-
political economy perspective. 
First, the efforts of international institutions to focus on the marketization of 
environmental policies before the Asian financial crisis provided important political-legal 
arrangements that supported the power of domestic corporations. 
Second, the historical variation in economic performance crucially influenced the 
political actions of the state and social actors. The Asian financial crisis seriously and 
negatively affected profits, which led state managers to offer an economic intervention in 
the form of a stimulus plan. After this stimulus plan rescued the economy, the anti-reform 
group attempted to enlarge the plan and transform it into state-driven long-term 
developmental agenda. In response, the pro-reform group mobilized politically in 




Third, during the policy formation process of the MAFMPU, through providing 
long-term treasury bonds to support construction, the Chinese government’s bailout in 
response to the Asian financial crisis threatened BOT practices. In response to this threat, 
reformists within the government and the burgeoning incineration corporations who 
benefitted from the BOT legal framework mobilized politically. Although the anti-BOT 
group resisted and used the negative effects of privatization to attack the reform, China’s 
entry to the WTO and embrace of the neo-liberal development agenda legitimized the 
reformists and private incineration corporations’ actions. As a result, several BOT projects 
were approved in Beijing and the central government passed the MAFMPU. These 
developments influenced Beijing’s solid waste policies, and facilitated the use of BOT to 
build more incinerators. 
Fourth, the policy formation process of the renewable energy law also 
demonstrated how historical conditions of the changes in economic performance 
influenced both state and non-state actors to establish a political coalition, shape the state 
structures, and align with the neo-liberal agenda to define a new renewable energy law. 
The Asian financial crisis encouraged the state, the State Power Corporation and the Ertan 
Hydropower Development Corporation to unite and issue the strategy of encouraging 
electricity use. However, when the historical condition of the economic downturn reversed, 
they became divided. The Ertan Hydropower Development Corporation mobilized and 
allied with reformists, then promoted the neo-liberal agenda to split up the State Power 
Corporation, fundamentally restructuring the role of the state in relation to the energy 




restructuring to influence decision-making related to renewable energy regulations. 
Specifically, incineration corporations successfully lobbied the National People’s 
Congress to include incineration technology in the national renewable energy strategy. 
This caused the incineration market to boom after the renewable energy law classified 
incineration technology as renewable energy, meaning it was eligible to benefit from the 
feed-in tariff. 
Fifth, this chapter demonstrates that the expansion of the incineration market 
resulted from efforts of social actors both inside and outside the state. Because political-
legal arrangements established in the previous period provided channels to access 
decision-making processes and benefited private corporations, reformists and private 
corporations were able to realize the market-led reforms. In fact though, the MAFMPU 
established a market that was not self-regulating and did not operate according to the 
private sector rules. The MAFMPU established a BOT legal framework that subsidized 
the operation of urban utilities by private corporations while making the government 
legally responsible for ensuring the incomes of those corporations for 20–30 years. The 
renewable energy law fixed the price of renewable energy. Without pre-existing political-
legal arrangements that allowed corporations and reformists to access the state structures 
and overcome resistance from anti-reform groups, the MAFMPU and the renewable 
energy law could not have been introduced or enforced, preventing the expansion of the 
incineration market. 
Finally, during this period, private environmental corporations organized 




and solidwaste-china) to influence decision-making processes by using historical personal 
relationships and the generation of strong public support for their positions. Although 
initial successes in influencing policies encouraged the continuation of such political 
coalitions, leaders of environmental corporation realized that limitations of what their 
personal relationships could achieve. Therefore, they established a formal industry 
association, the China Environment Chamber, in 2006. Subsequently, the China 
Environment Chamber, h2o-china.com, and solidwaste-china became the three most 
important platforms for collecting industry data and influencing policies. These three 








POLICY PERIOD THREE: 
12TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND NATIONWIDE FEED-IN TARIFF, 2008–2012 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I apply the organization-political economy perspective to analyze 
two specific policies’ formation process related to the rapid growth of incinerators from 
2008–2012. These policies were the 12th Five-Year Plan and the unit price standard for a 
feed-in tariff (Figure 4.1 shows social actors and political coalitions relevant to these two 
policies see). The perspective presented here also illustrates that changes in economic 
performance, the ability to access the state structure, and political coalitions constrained 
environmental authorities’ regulation and ENGOs’ activities. 
By 2007, the marketization of urban utilities and the renewable energy feed-in 
tariff provided the political-legal frameworks through which incineration corporations 
promoted incinerator construction and influenced more policies of central and local 
governments, especially in Beijing. However, the incineration market was impacted by 
certain deficiencies of these policies and by the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 
2007–2008. Corporations and the state initially responded to this threat to the incineration 
market employing diverse strategies. Eventually though, political mobilization led to their 
promotion of a common strategy that further expanded the incineration market. Two 
important policies were passed during this period: (1) the 12th Five-Year Plan set out a 




These policies established an environmental consensus between the government and 
corporations, resulting in numerous incineration contracts, and limiting the capacity of 
environmental authorities to implement incineration pollution prevention rules. 
Moreover, anti-incineration campaigns emerged in response to the potential 
pollution issues associated with the rapid growth of incinerators. Beijing witnessed several 
protests against plans for new incinerator plans. Diverse actors, including state managers, 
incineration corporations, anti-incineration groups, and so on, mobilized politically to 
shape the solid waste agenda in Beijing. Although these protests successfully suspended 
certain projects for a few years (Johnson 2010; Johnson 2013b), the pro-incineration 




Figure 4.1: Actors and their Political Coalitions Related to the Development of the 
Chinese Incineration Industry, 2008–2012 
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THE PREVIOUS POLICIES’ DEFICIENCIES 
In this section, I describe how the deficiencies of previous policies influenced the 
interests of diverse actors in relation to the incineration industry. During the previous 
period, the MAFMPU and the renewable energy law provided the incineration industry 
with political-legal arrangements that supported rapid growth. To promote the 
implementation of these two measures, the Chinese government subsequently passed 
several executive orders to promote urban environmental facility markets and stipulate 
subsidy rules. However, these orders did not equally benefit all incineration corporations 
and cities, incentivizing diverse actors to promote further changes to incineration policies. 
 First, although the TMMPAC subsidized electrical power generation by 
incinerators, this benefit was not extended to all incinerators. For example, because state 
manages argued that circulating fluidized-bed combustion (CFBC) was co-fired with 
auxiliary coal, it should be treated as fossil fuel power plants. The TMMPAC excluded 
CFBC incinerators from any feed-in tariffs (Fan, Shi and Qin 2010). 
Second, because the feed-in tariff for coal-fired plants in western China was lower 
than in eastern China, the adding feed-in tariff price of RMB 0.25 per kWh could not 
attract investment by incineration corporations to western cities (Li 2011). Therefore, 
incinerator construction was rare in western China. 
Third, the passing of the MAFMPU encouraged many local governments to 
formulate orders or measures to promote incinerators. Because the MAFMPU was a 
general policy, local governments had their own diverse interpretations. Incineration 




implementation of incineration, which effectively became an administrative obstacles (Jin 
2006). 
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008 AND THE WANING OF NEO-
LIBERALISM 
Besides highlighting the insufficiencies of the MAFMPU and the renewable 
energy law, the global financial crisis of 2008 also produced new problems for the 
incineration industry. This crisis represented historical variations of economic downturn 
and waning neo-liberalism that affected the development of the incineration industry. This 
occurred in several ways. 
First, in response to the sudden and negative impact of the crisis1, the Chinese 
government offered a four-trillion yuan 2  economic stimulus plan focusing on 
infrastructure investment. Suffering from severe deficit, corporations united to support 
this plan (Barboza 2008). 
Second, similar to the response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997, local 
governments decreased their investment in new BOT projects as the economic stimulus 
plan of 2008 provided them with infrastructure funds (H2o-china 2008; Dong 2015). 
Private incineration corporations thus once again were confronted declines in BOT 
 
1 According to the World Bank, in 2007, the rate of China’s GDP growth was 14.2%, which declined to 
9.6% and 9.2% in 2008 and 2009, respectively 
(http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?end=2015&locations=CN&start=1961&vie
w=chart). 




projects (Jin 2015b), with the result that the marketization process of urban infrastructure 
once again became uncertainty. However, the historical variation of neo-liberalism 
undermined the ability of the pro-reform group to reaffirm the marketization of urban 
infrastructure agenda. 
Because the crisis emerged from the US and Europe, serious doubts grew around 
the neo-liberal developmental agenda, advocated by developed countries and international 
institutions. The anti-reform group in China gained broadened political space to criticize 
the market reforms and privatization initiatives. Certain anti-reform officials and 
intellectuals became more confident of the capacities of the Chinese state and attempted 
to offer an alternative state agenda, especially after the stimulus plan proved effective and 
the Chinese economy recovered from the second quarter of 2009 (Freeman III and Wen 
2011). Moreover, the pro-reform group faced difficulty in reaffirming the marketization 
of urban infrastructure agenda that benefited the interests of private incineration 
corporations. 
Thus, the waning of neo-liberal influence allowed SOEs to invest in public utilities. 
The global financial crisis influenced all economic spheres, and many corporations, 
especially SOEs, sought new profitable business ventures. Simultaneously, the contract 
period for incineration BOT projects normally ranged between 25 to 30 years, allowing 
an investor to receive stable and long-term income (Li 2012). Consequently, many 
corporations attempted to invest in municipal solid waste (Jin 2015a), and investment by 
SOEs significantly influenced the incineration market. The decline in neo-liberal influence 




used their ties with the government, both formal and informal, to easily overcome 
administrative obstacles, persuade local governments to restore BOT projects, and receive 
additional incineration projects. This was especially evident in the first-tier cities3, which 
were large enough to host local SOEs to monopolize incineration projects. For example, 
Beijing’s new incineration projects were controlled by the Beijing Environment Sanitation 
Engineering Group. This local SOE were so powerful that central incineration SOEs and 
private corporations could not invest in the Beijing area. Everbright Environmental 
Protection Industry Co., Ltd. (Everbright) was the largest central incineration SOEs in 
China. A leader of Everbright said, “We have employed all our influences, but we cannot 
enter Beijing” (Interview Wan Jia-min, July 8, 2016). A leader of Sound Co. also 
complained that private incineration corporations were hardly to obtain new projects in 
Beijing (Interview Mai Cheng-feng, July 12, 2016). 
Third, in the incineration field, a conflict existed between incineration corporations 
and the Chinese government regarding the TMMPAC, passed in 2006. Because CFBC 
incineration corporations received no feed-in tariff, they were more heavily impacted by 
the crisis. Therefore, they mobilized politically to submit their demands to the China 
Environment Chamber and lobbied the government to relax the feed-in tariff standard of 
the TMMPAC (China Sciences Group 2009; China Environment Chamber of Commerce 
2011). However,  because the loopholes of the TMMPAC allowed incinerators to enjoy 
subsidies for adding coal to further misappropriate subsidies, the National Development 
 




and Reform Commission4 and financial departments that paid excessive subsidies argued 
that it was necessary to reform the TMMPAC (China Electric Power News 2008). 
As a result, although the bailout policy of 2008 produced a historical condition that 
stabilized the economy, it also produced conflicts of interests between members of the 
incineration industry (e.g., between SOEs and private incineration corporations, or 
between CFBC incineration corporations and others). Unlike the previous periods when 
neo-liberalism was prevalent, during this period private incineration corporations had 
difficulty creating an agenda that reaffirmed the market-oriented reform. The historical 
variation of changing neo-liberalism affected private sectors, industry associations, and 
state managers in their evaluation of the bailout policy and proposal regarding state 
developmental agendas. In the next two sections, I present how these actors used political 
coalitions and the state structure to compete with one another in the pursuit of their varied 
interests. 
THE INCINERATION DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
As described in Chapter III, by 2006, the Ministry of Construction and many local 
governments, including that of Beijing, employed the marketization of urban utilities and 
prioritized incineration treatment as a solution to urban garbage problems. These political-
legal arrangements obviously supported the development of the incineration industry. 
 
4 The National Development and Reform Commission’s preceding agency was the State Development 
Planning Commission. The State Development Planning Commission was reformed and renamed the 




However, after 2008, there were two historical variation that affected the incineration 
development. First, the global financial crisis and bailout policies eroded the benefits 
realized by previous policies, fostering conflicts among private incineration corporations, 
SOEs, and the state. Second, as the influence of neo-liberalism declined, the anti-reform 
group gained momentum for its efforts to promote state intervention with the economy to 
support SOE development. Therefore, it was a historical condition that that bailout policy 
of 2008 demonstrated the capacity of the state to rescue the economy and support SOEs 
in promoting a long-term and state-dominated developmental agenda. 
The State Structure Exploited by SOE 
The China Urban Construction Design & Research Institute Co. Ltd. (Urban 
Construction Institute) was a SOE that exploited this historical condition and the state 
structures (specifically its close ties with state departments) to define the long-term agenda 
for the incineration industry: the urban construction sections of the 12th Five-Year Plan. 
The Urban Construction Institute was a company responsible for designing urban facilities, 
and prior to 2000, it was a unit of the Ministry of Construction. In 2000, there was a crucial 
shift in the state structure that downsized the Ministry of Construction. The State Council 
announced corporatizing the Urban Construction Institute and other units in the year 2000 
(Ministry of Science and Technology 2000).5 Since then, the Urban Construction Institute 
 
5 Since then, the Urban Construction Institute was established as a company and is under the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, which is a department of the State Council that 




was established as a company and is under the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission, which is a department of the State Council that manages all 
SOEs. This new state structure represented a historical variation that the Urban 
Construction Institute had incentives and channels to influence policies. First, as a profit-
seeking company, the Urban Construction Institute treated incineration designs as an 
important source of revenue. Generally, the incineration design budget comprised up 3%–
5% of the incineration budget, which around US$80–160 million (Interview Mai Cheng-
feng, July 12, 2016). Second, as a SOE, it had close ties with the Ministry of Housing and 
Urban-Rural Development (Ministry of Housing Development)6 and other departments 
(Interview Shi Zhi-hong, June 17, 2016, Interview Mai Cheng-feng, July 12, 2016). 
Furthermore, the waning of the neo-liberal influence after 2008 was an important 
historical variation that allowed SOEs to influence policies. Contrasting with the weakness 
of SOEs in industry policy formation processes before 2008, the Urban Construction 
Institute appeared confident of its ability to define policies. Shi Zhi-hong, the leader of the 
Urban Construction Institute stated that, “Our business relationship with incineration 
corporations allowed us to gather comprehensive information concerning the incineration 
industry. Thus, we have a better understanding of the incineration market than the 
incineration industry associations” (Interview Shi Zhi-hong, June 17, 2016). The Urban 
Construction Institute’s ability to access both the market and the government allowed it to 
 
6 The Ministry of Housing Development preceding agency was the Ministry of Construction. The Ministry 




win the bid for the urban construction research project, which was part of the 12th Five-
Year Plan. 
The waning of the neo-liberal influence also represented a historical condition to 
affect social actors’ strategies. During the drafting of the 12th Five-Year Plan, incineration 
industry associations and private incineration corporations did not promote the agenda of 
the marketization of urban utilities, but rather aligned with SOEs to develop an industry-
wide policy. They attempted to establish a predictable growth rate for incinerators in the 
12th Five-Year Plan because the precise growth number was able to demonstrate explicit 
profit for the financial sector and offer confidence for local governments to create 
incineration projects. Zhuang Ying-mei, who was a leader of the China Environment 
Chamber, recalled that “before the 12th Five-Year Plan, we found that banks did not have 
confidence in the incineration markets. Banks’ negative attitude towards incineration was 
one major obstacle for incineration corporations to get financing for the projects” 
(Interview Zhuang Ying-mei, June 21, 2016). 
The primary obstacle toward establishing a nationwide growth number of 
incinerators was the local governments’ somewhat negative attitude. Because every region 
had its developmental stage and solid waste amount, several local governments’ Five-Year 
plans did not list incineration technology as a high priority. Moreover, the National 
Development and Reform Commission had a debate concerning the indicators regarding 






Political Coalitions of the Incineration Industry 
During this period, incineration industry associations (i.e., China Environment 
Chamber and E207) represented powerful political coalitions. They played diverse roles 
in the decision-making process of the 12th Five-Year Plan. First, because of low capability, 
the National Development and Reform Commission had to locate external support to 
fulfill plans for specific fields. Ren Xuan-ming, a staff member of the National 
Development and Reform Commission, admitted this, saying, “Our team had less than 10 
staff members. How could we draft the entire nation’s solid waste policies? We had to 
outsource to an appropriate organization” (Interview Ren Xuan-ming, June 21, 2016). 
The China Environment Chamber, E20, and the Urban Construction Institute 
became National Development and Reform Commission’s important expert sources 
(Interview Qin Ya-ling, June 17, 2016; Interview Shi Zhi-hong, June 17, 2016; Interview 
Zhuang Ying-mei, June 21, 2016; Interview Zhu Guo-an, June 30, 2016), and they played 
various roles in promoting the incineration development in the 12th Five-Year Plan’s 
agenda. 
 
7 For reasons explained below, in this chapter I use the label E20 to refer to h2o-china and solidwaste-china. 
In 2010, the leaders of h2o-china and solidwaste-china established the Environmental Industry E20 Club, 
which recruited more than 30 famous environmental corporations as members. E20 became an umbrella 
name of h2o-china and solidwaste-china. In 2014, the E20 Environmental Platform was established and 
became the parent company of h2o-china, solidwaste-china, china-daqi.com, E20 Institute of Environment 
Industry, E20 Club, and E20 Forum. In 2015, the E20 Environmental Platform issued initial public offerings 




Second, China Environment Chamber and E20 became important organizations 
which played a role in political coalitions. They held several conferences and forums to 
influence public opinions, as well as affecting officials’ attitudes towards incineration. 
By using these methods, incineration corporations’ agendas competed against the 
local governments, which had developed a negative attitude towards incineration in the 
decision-making process of the municipal solid waste part in the 12th Five-Year Plan. Shi 
Zhi-hong stated that: 
I cannot say that the Urban Construction Institute fully determined the municipal 
solid waste part of the 12th Five-Year Plan. … When many provinces and cities’ 
Five-Year plans had a high proportion of landfill and compost facilities, I insisted 
that the landfill and compost solutions did not work well in previous years and 
China had to increase its incineration (Interview Shi Zhi-hong, June 17, 2016). 
Therefore, the final version of the 12th Five-Year Plan reached a compromise. The 
main text of the plan did not explicate the exact growth rate of incineration, but only 
stipulated that municipal solid waste’s harmless treatment should approach 80%, which 
included landfill, compost, and incineration. The National Development and Reform 
Commission allowed the Ministry of Housing Development and the Urban Construction 
Institute to draw up an annexation plan for the 12th Five-Year Plan in the municipal solid 
waste field: the “National Municipal Solid Waste Harmless Treatment Facility 
Construction Proposal of the 12th Five-Year Plan.” This proposal also convened the 
experts of the China Environment Chamber, E20, and the Urban Construction Institute to 




30, 2016). In 2012, the proposal was announced, and suggested that using incineration 
technology in municipal solid waste’s harmless treatment should reach 35% in the national 
area and 48% in the eastern area. It was the first time that a Five-Year plan stipulated the 
proportion of incinerations in the municipal solid waste treatment. 
To summarize, the success of the 2008 bailout policy and the waning of neo-
liberalism was two historical variation that encouraged the anti-reform group and SOEs to 
promote a state-dominated agenda. Because administrative reforms in 2000 changed the 
state structure, the Urban Construction Institute played a dual role in policy making 
process after 2007: as both an external unit of the government and a profit-seeking 
company involved in incineration. Through its collaboration with the China Environment 
Chamber and E20, the Urban Construction Institute became an important channel via 
which incineration corporations could influence the 12th Five-Year Plan, a decision-
making process to which they had previously lacked access. 
NATIONWIDE FEED-IN TARIFF 
Although the TMMPAC stimulated the dramatic growth of incineration 
investment after 2006, its deficiencies (i.e., bias against CFBC incinerators and the low 
feed-in tariff of incinerators in the western area) resulted in the inequitable development 
of incinerators between various regions in China (China Sciences Group 2009; Li 2011). 
This situation worsened after the global financial crisis. The crisis was a historical 
condition that produced price-cutting competition in the incineration industry and conflicts 
between SOEs and private incineration corporations (Jin 2015a). When the feed-in tariff, 




incinerator, a price reform regarding the feed-in tariff was treated as a crucial policy to 
rectify the market order (Qin 2009). As in the policy formation process relating to national 
growth in the number of incinerators as set out in the 12th Five-year Plan, private 
incineration corporations did not promote a new feed-in tariff policy that excluded SOEs. 
When the historical condition favored the state-dominated agenda, private incineration 
corporations allied with SOEs to suggest a nationwide feed-in tariff policy. 
Reform of the TMMPAC and Conflicts within the National Development and 
Reform Commission 
Prior to the global financial crisis, CFBC incineration corporations voiced 
discontent with the TMMPAC. The Hangzhou Jin-jiang Group, the largest private 
incineration corporations, had been developing CFBC technology for many years. The 
exclusion of CFBC from the feed-in tariff offered an incentive for the Hangzhou Jin-jiang 
Group and other companies using CFBC to mobilize politically to change the TMMPAC 
(Qin 2009). For example, Wang Yuan-luo, the Executive Chairman of the Hangzhou Jin-
jiang Group, explained that the unfair treatment of CFBC impaired their interests and 
produced unfair competition. She also started to organize other CFBC companies after the 
TMMPAC was passed. They suggested that the China Environment Chamber to appeal 
for a new feed-in tariff rule, and lobbied the central and local administrations (China 
Sciences Group 2009). They also utilized the state structures to access the decision-
making processes. For example, after a few years’ effort, in 2009, the Energy Research 
Institute of the National Development and Reform Commission held a conference inviting 




that CFBC incinerators should be granted the feed-in tariff and that the incinerator’s 
subsidy should be calculated by the waste’s weight. 
However, CFBC corporations’ attempt to ease the tariff standard generated 
internal conflicts for the National Development and Reform Commission. As a department 
which carried out functions to integrate other departments’ opinions and then offer a 
macro control economic strategy, the National Development and Reform Commission had 
diverse divisions concerning different economic issues. Few divisions within the National 
Development and Reform Commission supported incineration subsidies because they are 
concerned the dramatic increase of garbage in urban areas and the huge investment in 
incinerators toward pushing economic development (Interview Ren Xuan-ming, June 21, 
2016). Because building incinerators constituted substantial investments and involved 
high technology, these divisions treated the promotion of the incineration industry as a 
better method by which to grow the economy than other garbage solutions. In general, the 
construction costs of an incinerator in first-tier cities reached more than US$80 million. 
Building an incinerator involved other sectors’ compatible development, such as financial 
credits, material science, prevention of pollution technology, etc. A previous division chief 
of the National Development and Reform Commission said: “as an authority which is 
responsible for the macro control of the Chinese economy, we prefer incineration because 
it is able to drive other sectors’ development and promote the whole national economic 
development. Other garbage solutions do not have a similar effect” (Interview Ren Xuan-




However, other divisions of the National Development and Reform Commission 
believed that incinerators used loopholes in the TMMPAC to misappropriate subsidies. 
Because China’s municipal solid waste did not properly classify the garbage, the result 
was that there was too much moisture and impurities. To reach the kilocalorie that 
represented the feed-in tariff standard, grate combustion incinerators also added coal. 
From these sub-departments’ point of view, incinerators using large amounts of coal 
should be treated as coal-fired plants and could not qualify for the renewable energy 
subsidies (Qin 2009). If this loophole was not addressed and CFBC eased the TMMPAC 
successfully, the national financial condition would deteriorate even further. These sub-
departments allying with financial departments recommended restricting incinerator 
subsidies. 
Therefore, the split of the National Development and Reform Commission was a 
state structure that social actors employed their influences on incineration policies. 
Besides the CFBC incineration corporations, other actors mobilized politically to 
influence the National Development and Reform Commission’s pro-incineration divisions. 
First, compared with eastern areas, western cities’ economic development was slow, and 
they still confronted a severe problem of garbage growth. When the TMMPAC guided 
incineration investment towards the eastern areas, western cities urged the central 
government to find a way to reverse the imbalance (Fan, Shi and Qin 2010; Li 2011). 
Indeed, after the global financial crisis, the economic stimulus plan allowed western cities 
to build incinerators. However, because the TMMPAC stipulated that incinerators’ feed-




feed-in tariff of coal-fired plants in the western area of China could not support the 
incinerators’ operation. Moreover, few western cities urged an appropriate feed-in tariff 
for the incineration industry (Fan, Shi and Qin 2010). 
Second, when local SOEs dominated the first-tier cities’ incineration market, 
private incineration corporations’ development was under threat and they, therefore, 
attempted to develop new markets. Their targets were second, third, and fourth-tier cities 
(The classification of the Chinese cities see Table 4.1) (Zhao 2012). As many second, third, 
and fourth-tier cities concentrated on the western area, and the western city governments 
became private incineration corporations’ allies. Realigning with western city 




Table 4.1: The Classification of Chinese Cities8 
 Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 Tier 4 
GDP 
The cities have 
a GDP over 
$US300 billion 





The cities have 




The cities have 
a GDP below 
US$17 billion 
Politics 












The cities is 
made up of 
prefecture 
capital cities 




Cities with more 
than 15 million 
people 
Cities of 3 to 15 
million people 
Cities with 
150,000 to 3 
million people 
Cities populated 










other 28 cities. 
Hengyang, 




other 477 cities. 
Source: The South China Morning Post 
 
8 There is no an official institution to classify the tier levels of the cities in China. There was a city-tier level 
report spreading on the Internet and was accepted by many industrial members, officials, and academic 
professors, which included the pro-incineration group. However, this report did not present sources and only 
had vague classification regarding the city tier levels. This research uses the reliable data generated by the 
South China Morning Post’s report in 2016: “Urban legend: China’s tiered city system explained”. (South 
China Morning Post 2016) 
9 The South China Morning Post used the three factors (GDP, politics, and population) to define all cities’ 




In 2009, the National Development and Reform Commission revealed the 
direction of the incineration feed-in tariff reform as a trial balloon. Ding Zong-han, a 
formal official of the Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform 
(Beijing Commission of Development and Reform), recalled that, “Every actor reflected 
that the tariff was not united, then the National Development and Reform Commission 
responded with a survey” (Interview, Ding Zong-han, June 16, 2016). The National 
Development and Reform Commission suggested a specific feed-in tariff rule for 
incinerators and agreed to CFBC incineration corporations’ suggestion that the 
incinerator’s feed-in tariff should be calculated by the weight of waste. After 2009, the 
National Development and Reform Commission held several meetings with corporations, 
industry associations, and experts to reach a consensus. 
The TMMPAC Reform, Political Coalitions, and State Structures 
During this period, the state structures allowed the China Environment Chamber 
and E20 to access the decision-making processes. These two organizations designated 
representatives to participate in the National Development and Reform Commission’s 
meetings (Interview Qin Ya-ling, June 17, 2016). Moreover, they also established strong 
political coalitions which collaborated with key actors both inside and outside the 
incineration industry. They recruited major corporations into their organizations to exhibit 
their good organizational capabilities. Ding Zong-han recalled his contact with E20 when 
he was an official of the Beijing Commission of Development and Reform: “We were 
impressed by their capabilities, especially E20.” He emphasized that “it was a virtuous 
cycle. E20 could recruit almost all corporations. The government had to participate in their 
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events because they represented the industry’s important actors. When many suggestions 
of E20 were accepted by the government, more corporations thought that E20 had great 
influence and wanted to participate” (Interview Ding Zong-han, June 16, 2016). 
In 2011, collaborating with E20, the China Environment Chamber submitted “The 
Advice of Improvement on the Municipal Solid Waste Treatment Industry” to the National 
Development and Reform Commission and the Ministry of Housing Development. 
According to this recommendation, the China Environment Chamber suggested a new 
nationwide feed-in tariff standard along with a subsidy formula. Finally, because anti-
incineration feed-in tariff divisions did not oppose this, the National Development and 
Reform Commission issued “the Policies on Improving Household Waste Incineration 
Price” which subsidized a fixed on-grid tariff of RMB 0.65 kWh, based on a ratio of 280 
kWh of electricity generated for every ton of waste received. 
As a result, the new feed-in tariff policy had significant outcomes. CFBC 
incinerators were finally able to receive the subsidy. Because the new feed-in tariff rule 
was a nationwide fixed tariff, many second, third, and fourth-tier cities began to establish 
incineration projects (Zhao 2012) (See Figure 4.2 and 4.3). Although local SOEs occupied 
almost all the first-tier incineration projects, private incineration corporations were able to 
garner other cities’ projects. Sound Co. leader Mai Cheng-feng said: 
The feed-in tariff policy of 2012 was extremely important…… In fact, it means 
that the incineration energy got the central government’s subsidy. If a local 
government chose landfill, it had to pay 100 yuan per ton. When it used 




governments would rather choose incinerators now.…… In recent years, our 
(Sound Co.) projects are in second and third-tier cities, or even lower (Interview 
Mai Cheng-feng, July 12, 2016). 
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Figure 4.3: Volume of Incinerator Treated in Four Types of Cities in China 
 
 
BEIJING INCINERATION DEVELOPMENT 
As described in Chapter III, Beijing Municipal Solid Waste Treatment in the 11th 
Five-Year Plan in 2007 was an important achievement of the pro-BOT group in Beijing. 
The plan stated that Beijing’s urban solid waste projects would use a BOT framework. 
During the drafting of the plan, although the BOT policy was assured, debate occurred 
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listed specific objectives of the Beijing government regarding incinerator construction, 
including numbers of incinerators, it also listed potential alternative solutions by 
supporters of urban waste composting and garbage classification. This compromise 
showed that the Beijing government could not meditate the conflict between the pro-
incineration and anti-incineration groups. Zhuang Ying-mei, who served on the Beijing 
Commission of Development and Reform during this period, said that compromises were 
common in policy formation processes in China. Because the Beijing Commission of 
Development and Reform lacked sufficient personnel, it could not resolve all the conflicts 
in the available timeframe and so maintained superficial harmony by drafting policies that 
included suggestions from different actors (Interview Zhuang Ying-mei, June 25, 2016). 
 As a result, when incineration corporations attempted to enact Beijing Municipal 
Solid Waste Treatment in the 11th Five-Year Plan after 2007, conflict emerged between 
the pro- and anti-incineration groups. The relative political influences of the two groups 
was determined by the historical variation of economic performance and influence of neo-
liberalism, and by their ability to access the state structures and establish political 
coalitions. In subsequent sections, I will detail how the pro-incineration group promoted 
pro-incineration policies in Beijing and outline the influence of anti-incineration protests. 
The Historical Conditions after the Global Financial Crisis 
Shortly after the enactment of the Beijing Municipal Solid Waste Treatment in the 
11th Five-Year Plan in 2007, Beijing was hit by the global financial crisis in 2008. Under 
this historical condition that the economy declined, the pro-incineration group confronted 




government’s four-trillion yuan economic stimulus plan solved the problem of decreasing 
profits facing private public utility, but eventually led to a decline in BOT projects (Jin 
2015a; Jin 2015b). 
 Second, supporters of urban waste compost and garbage classification continued 
to mobilize politically. Garbage classification was the most significant threat for the 
expansion of incineration. Some experts and state managers claimed that incineration 
technology could only be utilized in a city which established a precise garbage 
classification system. They argued that if garbage was not well classified, the incomplete 
combustion of incinerators would produce toxic carcinogens, such as dioxin (Interview 
Xie Shun-wen, June 15, 2016). Moreover, because one of the important aspects of 
incinerators’ income was derived from garbage disposal fees, which were measured by 
weight and were paid by the local governments, the classified garbage’s reduction in 
weight negatively impacted incineration corporations’ profits. In addition, supporters of 
garbage classification allied with anti-incinerator protests to shift Beijing’s solid waste 
agenda (the next section will elaborate the policy influence of the anti-incinerator group). . 
Because of the historical variation that the influence of neo-liberalism declined 
after the global financial crisis, the anti-reform group and SOEs enjoyed greater legitimacy 
and this supported their development. Private incineration corporations in Beijing could 
not reuse the market-oriented BOT strategy as they had done after the Asian financial 
crisis to respond to the above challenges. Private incineration corporations abandoned 
their previous position of promoting BOT under private sector control and instead aligned 




and political coalitions with other social actors that allowed the pro-incineration group to 
access Beijing’s decision-marking processes. 
First, although China experienced a dramatic privatization after the market reform, 
in the early 2000s, most existing SOEs were merged into corporations involving in pillar 
industries (i.e., defense, aerospace, finance and other industries that the Chinese 
government classified as strategically important and hence where majority state ownership 
would be maintained) (Eaton 2013).  Several local Beijing SOEs mobilized politically to 
have the Beijing government change classification rules to allow them pillar industry 
status. Having successfully maintained their market through this political mobilization, 
these local Beijing SOEs influenced policies by leveraging their huge resources and formal 
and informal ties with the Beijing government. 
For example, The Beijing government assigned the Beijing Municipal 
Commission of City Administration and Environment (Beijing Municipal Commission) 
to take charge of Beijing Municipal Solid Waste Treatment in the 11th Five-Year Plan. 
Ding Zong-han, a leader of Beijing Huanwei Group, a local SOE responsible for solid 
waste treatment, was a former official from Beijing Municipal Commission. Ding Zong-
han admitted that, “As local state-owned enterprises in Beijing, we naturally enjoy 
advantages. It’s impossible for my rivals to offer proposals more detailed than mine.” He 
continued: “A major reason is that when I can show how you I can establish, construct, 
design, and operate a project by myself, you can deduce that I must understand the local 
context, right?” (Interview  Ding Zong-han, June 16, 2016) An official who had previously 




is the leading expert on Beijing’s solid waste issue. We had to consult him when drawing 
up our solid waste policies” (Interview Li Zhi-wei, June 27, 2016). Therefore, private 
incineration corporations allying with SOEs to access decision-making processes related 
to incineration policies. 
Furthermore, leaders of incineration corporations, E20, and the China 
Environment Chamber used existing committees of experts to influence policies 
(Interview Li Zhi-wei, June 27, 2016; Interview Hu Wei-wen, June 29, 2016; Interview 
Shi Zhi-hong, June 26, 2016). These state structures became crucial channels for private 
corporations and SOEs to influence policies. 
Second, leveraging the improving access to the state structures obtained through 
their ties to SOEs, E20 and the China Environment Chamber established a new political 
coalition with Beijing governmental officials at the grass-roots and top levels. The pro-
incineration group successfully allied with Beijing leaders concerned by garbage disposal 
and urgently seeking a quick-fix solution (Interview Li Zhi-wei, June 27, 2016). 
As a result, local government leaders in Beijing and grass-roots state officials 
favored incineration at expense of other solid waste solutions. The Beijing government 
consequently provided insufficient funding and human power for the implementation of 
garbage classification and other solutions, and pro-incineration officials even fiercely 
resisted such measures. Li Zhi-wei, an official of the Beijing Municipal Commission, 
admitted that Beijing only implemented garbage classification starting in 2007 due to the 
upcoming Beijing Olympic Games. After the conclusion of Olympics in 2008, the Beijing 




classification in Beijing was weak, with only 10% of the garbage being classified 
(Interview Li Zhi-wei, June 27, 2016). 
Moreover, the political coalition of private and state-owned incineration 
corporations had an unintended consequence. Despite the intention of private incineration 
corporations to share BOT incinerator projects with SOEs, SOEs gained almost incinerator 
projects. In 2010, the Beijing government announced the Lugushan incineration project 
operated by Shougang Corporation (a local steel SOE), in lieu of the Liulitun incinerator 
which was suspended by anti-incinerator protests (Meng 2011).  In addition, although 
private incineration corporations pursued the Nangong incinerator project, there was a 
rumor that the Beijing government favored Beijing Huanwei Group (Interview Mai 
Cheng-feng, July 12, 2016). In 2016, as expected by the other incineration corporations, 
Beijing Huanwei Group was awarded the project. Ding Zong-han, a leader of Beijing 
Huanwei Group, said: 
Our advantage is that we provide comprehensive services in the urban sanitation 
field, including road cleaning, solid waste transportation, solid waste disposal, 
equipment production, facility operation, etc. …… We are ‘a dragon service’.10 
The Beijing government took this into consideration (Interview Ding Zong-han, 
June 16, 2016). 
 
10 “A dragon service” means that a company employs a vertical integration strategy which involves linking 




As a result, private incineration corporations, such as Sound Co., realized that the 
Beijing incineration market was monopolized by local Beijing SOEs, including Beijing 
Huanwei Group, Beijing Enterprises Group11, and Shougang Corporation. When other 
large cities that possessed local SOEs experienced similar problems, private incineration 
corporations became incentivized to open the second-tier and third-tier cities (this process 
was described in previous sections). 
The Roles of the Beijing Environmental Authority 
Throughout the disputes over the urban solid waste agenda after the 1990s, the 
Beijing Municipal Environmental Protection Bureau (Beijing Environmental Bureau), 
Beijing’s environmental authority, did not withdraw themselves, but rather got further 
involved in the decision-making process. In general, the Beijing Environmental Bureau 
played dual and conflicting roles in the urban solid waste agenda. The Beijing 
Environmental Bureau was responsible for supporting clean and environmental solid 
waste treatments, and incineration was one of the Beijing Environmental Bureau’s options. 
Yet, the Beijing Environmental Bureau was also in charge of monitoring solid waste 
facilities’ pollution. These institutional arrangements not only urged pro- and anti-
incineration groups to influence the Beijing Environmental Bureau’s policies, but also 
resulted in internal conflicts with the Beijing Environmental Bureau. Officials of Beijing 
Environmental Bureau were divided into two groups. The first group who believed that 
 
11 Beijing Enterprises Group merged with Beijing Green Energy Environment Co. to participate in the 




incineration was more environmental than other solid waste treatments, and allied with 
the pro-incineration group. The second group consisting of a few Beijing Environmental 
Bureau officials considered incineration’s pollution and supported the reinforcement of 
regulations on incinerators. 
Anti-incineration professors and ENGOs aligned with the incineration regulation 
strategy of the second group to expand their political coalition. In response to anti-
incineration professors and ENGOs’ actions, the pro-incineration group employed three 
main strategies. First, the pro-incineration group established a political coalition with 
Beijing government leaders and SOEs. Because the massive amounts of garbage in Beijing 
not being properly disposed of affected promotion prospects of government leaders, the 
pro-incineration group successfully convinced those leaders that incineration technology 
was the fastest solution to the solid waste problem. As a subordinate unit of the Beijing 
government, the Beijing Environmental Bureau faced pressure to deal with the concern of 
leaders regarding emergent garbage problems and ignore the threat of pollution from 
incinerators (Feng 2007). Moreover, local Beijing SOEs played an important role in 
promoting incinerators and had various close ties with the Beijing government. Thus, after 
2008, the Beijing Environmental Bureau was unable to implement environmental 
regulations since it would have damaged the interests of the local SOEs (Ma 2014). 
Second, the committees of experts of the Beijing Commission of Development and 
Reform and the Beijing Municipal Commission were important state structures that 
allowed incineration industry associations and leaders of incineration corporations to 




Beijing Municipal Commission determined Beijing’s urban waste policies, the Beijing 
Environmental Bureau’s implementation of environmental regulations came under 
pressure from these two departments. An official of Beijing Environmental Bureau stated 
that Beijing Environmental Bureau should consider the complete development of Beijing. 
Because incineration was able to address the current serious environmental crisis at the 
time – Beijing being besieged by garbage, Beijing Environmental Bureau was responsible 
for supporting the development of the incineration industry (Interview Xie Shun-wen, 
June 15, 2016). 
Third, the committees of experts of the Beijing Environmental Bureau were also 
an important state structure for pro-incineration groups to influence policies. Because the 
administrative reforms slashed personnel numbers, the capacities of the Beijing 
Environmental Bureau were reduced. Thus, they had to introduce external experts when 
the Beijing Environmental Bureau decided to promote incinerators. During this time, pro-
incineration officials and experts of the Beijing Environmental Bureau played an 
important role in reducing environmental regulations. For example, land acquisition was 
constituted one of the primary problems of incineration projects because there was a rule 
that stipulated that the distance between an incinerator and residential area had to be more 
than 1000 meters. Getting construction permits approved took incineration corporations a 
considerable amount of time, especially after the emergence of anti-incinerator groups. In 
Beijing, to get the Liulitun incinerator project approved, Beijing Environmental Bureau 
held a “Verification Meeting of Well-known Domestic Experts” to reduce the standard 




meeting invited an anti-incineration expert, Xie Shun-wen, his opposition to this change 
regarding the standard distance left the meeting in an undecided state (Mali 2010). Thus, 
the Beijing officials and pro-incineration experts lobbied the State Environmental 
Protection Administration to hold another expert meeting. Finally, State Environmental 
Protection Administration’s meeting with the experts passed the reduced standard distance 
and the new rule became a national standard. In addition, Beijing Environmental Bureau 
removed Xie Shun-wen’s name from lists of experts (Interview Xie Shun-wen, June 15, 
2016). 
 As a result, the pro-incineration strategy became Beijing Environmental Bureau’s 
policy. Beijing’s environmental authority became an active actor to support incinerators. 
Beijing Environmental Bureau was the first in line to advocate that incinerators were clean 
and non-polluting, and to claim that the decision-making processes of incinerators were 
in accordance with legal procedures, including environmental impact assessment 
processes. The political coalition between leaders of the Beijing government, officials of 
the Beijing Commission of Development and Reform and the Beijing Municipal 
Commission, and the incineration industry formed a policy to promote incinerators. This 
policy offered resources to support the building of incinerators and restricted any obstacles 
toward the development of the incineration industry within the administration. Although 
the Beijing government passed numerous environmental regulations on incinerators, they 
became entangled in a mass of political spin. Tao Qian, a leader of an ENGO, said, 
“Beijing Environmental Bureau passed these incineration regulations to propagate and 




because of Beijing Environmental Bureau’s monitoring. However, in reality, Beijing 
Environmental Bureau never implemented these regulations” (Interview Tao Qian, June 
8, 2016). 
The current incinerators’ operation demonstrated that Beijing Environmental 
Bureau’s passive monitoring created potential pollution threats and incineration 
corporations did not meet their environmental commitments. Although the Gaoantun 
incinerator had produced some stinky emissions, Beijing Environmental Bureau did not 
follow the regulations to disclose the emission data. The residents located near the 
Gaoantun incinerator engaged in several protests against environmental pollution (Zhang 
2009a). Moreover, Beijing Environmental Bureau did not focus on the disposed flying ash 
which was captured post-combustion from the Gaoantun incinerator. Flying ash contained 
heavy metals and dioxins which is a toxic carcinogen. According to Beijing’s incineration 
regulations, Beijing Environmental Bureau should strictly monitor the disposed flying ash 
contaminants. However, when the Gaoantun incinerator produced flying ash at a rate of 
12000 tons a year and Beijing’s capacity was only 9600 tons per year, Beijing 
Environmental Bureau did not take any action to prevent this pollution (Ding 2012). 
Because of cost considerations, the Gaoantun incinerator did not use new disposal 
technology to reduce the dioxin content in fly ash. Hence, under Beijing Environmental 
Bureau’s weak law enforcement, the Gaoantun incinerator is producing serious pollution, 
and other building incinerators may well have a similar situation, which will result in an 





ANTI-INCINERATOR PROTESTS IN BEIJING 
The rapid growth of incinerators stirred public doubts regarding the clean, odorless, 
and high-tech rhetoric that the government and incineration corporations promoted in 
relation to incineration. In 2006, nearly 30 years after the start of China’s market reforms, 
urban residents were becoming increasingly concerned with their health and the 
environmental issues, and moreover had the higher education necessary to locate 
information regarding incineration projects. Thus, after the announce of Beijing’s Liulitun 
incineration project, China experienced its first anti-incinerator protest (Tian 2008).12 The 
Beijing government’s plans for Beijing Municipal Solid Waste Treatment in the 11th Five-
Year Plan in 2007 included construction of three more incinerators (Gaoantun, Nangong, 
and Asuwei). In response, opposition campaigns spread from Liulitun to other local 
communities. These opposition campaigns were important because they succeeded in 
suspending the Liulitun and Asuwei projects and encouraged residents of other cities 
where incinerators were planned to take similar measures to protect themselves (Johnson 
2013a). 
The literature of the citizenship awareness model uses the above cases to conclude 
that anti-incinerator groups and ENGOs are capable of influencing policy and can obstruct 
or stop incinerator projects (Johnson 2010; Guo and Chen 2011; Chen 2012; Johnson 
2013b). However, evidence reveals only a few cases of successful resistance to proposed 
 
12 Although the Liulitun protest occurred in 2006, its effects on other dissents and policies occurred after 




incinerators, and many suspended incinerators subsequently resumed construction (Fu 
2014; Wang 2015). The citizenship awareness model cannot explain the lack of lasting 
successes achieved by anti-incinerator protest groups. Focused solely on analyzing 
ENGOs, and lacking a perspective that considers the roles of the state and other power 
groups in state agendas, industrial policies, and environmental regulations, the citizenship 
awareness model cannot fully reflect decision-making processes in China. 
This section traces the development of Beijing’s anti-incinerator campaign during 
2006–2012. During this period, two distinct stages of the anti-incinerator protest activity 
can be distinguished, respectively occurring before and after the global financial crisis. I 
demonstrate that the failure of the anti-incinerator protest groups to influence 
environmental policies resulted from historical variations in economic performance and 
neo-liberalism and their ability to access the state structures and establish political 
coalitions. Compared with the pro-incineration group, I elaborate on the weak ability of 
the anti-incinerator campaigns to access decision-making processes. 
Liulitun Anti-Incinerator Protests and the Market Reform 
After almost 30 years of market reform, China developed from a state-controlled 
socialist into an authoritarian state. Although the Chinese government remained its 
authoritarian control, the market reforms provided a historical condition that political 
social groups were able to pursue their interests. One kind of social groups were concerned 
with labor, environmental, and inequality issues. In this historical context, in 2006, the 
Liulitun anti-incinerator protest emerged when several Liulitun residents noticed that the 




an administrative district subordinate to the Beijing government. The Liulitun anti-
incinerator protest provided an excellent example of a protest against “locally unwanted 
land use” (LULU) (Johnson 2010). In such protests, residents concerned with the 
environmental and public health impacts of current or proposed industrial facilities 
employ diverse opposition tactics, including lobbying, protests, litigation, etc. 
The Liulitun anti-incinerator campaign realized two goals. First, the Liulitun anti-
incinerator campaign was successfully postponed the construction of the project. Liulitun 
residents focused on the environmental impact assessment (EIA) processes (Johnson 
2013b; Wang 2015), and found that the Beijing Environmental Bureau had not observed 
the legal requirement to conduct intensive environmental research and contract a public 
consultant as part of the EIA process. Using xinfang and shangfang (letters and visits) to 
claim infringement upon their rights and a protest outside of the offices of the central 
environmental authority, the State Environmental Protection Administration (Hou 2007; 
Wang 2015), the Liulitun anti-incinerator campaign attracted public attention from public 
opinion and even a response from the State Environmental Protection Administration. 
Eventually, on June 12th, 2007, the State Environmental Protection Administration 
announced that in response to the residents’ petition, the Liulitun incinerator should be 
suspended (Hou 2007; Tian 2008). 
Second, the Liulitun anti-incinerator protestors allied with anti-incineration 
experts and officials to influence Beijing Municipal Solid Waste Treatment in the 11th 
Five-Year Plan. Using the campaign against the Liulitun incinerator as leverage, anti-




last section, Beijing Municipal Solid Waste Treatment in the 11th Five-Year Plan was a 
compromise that tied incineration to other solutions to urban solid waste. 
In sum, neo-liberalism and marketization, the core ideas of the reform, were 
historical conditions that fostered both the expansion of the incineration industry as well 
as political spaces for other social actors. Shao Fan, an ENGO leader and important 
organizer of the anti-incinerator protests in Beijing, argued that, “Our political spaces were 
an outcome of the market reform. Without the reform, we could not get funding from 
international foundations and so conduct environmental actions” (Interview Shao Fan, 
June 20, 2016). In the historical conjunction of the economic stability that preceded the 
global financial crisis, the political coalition opposing of the Liulitun incinerator and anti-
incineration experts could mobilize politically to influence policies. 
Beijing Anti-incinerator Campaign after the Global Financial Crisis 
As I described in the last section, the global financial crisis resulted in the impact 
of the economic growth and the waning of neo-liberalism. This development was a 
historical variation to affect the agenda of pro-incineration group which involved SOEs 
promoting the incineration market. When the pro-incineration group attempted to advance 
their industry-wide agenda, the Asuwei anti-incinerator protest emerged. In this section, I 
will elaborate how the historical variation in the economic performance and neo-liberalism 
affected Asuwei anti-incinerator protest’s actions and ability to influence policies. 
The Asuwei anti-incinerator protest emerged in 2009 when the Changqing District 
government issued its “Announcement on the Beijing Asuwei Incinerator Construction 




Asuwei challenged the EIA followed by the Beijing Environmental Bureau, employed 
radical protests, and established an alliance with anti-incineration experts and officials. In 
response to the new wave of anti-incinerator protests, the pro-incineration group attacked 
the campaign as a selfish form of “Not in My Back Yard (NIMBY)” syndrome. 
In response to the attack by the pro-incineration group, Asuwei activists 
collaborated with ENGOs in Beijing which allied with other cities after the Liulitun protest. 
They formed a study group, which published a report titled, “Chinese City Environment’s 
Life-or-death Decision: Waste Incineration Policy and Public Intention.” The report 
suggested alternative treatment options for municipal solid waste and recommended 
garbage classification and recycling. This marked the first time that ENGOs and grassroots 
groups attempted to offer a comprehensive waste policy to compete with the agenda of 
government and incineration corporations (Beijing North Olympic Area Volunteer Study 
Team 2009). 
After several protests and displays of public support, the Beijing government 
halted the EIA process related to the Asuwei incinerator project in September 2009. The 
Asuwei residents and ENGOs treated the suspension of the Asuwei incinerator as another 
victorious anti-incinerator campaign (Johnson 2013b; Wang 2015). 
As anti-incinerator campaigns offered an alternative agenda and successfully 
convinced local governments to suspend numerous projects, a political atmosphere 
developed in which the central and local governments no long supported the pro-
incineration agenda. However, when economic growth resumed, the pro-incineration 




state agenda to once again support incineration. As described in the previous sections, 
under the historical condition that the influence of neo-liberalism declined, the pro-
incineration group allied with SOEs. Because local Beijing SOEs had diverse ties with the 
Beijing government, the pro-incineration group established the new state structures to 
access decision-making processes and political coalitions with key policy makers. 
In contrast, with waning of neo-liberalism, the anti-incineration group was unable 
to access the decision-making processes. First, the ability of anti-incineration actors to 
form political coalitions declined with the reinforcement of state control over civil society. 
Local anti-incinerator activists and ENGOs established the “China Zero Waste Alliance” 
after the successful Asuwei campaign, with the goal of recruiting diverse social actors and 
sharing relative campaign experiences. Although the China Zero Waste Alliance 
advocated for its alternative agenda in the public domain, its activities were limited by the 
Chinese government. Tao Qian observed that in recent years, the Chinese government 
reinforced restrictions on activities of various groups. The restrictions created difficulties 
for attempts to organize by individuals whose rights and interests were damaged by local 
governments or by special interest groups collaborating with government (Interview Tao 
Qian, June 8, 2016). However, previous chapters have illuminated retired officials going 
into business and industry associations played a role in gathering information from the 
market and transmitting the common demands of the industries to the government. They 
further established relationships between the pro-industrial officials and industries. As a 
result, under conditions that did not challenge the Chinese Communist Party’s rule, 




Therefore, anti-incinerator groups faced challenges in establishing effective 
political coalitions.  With limited resources and political conditions, the China Zero Waste 
Alliance was unable to establish political-legal arrangements to influence officials and 
experts. The alliance had to exhibit a collaborative attitude towards the government and 
avoid radical campaign strategies. Moreover, Tao Qian, a founder of the China Zero Waste 
Alliance, said that the China Zero Waste Alliance experienced several instances of 
harassment by unknown state authorities, as well as by the national security department 
(Interview Tao Qian, June 8, 2016). Tao Qian explained, “In recent years, we have reduced 
our radical actions in response to state harassment. Without strong protests, it is impossible 
to challenge solid waste policies” (Interview Tao Qian, June 8, 2016). 
Second, compared to the pro-incineration group, which used incineration industry 
associations and SOEs’ government ties to create new state structures, the anti-incinerator 
group merely had private and informal relationships with a few Beijing Environmental 
Bureau officials. Although these informal relationships helped the anti-incinerator group 
understand regarding the government’s attitude towards solid waste policies, their effect 
was limited. Such informal relationships did not allow for participation in decision-making 
processes. Tao Qian said, “Without accessing decision-making processes, the China Zero 
Waste Alliance faced a challenge in obtaining precise information from departments and 
then employing a new strategy to protest against pro-incineration policies” (Interview Tao 
Qian, June 8, 2016). 
In contrast, by utilizing various committees of experts, industrial associations, and 




establish intensive and extensive relationships with various leaders within the Beijing 
government. For example, An E20 leader said, “E20’s director and president are experts 
of the Beijing Commission of Development and Reform and the Beijing Municipal 
Commission. They represent incineration corporations in dealings with the Beijing 
government and emphasize the importance of incineration technology” (Interview Qin Ya-
ling, June 17, 2016). These ties were political-legal arrangements embedded within 
decision-making processes. These political-legal arrangements were vital in framing 
incineration as the optimal solution and convinced the Beijing government to neglect 
garbage classification. 
Third, anti-incinerator groups failed to identify changes in the influence of neo-
liberalism on solid waste policies. After 2008, anti-incinerator groups continued to employ 
strategies similar to those used before the recommencement of the Asuwei incinerator. 
Shao Fan stated that, “in my opinion, I think the Chinese Communist Party had abandoned 
neo-liberalism after 2008……. However, Chinese environmental groups could not reach 
a consensus. We could not discuss China and the world’s situation. We did not know how 
the marketization reforms contributed to BOT or how feed-in tariff policies emerged; 
hence, we could not actually know how the marketization supported the incineration 
industry. We only focused on a single campaign’s tactics. We rarely discussed a broader 
political strategy” (Interview Shao Fan, June 20, 2016). 
As a result, when the strategies of the anti-incinerator groups met failure after the 
Asuwei campaign, pro-incineration groups could use diverse political-legal arrangements, 




despite the claims of the citizenship awareness model, anti-incinerator campaigns failed 
to reverse urban solid waste policies, and merely temporarily disrupted incinerator 
construction. By 2010, following successfully lobbying by the pro-incineration group, the 
Beijing government announced the continuation of the incineration plans laid out in 
Beijing Municipal Solid Waste Treatment in the 11th Five-Year Plan. Consequently, 
design work started on the Nangong incinerator and Shougang Corporation, a steel SOE, 
was offered the opportunity to construct a new incinerator at Lugushan, in lieu of the 
suspended Liulitun incineration project. As the Nangong and Lugushan incineration 
projects were located in rural and poor areas, there emerged a fresh wave of accusations 
that the anti-incineration campaign did not offer a viable solution to the solid waste 
problem, but merely produced environmental inequality (Meng 2011). Moreover, in 2013, 
the Beijing government passed “The Three-year Plan for the Construction of Municipal 
Solid Waste Treatment Facilities in Beijing”, which announced the number of incinerators 
in Beijing would increase to 10 (Beijing Municipal Committee of the City 2013). 
Following this announcement, in 2014, the Beijing government further announced that the 
Asuwei incineration project would be restarted to deal with serious solid waste problems 
and the failure of alternative policy solutions such as garbage classification and recycling 
(Fu 2014). 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I examined the policy formation processes in the incineration 
industry after 2008, and the emergence of anti-incinerator campaigns. The results support 




First, in this period, two important policies were passed: the incineration 
development agenda in the 12th Five-Year Plan and the new nationwide feed-in tariff. 
Environmental authoritarianism would suggest that the Chinese government determined 
the policy formation processes. However, I have demonstrated that the global financial 
crisis impacted profits among SOEs and private corporations. In addition, although the 
economic stimulus plan averted the economic depression, its tendency to threaten BOT 
projects created conflict between SOEs and private corporations. Under the historical 
condition that the neo-liberal ideology was in doubt, private incineration corporations did 
not reenact privatization policies, but rather aligned with SOEs. Furthermore, newly 
emerged incineration associations established a political coalition and leveraged their 
relationships with relevant state officials to protect incineration interests. As a result, these 
two policies reduced intra-industry conflicts and expanded the incineration market. 
Second, the development of incineration in Beijing showed that incineration 
corporations could leverage state structures and political coalitions to influence policies. 
Specifically, they successfully constrained the environmental authorities. 
Third, using rhetoric that capitalized on the social conflicts and corruption 
produced by privatization as well as the global financial crisis, the anti-reform group 
criticized neo-liberalism and the reform. As Polanyi argued (Polanyi 2001[1944]), the 
crisis triggered certain anti-market social protection measures. SOEs, and most especially 
local SOEs, enjoyed legitimacy in pursuing the incineration market. “Advance of the state, 
retreat of the private sector” became an obvious trend, especially in the first-tier cities. 




The Chinese incineration market was reorganized by profit-seeking SOEs and pro-
incineration officials, with both groups significant incentivized to create more incineration 
projects. Being familiar with the administration, these SOEs could effectively utilize the 
state structure to realize their goals and in the process constrained environmental 
regulations. When local SOEs monopolized the incineration market in the first-tier cities, 
private corporations had a unique incentive to exploit the market in the second and third-
tier cities. 
Finally, some support exists for the citizenship awareness model, but only in the 
short-term. The above evidence supports the organizational-political economy perspective 
to demonstrate that linking state structures and political coalitions affected the success of 
anti-incinerator campaigns. The campaigns could suspend incinerators through organized 
protests. However, these campaigns could not challenge the incineration developmental 
agenda, which was shaped by the pro-incineration group that composed of officials, SOEs, 






Overall, this study supports the organizational-political economy perspective and 
explains changes in environmental policies that effected the expansion of the Chinese 
incineration industry from 1989–2012. Central to this perspective is the identification of 
historical conditions that affect how the state and social actors influence policy. I analyzed 
the historical processes of the three periods: (1) after the Tiananmen Square protests 
(1989–1997), (2) after the Asian financial crisis (1997–2007), and (3) after the global 
financial crisis (2008–2012). The analysis focuses on how the organizational-political 
economy affected policy formation processes. Specifically, I examine the effects of 
historical conditions, state structures, political coalitions, and neo-liberal ideology on the 
policy formation process. 
CHANGES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN CHINA 
Historical Conditions 
This analysis supports the proposition that changes in economic performance 
created historical conditions that social actors adopt varied strategies to advance their 
preferred environmental policies. The policy influence of social actors is not static. During 
crises, when existing environmental policies that support economic growth are clearly 
unsustainable, corporations align with the bailout agenda of the state. Later, if the bailout 
agenda cannot solve crises, the state and social actors attempt to provide another general 
agendas. If the bailout agenda restore economic stability, social actors with diverse 




During the Tiananmen Square protests, most leaders of the Chinese Communist 
Party decided to repress. Although this decision forced the discontented social actors to 
support the government and recused the regime, it produced other political and economic 
problems. The international isolation of the People’s Republic of China and associated 
legitimacy crisis caused a debate whether China should continue further the market 
reforms. Although the pro-reform and anti-reform groups had serious conflicts during the 
debate, they supported an environmental diplomacy strategy to break out the international 
isolation. After the market reforms were re-ensured in 1992 and the political and economic 
crisis was resolved, conflict between the pro-reform and anti-reform groups emerged from 
the pro-marketization environmental policies promoted by international institutions 
Eventually, the pro-reform group released two crucial project documents that promoted 
the privatization of public utilities under the BOT model “China’s Agenda 21,” and the 
“China Environmental Strategy Paper.” This BOT policy transformed urban utilities, such 
as garbage disposal, from state functions into marketplaces with space for economic 
growth. Private incineration corporations explicitly designed to pursue profit were 
established in this nascent period. 
Moreover, both the Asian financial crisis of 1998 and the global financial crisis of 
2008 urged a state-funded stimulus agenda that enjoyed corporate support. When the 
economy recovered, private corporations pursued their own agendas to expand BOT 
policies and redefine nationwide feed-in tariff policies. Firstly, during the Asian financial 
crisis of 1998, extensive corporate losses compelled the central government to fund 




domestic demand and ensured the survival of numerous corporations. However, the 
bailouts also threatened to derail privatization projects, including those involving BOT 
incinerators, causing advocates for the private incineration industry to push for more local 
BOT pilot projects as well as for central government intervention to mandate BOT at the 
national level. After the global financial crisis of 2008, those advocates forged new 
alliances with SOEs to influence the urban construction section of the 12th Five-Year Plan. 
Such actions helped the private incineration industry deal with financial losses arising 
from the global crisis. 
Secondly, in a separate political arena, under the impacts of the crises mentioned 
previously, power corporations initially supported the bailout policies intended to solve 
the problem of power surplus. However, when the bailout policies only benefited the State 
Power Corporation, reformist officials and the renewable energy industry, chiefly 
represented by the Ertan Hydropower Development Corporation, cooperated to advance 
market reform. Specifically, they broke the State Power Corporation into numerous 
localized power generation and power-grid companies, thus allowing the renewable 
electricity generators to carve out a market space for themselves and promote the 
introduction of a new feed-in tariff policy. The renewable energy law that introduced the 
feed-in tariff policy made garbage incinerators eligible for state subsidies for renewable 
energy promotion. Later, in response to the global financial crisis of 2008, private 
incineration corporations and SOEs supported bailout policies. Although bailouts rescued 
the economy, the primary beneficiaries were SOEs. Consequently, private incineration 




inadequate to promote pro-marketization environmental policies. Eventually, the alliance 
of private incineration corporations and SOEs mobilized politically to revise the feed-in 
tariff policy and successfully shifted the burden of funding incinerators from local 
governments to the central government. The “Policies on Improving Household Waste 
Incineration Prices” issued by the National Development and Reform Commission 
solidified this gain and ensured the future construction and operation of garbage 
incinerators. 
State Structures 
This study demonstrates that variation in state structures affects the ability of social 
actors to influence environmental policies. The state is an organization with broad and 
diverse authorities that are influenced by powerful groups in society (Prechel 1990). As 
argued by Weber in relation to bureaucratic structures, fostering market operation creates 
demands changes in state structures to produce rational and efficient policies. The state 
extends its authority to encompass more social and economic activities to collect market 
information, recruit capitalists’ opinions, and finally produce practical and reasonable 
policy. In this way, changes in the state structures neither exclude the influence on policies 
of special interest groups nor increase state autonomy. Rather such changes provide 
powerful social actors with institutional channels to access decision-making processes. 
In the case of China, the Chinese government promoted the market economy 
through numerous waves of administrative reforms. Social actors were able to influence 
policies throughout the three periods examined in this study largely because the Chinese 




previous chapters, the hallmark policy measure of the market reform was to reduce the 
workforces, responsibilities, and decision-making capacities of government agencies. The 
reform shifted responsibilities from these downsized agencies to newly-created SOEs, 
some of which would eventually be privatized. This process saw a large transfer of 
government personnel, including senior officials, to the private- or state-owned enterprises. 
The result was that many managers of corporations or trade associations in the incineration 
industry came to be former government officials responsible for regulating that industry. 
With downsized workforces, state agencies faced increasing challenges in information 
collection, technical expertise, and other capacities necessary to their proper functioning. 
Industry leaders, who happened to be retired senior officials from these downsized 
agencies, were perfectly situated to assist their previous employers. In many instances, 
government agencies created formal institutions (e.g., committees of experts) to recruit 
industry leaders to help government agencies write policies to benefit their industries. 
International institutions (i.e., the UN and the World Bank) also fostered changes 
in the state structures that favored privatized industries such as the incineration industry, 
especially during the earlier period examined in this study. To meet requirements imposed 
by these international institutions for provision of financial and technical assistance, the 
Chinese government had to create new administrative departments under the tutelage of 
World Bank and the UN programs. Officials in these new departments then received 
training and regular policy advice from the international institutions. Projects needing high 
capital and technical input, such as incinerators constructed in the earlier decades of 




directives and pilot projects were passed in 1995, and how the first Beijing incineration 
project, the Gaoantun incinerator, was built in 1997. 
Political Coalitions 
This study further demonstrates that diverse organizational-political coalitions 
mobilize different actors and engage in political actions to influence policies. The issue of 
political coalitions is important because it relates to the ability of social actors to 
collaborate with other actors to pursue common interests. Industry political coalitions can 
be established through the efforts of diverse organizations to utilize resources and employ 
collect activities. Powerful organizations (e.g., international institutions, MNCs, or big 
businesses) can utilize resources to establish alliances with other actors. Cross-firm 
organizations (e.g., industrial associations) provide corporations and other social actors 
with diverse collective activities that can be used for conflict mitigation. 
In 1989–1997, MNCs and international institutions created the incineration 
industry by forging a coalition with reformist officials. In response to political pressure 
from opponents of reform, the reformist officials took advantage of the requirements of 
the World Bank and UN programs as well as associated technical assistance, in addition 
to investment from multinational corporations. This political coalition promoted China’s 
Agenda 21 and the China Environmental Strategy Paper, which formulated by a series of 
pro-market environmental policies. Finally, two BOT legal frameworks were passed in 





After the Asian financial crisis of 1998, the creation of industry associations for 
the nascent incineration industry provided vital organizational platforms through which 
industrial experts, officials, academics, and corporate leaders could exchange information, 
create personal ties, and promote policies. Moreover, after the global financial crisis of 
2008, a decrease in BOT projects and SOE investments in the incineration market 
intensified competition among the private incineration companies and SOEs. At this 
juncture, industry associations mediated conflicts of interest inside the business, and 
joined with SOEs and other powerful actors for further investment and favorable policies. 
These policies helped the incineration industry to ride out the crisis and thrive. 
Neo-liberal Ideology 
The analysis shows that the waxing and waning popularity of neo-liberal ideology 
shaped the political spaces of diverse social actors and so affected their ability to influence 
environmental policies. This factor of ideological popularity determines: (1) whether 
social actors can gain legitimacy through using neo-liberal discourses to present their 
respective agendas, and (2) whether social actors can offer alternative agendas to promote 
their interests. Initially, the pro-incineration group capitalized on the prevalence of neo-
liberalism to build support for the creation of the private incineration industry. When neo-
liberal ideology attracted heavy criticism following the global financial crisis of 2008, the 
pro-incineration group altered its strategy to align with SOEs. By changing its strategy to 
match the changing ideological landscape, the incineration industry has won victories in 




liberal reforms, and then presenting incineration as a solution to the urban garbage 
problem. 
Between 1989 and 2007 neo-liberalism served as the dominant ideology of China’s 
economic reform. Utilizing neo-liberal discourses, the pro-reform group gained legitimacy 
to promote the marketization of environmental policies. After 1989, the neo-liberal 
sustainable development agenda was successfully co-opted by reformists to promote 
privately-owned environmental corporations, including incineration corporations. 
Examples of this success included privatization of public utilities investment through the 
BOT scheme and the breaking up of the State Power Corporation’s monopoly. In this 
atmosphere of political dueling between the pro-reform group in the state and their 
opponents, the Chinese incineration industry was created, with a seemingly ever-
expanding market for economic growth. 
Chinese critics of neo-liberalism failed to change the direction of the pro-market 
state policy during the first two period examined in this study. However, they succeeded 
during the third period, when neo-liberalism was blamed for the global financial crisis of 
2008. In a political atmosphere in which it was assumed that unregulated market had 
created the crisis, there were suggestions that SOEs could outperform ill-disciplined 
private companies engaged in constant negative competition with one another. SOEs 
exploited this anti-neo-liberalist rhetoric to expand their businesses, including in the 
incineration industry. Private incineration corporations had difficulty using neo-liberal 
discourses to constrain this expansion of SOEs. Instead, the response of private 




they yielded lucrative markets in first-tier cities (i.e., Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, 
Chongqing, and Tianjin) to the SOEs, while retaining lesser markets for themselves. 
Together with their new allies, business leaders in the Chinese incineration industry also 
successfully shifted financial burden associated with the construction and operation of 
incinerators from the local governments to the central government in the 12th Five-Year 
Plan and the revised feed-in tariff rules. 
As the incineration business began to thrive throughout China after 2005, 
environmentalists raised alarms regarding the associated toxic air pollution. Although 
anti-incinerator groups launched several successful campaigns to suspend incinerator 
construction, they failed to effectively oppose to pro-incineration urban waste policies. 
Central to this failure was the association with changes in neo-liberal influences. 
Environmental advocacy groups owed much of their freedom to laxer political atmosphere 
during the years of China’s greatest economic prosperity, which in turn was widely 
attributed to neo-liberal market reforms. In the absence of an examination of changes in 
neo-liberalism, which would inevitably include a critique of the market economy, anti-
incinerator groups have had difficulty making gains. In Beijing, for example, while anti-
incineration groups had successfully delayed several incinerator construction projects, the 
incineration industry had simultaneously defined a new developmental agenda to open up 
even more projects. Based on their realization of the decline of neo-liberalism, they allied 







State-centered vs. Society-centered Theory 
After the market reform in 1979, some environmental sociological studies on 
China began to debate whether the state maintained its capacity to develop and implement 
environmental policies. Drawing on the central tenets of society-centered theories, the 
citizenship awareness model argues that ENGOs can influence policies as the control of 
an authoritarian regime fades. In contrast, environmental authoritarianism draws upon 
state-centered theories to suggest that the state determines the transformation of 
environmental policies. However, neither model can transcend the fundamental 
weaknesses of both state-centered and society-centered theories. Both models fail to 
examine the variance over time in how diverse actors affect policy formation processes. 
As a result, neither model can effectively explain the complex developmental processes 
related to the Chinese incineration industry. 
Environmental Authoritarianism 
Research on environmental authoritarianism points out that through the 
establishment of top-down decision-making structures, the Chinese state maintains its 
ability to determine environmental policies. State managers used these structures to limit 
participation in environmental governance work to professional and neutral officials, 
scientists and technocrats. This exclusion of social interest-based interference in policy 
formation processes allows the state to offer more practical and efficient policy (Gilley 




However, environmental authoritarianism is limited in its ability to portray the 
capacity of social actors within these state structures. The present study has demonstrated 
that changes in state structures to fit the developing market economy did not ensure state 
autonomy. For example, when the Chinese government responded to economic crises with 
bailout policies, reformists and corporations mobilized politically to redefine state agendas. 
This occurred in three ways. First, because the political and economic crises constrained 
economic growth, reformists and corporations mobilized politically to advance preferred 
policies. Second, the market reform reinforced corporate power and resources, increasing 
the veto power of corporations over the state, and the ability of corporations to ally with 
state managers. Third, changes in the state structures provided corporations with channels 
for policy influence. Downsized state departments faced increased challenges in 
information collection, technical expertise, and other capacities necessary to promote the 
market operations. Leaders in the incineration industry, being familiar with the market and 
incineration technology, therefore were recruited to assist these departments. The result 
was that the state structures became a political-legal apparatus through which industry 
leaders could pursue their interests. 
Environmental authoritarianism also fails to adequately explain internal conflicts 
involving state departments. Studies of environmental authoritarianism have suggested 
that such internal conflicts arose from territorial overlap in the jurisdictions of different 
departments. Environmental authoritarianism also states that the solution to internal 




(2) state managers having knowledge and information that allow them to negotiate with 
each other (Moore 2014). 
This research demonstrated that internal conflicts involving state agencies result 
from social actors engaging in political activity that targets these agencies. After 
experiencing a downsizing owing to the administrative reforms, the Chinese government 
reacted to a personnel shortage by changing the state structures to recruit social actors to 
participate in decision-making processes. Specifically, the pro-reform group forged a 
political coalition with reformist officials that contributed to conflict with state 
departments between forces opposed to and supportive of further market reforms. 
Similarly, the debate over garbage disposal solutions involving different agencies of the 
Beijing government lay in the political influences on those agencies of pro- and anti-
incineration groups which attempted to fulfill their solid waste agendas. 
This research also discovered that the state mediates inter-departmental conflict by 
collaborating with social actors. Between 1989 and 2007, pro-reform officials confronted 
resistance from several state agencies to a set of pro-market environmental policies. Pro-
reform officials therefore exploited requirements of international institutions, consultation 
with private BOT corporations, and support from industry associations. Finally, pro-
reform officials transcended opposition and passed a set of BOT policies that created a 
boom for incineration corporations. 
Citizenship Awareness Model 
The limitations of the citizenship awareness model are rooted in its inability to 




that underlie environmental policies. Studies of the citizenship awareness model have 
addressed the emergence of anti-incinerator campaigns and their effects on municipal 
solid waste policies. These studies generally concluded that the success of these 
campaigns in suspending incinerator projects represented the ability of social civil groups 
to influence municipal solid waste policies (Johnson 2010; Guo and Chen 2011; Chen 
2012; Johnson 2013b). 
However, this research has demonstrated that the theoretical framework of 
citizenship awareness model is too narrow to include the effects of other actors on 
municipal solid waste policies. Using the organizational-political economy perspective, 
this study does not completely reject the influence of anti-incinerator campaigns, but 
focuses instead on the imbalance in political power between corporations and 
environmental organizations. The political-legal arrangements allowed pro-incineration 
members to connect the state structures, establish efficient political coalitions, and utilize 
neo-liberal discourses. These political-legal arrangements limited the capacity of the anti-
incinerator groups to influence decision-making processes and challenge the incineration 
developmental agenda. 
The Creation and Operation of the Incineration Market 
This research supports the organizational-political economy perspective that 
market creation cannot be separated from politics. In contrast to neo-liberalism’s claim 
that markets are self-regulating and independent of the state, this study found that the 
incineration market was created by the collective political actions of social actors through 




international institutions to promote further market reforms. The hallmark policy measure 
of the reform was to privatize public utilities. Taking advantage of international 
institutions and MNCs, the pro-reform group fulfilled a set of policies that transformed 
public utilities from state functions into market-orientated enterprises. BOT, a fee-
collecting system, and financing rules were created to support incineration corporations to 
make loans and collect fees. The incineration market in China emerged not from the 
business behavior of incineration corporations, but rather from political actions and 
administrative reforms enacted by diverse power groups. 
My analysis also provides limited evidence to support the industrial environmental 
management model’s claim that markets can encourage corporations to increase efficiency 
and enact private environmental regulations. As members of an industry involved in 
environmental management, incineration corporations claimed that they established strict 
private regulations, followed environmental norms, and provided an example for other 
sectors. The Chinese incineration industry should be a perfect case to prove the 
explanatory power of the industrial environmental management model. However, instead 
of living up to their environmental commitments, incineration corporations established 
and operated numerous polluting incinerators. From the organizational-political economy 
perspective, this study explored three reasons why incineration corporations violated their 
commitments. First, like corporations in all industries, incineration corporations were 
concerned with issues related to their survival, such as market expansion and subsidy 
policies. Especially after the Asia financial crisis of 1998 and the global financial crisis of 




Environmental commitments therefore became part of the rhetoric they used to legitimize 
their political actions and influence policies. 
Second, although incineration corporations successfully established BOT and 
feed-in tariff policies to expand the market, these policies had an unintended consequence: 
substantial investments intensified already severe competition in the incineration market 
and contributed to a situation of cutthroat competition. To win BOT project bids, 
corporations cut garbage disposal fees, paid by the local governments. In 2016, garbage 
disposal fees hit a record low of US$3 per ton. 1  As the incomes of incineration 
corporations decreased, they became reluctant to increase their investments in pollution 
prevention technology. 
Third, incineration corporations aligned with local government leaders concerned 
with garbage disposal issues. Under pressure from these leaders, local environmental 
authorities supported incineration projects, refrained from implementing regulations, and 
ignored incinerator pollution. The result was to motivate incineration corporations to delay 
pollution reduction measures. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The Beijing case study could not provide a comparative analysis of changes in the 
municipal solid waste policies of diverse cities and countries. Although this study traced 
 
1  In developed countries, garbage incineration fees are US$34-113 per ton. The China Environment 
Chamber of Commerce calculated that a reasonable garbage incineration fee in the Chinese context would 




historical processes to identify and examine causal factors behind social changes, an 
appropriate comparative analysis is necessary to reach conclusions regarding the 
theoretical importance of similarities or differences among cases. For example, my 
research demonstrates that historical conditions, state structures, political coalitions, and 
neo-liberalism affected environmental policies within the central and Beijing governments. 
Without a comparative analysis, there is a problem of generalizability to ensure that the 
above causal factors can explain other cities and countries’ incineration development. 
Additionally, this study only partly analyze the role of the Chinese Communist Party in 
environmental policy formation. As many scholars of China have argued, China remains 
a one-party state, and the Chinese Communist Party continues to wield power in policy 
determination (Guo 2013; Saich 2016). Furthermore, members of the Chinese Communist 
Party hold the most authoritative positions, even at the grassroots levels, to directly and 
indirectly control the entire social structure. Without comprehensively and theoretically 
analyzing the party’s various roles, any conclusions regarding whether the state or the 
society ultimately determines polices may be biased. However, the opaque nature of the 
inner workings of the party makes it difficult to gather credible information on this area 
simply by interviewing participants during fieldwork. 
Moreover, although this study found that much of the investment in the 
incineration business occurs through holding companies, I did not examine the political 
effects of these companies. Corporate forms are important because organizational 
structures determine the abilities of organizations to gather information, make decisions, 




SOEs and private corporations evolved into holding companies after 2008, their ownership 
became more diversified and subsidiaries were established with jointly ownership by 
SOEs and private corporations. This development means that the traditional methods for 
distinguishing SOEs and private corporations (and examining their political actions) may 
be biased. 
Finally, this study was unable to theorize about anti-incinerator movements. It 
examined the reasons behind the emergence, development, and decline of the policy 
influence of anti-incinerator campaigns. Although these reasons provide new insights into 
the development of a social movement and the interactions of that movement with the 
state and other social actors, it is unclear whether the study findings can supplement or 
replace other social movement theories. For example, in recent years, social movement 
scholars have attempted to address the shortcomings of political opportunity theory. They 
have argued that political opportunities are not an objective existence but instead comprise 
social processes that are recognized or even produced through interactions among social 
actors (Jasper 2012). My research contended that the constraints of state structures, 
political coalitions, and neo-liberalism impacted the abilities of anti-incinerator groups to 
influence municipal solid waste policies. There is no attempt to analyze the removal of 
these constraints as political opportunities and to analyze how the removal occurs. 
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several ways to extend this research’s findings. First, a comparative 
historical analysis of other industries, cities and countries can compare similarities or 




reliable causal factors and enhance this study’s explanatory power and generalizability. 
For example, similar to the Chinese incineration industry, other industries also 
experienced the market reform practices. Future comparative historical analysis for other 
industries can identify MNCs, international institutions, domestic private corporations, 
and reformist officials’ roles in policies. If my four interrelated propositions (involving 
historical conditions, the state structures, political coalitions, and neo-liberal ideology) can 
explain their influences, the comparative analysis is able to enhance this study’s 
generalizability. 
Furthermore, the incineration development in democratic countries may have 
different outcomes. For example, India, South Korea, and Taiwan are democratic 
countries. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, they were enthusiastic towards the 
incineration industry influenced by the promotional activities of international institutions 
and MNCs. The emergence of ENGOs has suspended the continuous expansion of 
incinerator construction in these countries after 2000. A comparative historical analysis of 
these countries can reexamine explanatory power of other three prevailing models and the 
organizational-political economy perspective. When historical variations in historical 
conditions, the state structures, political coalitions, and neo-liberal ideology affect these 
countries’ incineration usage, this comparative analysis can strengthen my study’s 
generalizability 
Second, follow-up research with participant observation methods would gain trust 
of interviewees and organizations to collect more reliable data. This approach can 




possible for deeper insight into operations of holding companies and Chinese Communist 
Party’s rules in decision-making processes. 
Third, future research can apply the organizational-political economy perspective 
to track social movement groups’ efforts to influence policies. The research can identify 
the relationships between my four interrelated propositions and policy outcomes. For 
example, the researchers can examine ENGOs’ political mobilization to access state 
structures and establish political coalitions. If the mobilization contributes towards a 
significant influence on policies, it is possible to conceptualize state structures and 
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name, occupation, previous employment, and interview date. To meet the IRB’s 




Interview Date Name Institution 
Previous 
Employment 






June 27, 2016 Li Zhi-wei Beijing Municipal 
Commission 
 
June 27, 2016 Qin Zhi-hong Beijing Municipal 
Commission 
 












Interview Date Name Institution 
Previous 
Employment 












July 8, 2016 Wan Jia-ming Everbright  
July 8, 2016 Yang Qi-xu 
Beijing Enterprises 
Group 
A member of 
Beijing anti-
incinerator group 
July 9, 2016 Zheng Zhen-xiang Everbright  
 
 
C. Private Corporations 
Interview Date Name Institution 
Previous 
Employment 





July 7, 2016 Shen Jia-zheng Sinolink Securities  
July 11, 2016 Zou Zhao-an Sound Co.  






D. Industry Associations 
Interview Date Name Institution 
Previous 
Employment 
June 17, 2016 Qin Ya-ling E20  














June 29, 2016 Wang An-pei 









June 30, 2016 Zhu Guo-an E20 SOE 







E.  Academic Institutions 
Interview Date Name Institution 
Previous 
Employment 























F.  ENGOs 
Interview Date Name Institution 
Previous 
Employment 
June 3, 2016 Feng Qi-xu Rock Environment 
& Energy Institute 
China Zero Waste 
Alliance 
June 26, 2016 Tao Qian China Zero Waste 
Alliance 
 
June 20, 2016 Shao Fan Friends of Nature  
 
G. Media 
Interview Date Name Institution 
Previous 
Employment 
May 29, 2016 Yuan Xiang-xuan Energy  
May 31, 2016 Su Jian-hong 
China Inspection 
and Quarantine 
Times 
 
 
 
